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A brainstorming seminar on public risk perception was 
organized at the National Institute of Advanced Studies on 29th 
and 30th September 2011. The aim was to explore the possibility 
of bridging the gap in communication between the public and 
the technocrats on a variety of topics such as use or abuse of 
alcohol, cell phones, genetically modified (GM) crops, climate 
change and nuclear energy.  
Introducing the theme of the seminar, Prof. V S 
Ramamurthy, the Director, NIAS pointed out that the media 
has a major role in shaping public risk perception and 
acceptance. The crux of the matter of risk acceptance is the 
issue of who decides what risks are to be taken especially in the 
public arena. Should it be the specialist who has the technical 
knowledge or the layperson who is the actual stakeholder? 
In the public arena, we have witnessed waves of anxiety and 
sometimes even pandemics, when it comes to issues of risk like 
nuclear decisions or epidemics like H1N1, SARS etc. If there 
is public anxiety, it means that nothing was done to remove 
it. It means that the specialist has not communicated the right 
information to the lay people. What is significant is that risk 
response is something yet to be understood and this is due 
to a cluster of factors including sociological and cultural. Yet 
at the end however, risk acceptance by individuals is highly 
personal.
x 
The seminar had three sessions followed by discussion and 
a panel discussion. The first session provided the background 
to public risk perception and psychosocial aspects of risk 
perception. Prof. Sangeetha Menon proposed that desire, fear, 
insecurity played a major role in our choice and decision making 
regarding risk experience. Prof. Malavika Kapur focused on the 
conscious and unconscious psychological processes that mediate 
the risk perception at individual and at social levels.  Dr. M G 
Narasimhan analyzed the nature of risk communication, risk 
perception and risk management.
The second session focused on specific risk and public risk 
perception regarding these risks. Prof. Vivek Benegal spoke on 
alcohol use/abuse and highlighted that despite the public health 
risk alcohol posed, it was not associated with fear as with life 
threatening diseases like cancer, as it is thought to be voluntary. 
He also highlighted the role of brain in risk perception. As 
discussed by Prof. SenGupta and Dr Vani Sanosh, cell phone 
use remained a risk of unknown quality without substantive 
research. The other three topics namely GM Crops, Climate 
Change and Nuclear Energy were much on the public domain 
and provided platform for polarized opinions. In the Indian 
context, Prof. Mahadevappa held GM crops to be beneficial 
and negative impacts were entirely due to systems failures. On 
the other hand Mr. Nagesh Hedge had series of examples to 
contrary to the claims of safety of GM technology. Prof. Dilip 
Ahuja and Dr Ravi Srinivas spoke on Climate change and 
carbon sequestration and pointed to the fact that climate change 
did not receive the attention it deserved. Prof. Parthasarathy 
highlighted the safety of nuclear safeguards, while Prof. Atul 
Choksi focused on the fallibility and uncertainty of expert 
opinions and role of vested interests in the decision making. 
The third session was a panel discussion on nuclear energy 
moderated by Prof. R Rajaraman. The debate highlighted the 
lack of consensus among the experts, communication gap 
between the experts and the public and failure to recognize 
the public as equal partners. The brainstorming seminar at 
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NIAS aims at evolving strategies for bridging the gaps in risk 
perception, risk communication, and risk management between 
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intRoduction: PeRcePtion and 
accePtance of Public Risks
V S  Ramamurthy
National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore 560 012
Let me start with some recent newspaper headlines which I 
found somewhat disturbing. 
i. Public agitation against the Kudankulam nuclear power 
project
ii.  National moratorium on Bt Brinjal 
iii. Inter-state controversy over the Mullaperiyar Dam
The Nuclear Power Corp. of India is building two 
1,000-megawatt nuclear power plants on Tamil Nadu coast 
at a cost more than Rs.10000 crores. The plants have been 
under construction for nearly a decade and are almost ready 
for commissioning. Suddenly, there is a public uproar against 
the safety of the plants, presumably in the backdrop of the 
Fukushima nuclear event, with a demand that the project be 
scrapped. Repeated assurances by the experts do not seem to 
be convincing the agitators. That this country can not afford 
to say NO to nuclear power is also not convincing to the 
agitators.
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The Bt brinjal is a suite of transgenic brinjals created by 
inserting a crystal protein gene from the soil bacterium, Bacillus 
thuringiensis, into the genome of brinjal cultivars. The Bt brinjal 
has been developed to give resistance against specific insects, 
in particular the Brinjal Fruit and Shoot Borer.  The Bt brinjal 
was approved for commercialization in India in 2009, but after a 
public outcry, the Indian government applied a moratorium on 
its release.
The Mullaperiyar Dam is a masonry gravity dam on the 
Periyar River in Kerala. The dam was constructed between 1887 
and 1895 by the British Government to divert water eastwards to 
Madras Presidency area, the present-day Tamilnadu. The dam 
and the river are located in Kerala but the dam is controlled 
and operated by Tamilnadu state under a period lease. The dam 
is an ‘endangered’ scheduled dam under the Kerala Irrigation 
and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2006. The control 
and safety of the dam and the validity and fairness of the lease 
agreement have been points of dispute between Kerala and 
Tamilnadu states.  
All the above projects are clearly in public interest but 
unacceptable public risks as perceived by a section of the 
population are prompting them to agitate against the projects. 
Repeated assurances by the specialists do not seem to be cutting 
ice with the agitators. It is also unrealistic to expect full consensus 
in matters of public perception. Are the long term interests of the 
country being compromised by these agitations? What is the way 
forward?
One would be tempted to say “Well, it is the responsibility 
of the government to protect the interests of the public and 
take appropriate decisions based on a majority view”.  There 
are two wings of the government that are mandated to take 
decisions in public interest- the bureaucracy and the elected 
representatives. What are their past records? Let us take two 
examples- the introduction of Euro-II cars and CNG in Delhi. 
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Both these decisions came through judicial interventions, neither 
executive nor legislative interventions. One might say “after all, 
we are a democracy. Let the public decide”. But the question is 
“Is the public informed enough, particularly on issues that are 
highly technical?” especially when there is no consensus? Are 
there channels to express and force their choices other than 
the periodic elections? How to protect the system from vested 
interests?  This indeed is a challenge to the democracies.
Let me start with a simple analysis of our day-to-day decision 
making processes. We are all used to a Cost-Benefit analysis in 
most of our decisions. When the decision also involves a risk, a 
Risk-Benefit analysis also becomes important. The issue becomes 
complex if costs, benefits and risks are spread over long periods 
of time. Sometimes, the costs of not making the right decision 
at the right time also becomes important and have to be taken 
into account in the decision making process. All of us make such 
choices in our day to day life almost on a daily basis. Let me take 
for example the purchase of a house that most of us have done at 
some time or another. We need to worry about the cost, the rental 
value, anticipated appreciation, potential risks etc. Some of us have 
delayed the decision for so long that we lost golden opportunities 
that we repent later. Sometimes, the costs, the benefits or the 
risks need not all be financial. Take the case of adventure sports 
like bungee jumping. While the costs are financial, the benefits 
are psychological and the risks are extreme. When the choice 
involves matters of new and emerging technologies, the choice 
indeed becomes complex. I always say don’t offer to buy a color 
television or a cell phone to your family because by the time you 
purchase the item, it is already out-of-date and you may be open 
to ridicule. In some areas like the emerging stem cell therapy, we 
are as ignorant as any other non-specialist. But in all these cases, 
the costs, benefits and risks are confined to individuals or a small 
group of people like a family and they make the choices. When 
the costs, benefits and risks are not limited to an individual or a 
family but involve the public at large, the decision making process 
is indeed very complex and may involve not only financial and 
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technical but also ethical and moral issues. More importantly, the 
population benefiting from the choice may not be the one that 
bears the costs and the risks. In such cases, it is nearly impossible 
to have a consensus leaving pockets of disgruntlements. They are 
also open for exploitation by vested interests.
Let me take one well known example, the Singrauli 
resettlements.  The area in the eastern part of MP and the adjoining 
southern part of Sonbhadra district in UP is collectively known 
as Singrauli. Due to rich coal districts in the area, Singrauli is 
often referred to as India’s energy capital. A cluster of thermal 
coal plants, both government and private owned, dot the area 
with a declared potential for 35,000 MW of generation capacity. 
The history of displacement in this area is indeed revealing. The 
entire area of Singrauli was originally covered by dense forest. The 
river, Rihand, dammed in late 1950s (Govind Vallabh Pant Sagar 
Dam) to create an artificial lake called the Rihand reservoir. The 
building of the dam displaced around 200000 people. However 
due to a misjudgment of the catchment area, people had to move 
again as reservoir area expanded in the early 1960s. In 1975, 
people were again displaced for the NTPCL Shakthinagar thermal 
project. Not only tribals were disproportionately affected but the 
so called compensatory development had little to talk about- 
no schools, no health centers, no roads, not even electricity and 
clean drinking water. A very high unemployment amongst the 
displaced communities has also been noted. It is not surprising 
that in 1993, a proposal to expand the Rihand Ash Dike through 
World Bank financing met with stiff resistance from the villagers. 
The pattern is replicated across India souring relations between 
the government, corporates, NGOs and the public. 
In contrast, there are important lessons to be learnt in 
another case- relocation of yeravadi tribes in Sriharikota, the hub 
of India’s space launch programme. By a conscious decision, the 
strategy was to co-habilitate rather than rehabilitate the locals 
which made them partners. The island has seen no conflicts 
during the last few decades. One may also recall some of the 
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recent discussions on human-animal conflicts where even ethical 
and moral issues surface. Sometimes, specially, in the case of 
new and emerging technologies, neither the cost nor the risks 
can fully be enumerated. A hope to arrive at a consensus through 
truly democratic means is indeed a utopia. We also seem not to 
learn from our past experiences.
 
While costs and benefits and risks at the public level are 
complex issues, risks are even more complex. The insurance 
people have always been doing risk analysis but mostly based 
on past experiences. We all know that risk perception is a highly 
personal affair. It is said that pleasure and pain are personal and 
subject to individual experience. It could be your own experience 
or that of your close ones. Risk defined as unexpected pain is no 
exception and is highly personal. On the other hand, personal 
experiences however extensive they are, cover a miniscule of 
risks one faces in one’s life time. Risk perceptions are therefore not 
always logical, they are often psychological. Much of superstitious 
beliefs and phobias that one sees around belong to this category. I 
was surprised to discover at the age of 60 that I am afraid of space 
constrictions during my visit to Cu Chi tunnels in North Vietnam. 
Technology risks are even more complex. Sometimes these risks 
are totally futuristic. Risk communication therefore plays a 
very important and challenging role in molding individual risk 
perceptions, especially when the risks are of technical, futuristic 
and probabilistic. It is also important to note that not only media 
play a major role in molding risk perceptions but this is also most 
effective on the younger population. On matters that depend on 
public perceptions, I believe that widespread contacts with the 
student community is the most effective way of communication. 
Risk acceptance is even more complex. Acceptance at 
the personal level is highly individualistic. I mentioned about 
adventure sports where even a risk to life is willingly taken. Risk 
acceptance at the personal level and at the collective level need 
not be the same. At the collective level, sociology and culture 
play a very important role in defining public risk acceptance. 
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Let me ask you a simple question “What is the most serious 
risk to life that an average Delhi resident faces?”. Is it Pollution, 
Terrorist attacks, Acts of war, Natural disasters like floods and 
earthquakes, Traffic accidents, anything else? Following the 
devastating earth quake in Bhuj, I had received an international 
delegation to discuss strategies for earthquake proofing Delhi. 
One of the delegation members remarked that the biggest risk 
that an average delhiite faced was fatal traffic accidents. He was 
wondering why India is paying so little attention to regulating 
traffic while worrying about a possibility of an earthquake. 
Clearly public perceptions and acceptance of risks differ widely. 
Here again, media play a major role but a sustained campaign 
and demonstrated compensatory benefits to offset the risks 
accepted are more likely to be effective.
Some times it is argued that why should any one opt for 
a risky choice at all. Why can’t we take only safe choices? At 
the outset, we all know that there is nothing that is absolutely 
safe. More importantly, a safe choice of today may not remain 
so over a period of time. On the other hand, a risky choice of 
today may turn out to be more safe in course of time. Let me 
take the example of jet engines for passenger travel. The first 
few years of experience with COMET engines in the fifties were 
disastrous with a series of accidents. We now know why but at 
that time the feeling was “say no to jet engines”. Great Britain 
precisely did that. Fortunately the world didn’t and moved 
forward. Britain lost the opportunity to be the world leaders 
in this technology though they were the pioneers. When India 
introduced the fly-by-wire aircrafts, A-320, in the early nineties, 
we opened our account with the air crash on the outskirts of 
Bangalore. The memory of another A-320 air crash in 1988 in 
Habsheim, France in the prestigious Air Show was still fresh in 
our memory. We grounded the entire fleet of A-320’s for a long 
period but fortunately resumed after convincing ourselves that 
there was no safety issue with the aircraft. In fact, our airports 
were underprepared to exploit some of the safety features of the 
aircraft.  When our airports were ready, still an accident took 
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place in Mangalore. They said “Ah, the pilot was sleepy”. When 
they were negotiating with the pilots, yet another aircraft landed 
on the nose wheel. They said “Ah, the pilot had a fake certificate”. 
When DGCA is tightening the licensing procedures, I continue to 
travel by air. My wife believes that the road journey to the airport 
is more risky than the air journey itself. Any time I overhear 
some one whispering “Svalpa adjust madi”, I feel a chill in my 
spine. Still I take the plane knowing fully well that any thing 
can happen but the balance of advantage lies in utilizing this 
technology while continuously upgrading the safety features. 
In contrast, one accident in the early days of air ship 
development led to complete denial of this technology for public 
use. While we are discussing a ban on the use of helicopters in 
the North-Eastern states, it hurts to think that the air ship could 
have provided a safer option. The message is clear. The answer 
does not lie in saying NO to any technology option in our search 
for an absolutely safe option. Such an absolutely safe option does 
not exist either. We need to continuously evaluate the advantages 
and the risks and prepare the public to take informed options.
 
What is the dynamics of public risk perception and public 
risk acceptance? How does one translate financial and technical 
risk assessments into public perceptions? How do public 
perceptions mould public acceptance of the risks? What is the 
role of the media in this? These are complex issues that warrant 
an interdisciplinary research and debate. Unfortunately, neither 
the research funding agencies nor the mandated departments 
support such multidisciplinary research and advocacy. 
NIAS has a unique advantage in having technologists, 
sociologists, psychologists and even philosophers under one roof 
with no walls and is ideally placed to analyze and understand 
public risk perception and public risk acceptance. In due course 
we hope to contribute to the policy making process in matters 
not only of new and emerging technologies but also in matters 
of social conflicts. 
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Risk PeRcePtion and the sense 
of secuRity: a humanities 
aPPRoach
Sangeetha Menon
School of Humanities, National Institute of Advanced Studies 
Indian Institute of Science Campus, Bangalore 560 012
na āpadām asti maryāda na nimittam na kāranam
There is no limit to outcomes [dangers]; and also its 
efficient and final causes are unknown.
Sabha Parva: Yaksha Prasna
Mahabharata
You have to risk going too far to discover just how far 
you can really go.
T.S. Eliot
Technical discussions aside, the view of the common man, 
the person in the street, is also equally important to understand 
the intricacies of risk perception. It will not be incorrect to say 
that at some point each one of us is ‘someone in the street’. This 
is because, in spite of our respective disciplinary training and 
professions, we have a private mind, and a personal life to lead. 
Chapter 2
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Our objective and rational thinking are often subjected to the 
vagaries of a subjective, personal mind. 
My Yatra to Mt. Kailash
People tell me that a trip to Mt. Kailash (in Tibet) is one of 
the severest risks one could take, because even the trade-offs are 
not too encouraging: you either break a bone, or you die of high 
altitude pulmonary or cerebral oedema. Possibility of death is 
commonly perceived not as a risk but a blessing, over there. So, 
even helicopter evacuation for the accident victims is not taken 
very seriously!
Mt. Kailash trekking involves reaching altitude which is 
technically qualified as “extremely high”. Altitude is defined 
on the following scale: high (8,000 - 12,000 feet), very high 
(12,000 - 18,000 feet), and extremely high (18,000+ feet). There 
are no specific factors such as age, gender, or physical condition 
that correlate with susceptibility to oedema. Some people get it 
and some people don’t, and some people are more susceptible 
than others. Altitude was no beckoner for me to retract from 
the decision to do the Yatra. Because, I hardly knew about the 
technical details of the scales of altitude and the possible adverse 
outcomes. I did not think what I did not know will be a possible 
threat for me.
The four threats, in an increasing order of difficulty, I faced 
during the Yatra were:
a. Climbing to Dolma La Pass, of plus 19000 ft, and the 
immediate descend
b. Weak knees
c. Sense of privacy
d. Sensitive stomach (being allergic to unclean bathrooms)
Fortunately, I did not have to receive both the trade-offs I 
mentioned in the beginning. I did not break a bone, and did not 
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die. After the return from the Yatra I found that what gave me the 
toughest challenge was not what I did not fear, that is, high altitude 
-- because of my lack of knowledge and previous experience. But 
what gave me the toughest challenge was what I did fear, which 
was lack of privacy and bathrooms, of which I had some idea and 
previous experience through other trekking experiences.
But I learnt later that the first one in the list is the most 
challenging threat to anyone who makes the Yatra. Since I did 
not know about it and have had little previous experience, it was 
hardly considered as a threat by my mind before I started the 
Yatra. And that lack of knowledge was crucial for me to make the 
decision of going for the Yatra and taking the risk.
This is the closest experience I have to place behind my 
speculations about risk perception that I wish to share.
Etymology of ‘Risk’
The etymology of ‘risk’ goes back to classical Greek origin. 
It was a nautical expression. The term risk may be traced back to 
classical Greek ριζα (pronounced as per-ree-za), meaning root, 
later used in Latin for cliff. The term is also used by the greatest 
Greek Epic poet Homer in his Odyssey. Dictionaries confirm 
that the Latin word (resicum, risicum, riscus) comes from a Greek 
navigation term rhizikon, rhiza which meant “root”, and was a 
metaphor for the challenge given by a barrier reef to the sailor. 
Only in later times, in French (risqué), German (rysigo) and 
English risk came to mean “to dare, to undertake, enterprise”. 
(Rolf Skjong, 2005.)
And today the common interpretation for ‘risk’ in vogue 
is a challenge, and point to “adverse outcomes”. ‘Risk’ to a 
commoner implies something negative than positive.
A Humanities perspective
A humanities perspective would take its wisdom from the 
human experiences expressed and interpreted by culture, arts, 
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psychology and philosophy. Such a perspective would primarily 
bring into question the psychological and philosophical forces 
that underlie risk perception, risk-taking tendencies and abilities. 
Such a perspective would assume two issues: 
i. ‘who is at risk’ (actual risk), and 
ii. ‘one’s feelings about risk’ 
And, that these two issues cannot be reduced to each 
other. One would feel at risk when there is no risk and vice-
versa. Feelings about risk and actual risk need not be always 
corresponding to each other. At the sa me time, one cannot be 
undermined in the face of the other.
What this means is that the information on 
quantified (actual) risk assessment will not be sufficient 
to address the feelings about risk one would have. Risk 
perception and risk alleviation becomes highly individualistic, 
and directed by differences in cultural, psychological and 
moral underpinnings.
The Sense of Security
A fundamental factor necessary in distinguishing between 
feelings about risk and the actual risk is the sense of security. 
The sense of security is constituted by: (a). fears that decide 
biases in responding to risks, and, (b). nature of desire and its 
purpose. Just as we have a sense of our body and a sense of our 
mind, the sense of security is fundamental to our physical and 
psychological equilibrium. Often, we are oblivious to the subtle 
existence of such a sense playing a crucial role in our decision-
making activities.
Fears, desire and its purpose are invariably related to 
our sense of security. Here once again, what we are talking 
about is not only the quantified amount of security in the 
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areas of national, health, nuclear etc., based on probabilities 
and statistical data, but also the subliminal sense of security. 
All our actions and responses are founded on our sense of 
security.
Philosophically or otherwise there is agreement that desire 
invokes action. Desires produce intentions, and intentions lead 
to actions. Desire refers to having an urge for something in 
the distant, feeling to possess or dispossess, intend to achieve. 
On one side when all types of desires have cognitive elements 
constituting them, on the other they are ridden with un-
articulated emotions, values, and world-views. The psychology 
of desire is a subject that has brought in controversial theories 
of the unconscious and personality traits that arise from that 
space. In the context of risk-taking behavior and risk perception, 
what comes to focus is that the nature of desire aligned with fear, 
desire and its purpose.
What causes a desire, and what is achieved through the 
fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the desire? How does desire 
and its ultimate purpose of wellbeing or common good (in 
risk assessment) influence our biases in risk perception? How 
objective are we in considering the merits and adverse outcomes 
without downplaying or exaggerating either? How do the bias 
interfere in decision-making process? 
The last two questions are significant in understanding the 
processes that go into risk assessment particularly when studies 
have shown that when making choices and solving problems 
of complexity, rational elements are found missing and we are 
influenced by ‘a-rational’ factors. “People do not typically solve 
problems, make decisions or reach conclusions using the kind of 
standard, conscious and rational processes that they were more 
or less assumed to be using. … When people were observed 
making choices and solving problems of interesting complexity, 
the rational and the logical elements were often missing”( (Reber, 
1993).
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Desire motivates action. And, the sense of security decides 
the emergence of desires. Both risk aversion and risk-taking 
tendencies are dependent on our sense of security which in turn 
is driven by fear and anxiety. And it is established theory that 
while fear and anxiety to a certain extent perform functions 
evolutionarily engraved by our biology (fight or flight) they also 
create health hazards when taken out of proportion.
Fear of the unknown is a psychological force that overrides 
any rational and quantified account of possible threats and 
adverse outcomes. Subjective identity is defined by the fear of 
the unknown which is a crucial deciding factor in risk taking 
behaviors and risk perceptions. A person who would not 
take a risk as an individual may choose to do so as part of a 
group. The fears of the unknown (consequences) are seemingly 
distributed when one is a part of the group: ‘I alone is not 
affected, but others also’; ‘Since many are, there mitigation 
would be better’. This is evidenced by the common practise of 
pedestrian crossing. We feel more assured in crossing when a 
few more people are with us to cross the zebra lines. And as far 
as the personal anecdote shared in the earlier part of this paper 
goes, perhaps I took the risk of a trip to Mt. Kailash because 
twenty six people were with me, or perhaps the leading light of 
our spiritual teacher was with us.
The fears and the sense of security one would have 
independently and as part of a group would vary. And, this is 
important when risk perceptions are evaluated. The influence of 
group-processes and individual processes in decision-making 
and risk-acceptance is central to understanding the psychology 
of risk.
What I wish to call as a “Humanities approach” would 
consider apart from the mathematical calculations, probabilities 
and statistical data, the ‘a-rational factors’, the fundamental 
motivations that lead people to risk taking behavior and 
framing risk perceptions. After all here we are dealing with the 
17
Sangeetha Menon
minds and mindsets of individuals, when risk perceptions are 
discussed.
Let me come back to the question I asked in the beginning:
What is the feeling of being at risk?
What is it to be at risk?
How alternatively can we describe the experience of being at 
risk?
Let us look at some instances, narratives —
i. I said something hurtful to A
Because of which I do not know what might A’s response would 
be in the near and long term future. 
Did I say something wrong?
What are the consequences and relevance for me?
ii. I desired for something. And have engaged in relevant 
action leading to its fulfilment.
Did I put myself in an unknown space in the course of my action?
Was my desire legitimate?
Can I analyse my actions and reason for that particular desire 
objectively?
Am I in control?
What are the fundamental mental forces behind these 
motivations?
i. Desire for something which is yet to be achieved,
ii. Inability to gauge (long-term) consequences, and,
iii. Anxiety and discomfort
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Are human actions, in general, free of these three 
fundamental mental forces? Can we be free of desires? We wish 
to control outcomes. But do we have control on the multiple 
factors that decide the outcomes?
In fact, we could say that, no action can be performed 
without the motivation of a desire. No amount of consequential 
thinking and conceptual tools will give as an exhaustive scale 
of outcomes. And, no action is free from some amount of 
expectation.
All actions are founded in desire; anticipation of outcomes, 
and some degree of anxiety. These three subliminal psychological 
forces together determine our sense of security.
Sense of security is the sense we have of displacement (or 
its absence); of losing (or not); and being (or not) in control. 
As individuals, and unique individuals with our makings 
determined by a host of private factors which are psychological 
and cultural, we perceive risk determined by our sense of 
security.
Risk experience is that which disturbs an equilibrial state of 
our sense of security, and, 
i. Warns displacement 
ii. Generates fear of loss, and
iii. Fear of absence of control.
Risk experience belongs to a person, with its impact on his 
mind and body. Every individual is important. It is the collective 
experiences of individuals that contribute to a larger conception 
of risk.
Even when we analyse public risk, let us keep in mind 
that it is an individual who perceives the risk and becomes the 
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partaker of the outcomes, along with other stakeholders. Let 
‘public’ do not become a chimera for us, and let us not return to 
the age-old horns of the dilemma, ‘is individual more important, 
or is the public more important?’ There is no scope for public 
risk without the conception of an individual and the risk to the 
individual.
How to address and work for an optimal sense of 
security?
An optimal sense of security is decided by the nature of 
choices and decision-making, and also our tolerance to outcomes.
i. Choice and decision-making
Are our choices well-informed? Have the subliminal 
forces behind the nature of choice been brought to the light 
of conscious analysis? Have we addressed the ‘what –if’ 
question (e.g.: what if something goes wrong)? Do we make 
better decisions when there are more choices? Sheena Iyengar 
writes: Perhaps it is not that people are made unhappy by 
the decisions they make in the face of abundant options but 
that they are instead unsure – that they are burdened by the 
responsibility of distinguishing good from bad decisions 
(Iyengar, 2000). 
While receiving options and making choices from the many 
available, our minds convert the objects we see to symbols. 
For e.g.: when I am given a range of soda drinks, though the 
content of all are the same, the one (or none) I would opt for is 
decided by the symbolic value I give for it. Often when we see 
objects, we then convert them to symbols so that we can make 
decisions in tune with our perceptions and beliefs. Our biases 
are tuned either by the apparent package of the object or its 
deeper content.
The question to explore is whether we make better decisions 
if we devise effective low-risk strategies for getting the ‘small 
things’ we desire in life?
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ii. Tolerance of outcomes
Sense of security is not a sense for the absence of risk, but 
rather a sense that allows us to estimate our individual risk-
tolerances. How acceptable is my choice to me and others? How 
poised are our choices for larger good?
The impact of choice and decision making in defining risk is 
best illustrated by a story from the Mahabharata. This is the story 
of the Pandava brothers’ rendezvous with Yaksha, described in 
the Sabha Parva. The narrative below is adapted from Kamala 
Subramaniam’s Mahabharata (1990).
Once, when the Pandavas were living in Dwaitavana--it 
was during their final stay of a few months--a brahmin came to 
Yudhishthira with an appeal. He said that a deer had entered his 
hut and carried away the sticks used for making fire, the Arani. 
The Pandavas left at once and went in pursuit of the deer. They 
followed it very far but suddenly it disappeared from their sight. 
Depressed in mind and fatigued by thirst and hunger, they sat 
down under the shade of a huge tree. They were very unhappy 
and all the brothers except Yudhistira started lamenting about 
the fate and the unending number of woes that follow them.
Yudhishthira smiled at them all and said: “This is not 
the time to look back and think of the might-have-beens. Our 
immediate worry is this: How are we to quench this dreadful 
thirst that has been troubling us since some time? Nakula, get 
up on the tree and look around. See if you can find any spot 
of water in the neighbourhood. We are all almost dying with 
thirst”. Nakula did as he was told. He said: “I can see a lake just 
nearby”. They were all so happy to hear it. Yudhishthira said: 
“My child, go at once and bring water for all of us”. Nakula 
hurried to the lake.
He reached the lake. The water looked so cool and inviting. 
He went near it to drink it. Suddenly he heard a voice from 
nowhere. It said: “You must not drink the water of this lake, not 
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before you have answered certain questions of mine. You can 
neither drink this water nor can you carry it unless you answer 
my questions”. Nakula did not pay any heed to this voice coming 
from nowhere. He was very thirsty. He rushed to the brink of 
the lake and drank the cold water eagerly. Immediately Nakula 
fell down dead. The others waited for him for a long time. But 
Nakula did not return. 
Yudhishthira sent Sahadeva to go in search of his brother. 
Sahadeva reached the lake. He saw the dead form of his brother 
on the ground. He was shocked at the sight. But his thirst was 
so great that he rushed towards the water as Nakula had done. 
The same voice was heard with the same warning. But Sahadeva 
was like Nakula. He disregarded the warning and drank the 
water and suffered the same fate as his brother. Yudhishthira 
next sent Arjuna and then Bheema. Not one of them came 
back. Yudhishthira waited for a long time and yet they did not 
come back. Intrigued by this, and with misgivings of the mind, 
Yudhishthira walked towards the lake. He reached it soon. He 
stopped in his tracks, horrified by the sight that met his eyes. He 
saw all his brothers there, dead.
Yudhishthira was almost mad with grief. His roving eyes 
fell on the cool water and his thirst came back. His throat was 
parched and dry with unshed tears. He walked to the brink of 
the lake and was about to drink the water, when he was arrested 
by the unearthly voice. He was told that he should not drink 
until some questions were answered. Yudhishthira paused in 
the act of drinking. He looked around to locate the source of the 
voice. The voice said: “I saw your brothers come here one by one. 
I told them not to drink. They would not listen to me. They drank 
and died. I am the yaksha who owns this lake”. 
The story continues that Yudhisthira answers all of sixty 
odd questions of Yaksha, and to Yaksha’s happiness he is not 
only granted water from the lake, but also the lives of the four 
brothers.
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Yudhisthira and his brothers had to face two risks. One, the 
risk of having to die with no water to drink, and two, the risk of 
having to die by giving wrong or no answers to Yaksha. There 
was the risk of death in both options of choices and decisions.
The brothers were already fatigued by hunger, and also 
by their depressed minds. Their immediate worry being thirst 
Yudhishtira prods the brothers to find a water source. 
Nakula and other brothers find a lake, and confront the 
owner of the lake –the Yaksha, but do not heed to his questions. 
With the desire for some drops of water, the surroundings did 
not matter much to them. They were unable to see and listen 
to the happenings of the immediate environment. At the same 
time the water of the lake was found so cool and inviting, that 
even death was not a concern. What was pulling them deeply 
was a haste to somehow quench the thirst. Hence they either 
did not hear the voice of Yaksha or ignored him who fore-
warned them of death. At that point, quenching thirst was 
the primary desire. Even the sights of the dead bodies of the 
brothers did not thwart the motivation of Bhima, Arjuna and 
Sahadeva, from stepping to the lake and drinking water. 
Only Yudhishtira heard the voice of Yaksha, inspite of 
the desire to quench the thirst, and had the patience as well as 
courage to respond to Yaksha’s questions.
What we may conclude from the story is that when pushed 
to a corner, we are forced to take a risk, even if it is at the cost of 
a trade-off like death.
Can we stop desiring? 
Can we stop engaging in actions? Can we objectify the 
subliminal forces that shape our choices? All these, so as to gain 
a stable sense of security? Not really. The only way to know the 




This is also because we know that individuals change, risks 
change, individual perceptions change, and also the outcomes 
change. The only way to know if yesterday’s risk is still a risk 
today, and whether we perceive it differently, is to continue to 
take risks. At any case there is no human action whose course of 
outcomes can be chartered for an infinite future. We take risk, as 
long as we cherish desires – small or big.
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Risk studies
M G Narasimhan
School of Humanities, National Institute of Advanced Studies
Indian Institute of Science Campus, Bangalore -560 012
Introduction: On the origins of the concept of Risk 
In this chapter I describe and examine the nature, role, and 
significance of Risk Communication in the field of Risk Studies. 
The field of risk studies emerged in response to various debates 
concerning environmental degradation and related issues 
in the second half of the last century is an interdisciplinary 
enterprise comprising studies from the vantage point of natural 
and engineering sciences, social sciences and humanities. 
Within its ambit are located subfields such as Risk Perception, 
Risk Communication, Risk Management and Risk Governance. 
Risk Communication emerged from risk perception in the 
mid-eighties and has made rapid progress both in terms of 
quantity and quality of publications. In addition to a broad 
based description of the nature of risk communication, I deal 
with an important issue in the fields of risk perception and 
risk communications i.e., the issue of Knowledge Discrepancy 
in risk studies. Also known as Experts vs Lay people divide, 
the issue of knowledge discrepancy has been a source of deep 
concern for risk managers and theorists. Following this in 
Chapter 3
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conclusion this I will briefly present certain important attempts 
made in order to bridge the gap.
The Emergence and Evolution of Risk Communication 
constitutes an important chapter in the field of risk studies (see 
Fig. 1). In terms of its own origin and development the concept 
and study of risk emerged in the seventies and eighties in the 
context of wide spread concern about environmental degradation 
and its short term and long term consequences.  Although the 
phenomenon and experience of risk has been a part of human 
social existence since early times  (Covello and Mumpower, 
1985),  the conceptualization and professionalization of risk 
studies has been a matter of recent development and  in 
particular, has been closely associated with  the major transition 
from  traditional to modern society (Plough and Krimsky, 1987; 
Beck, 1992; Luhmann, 1996)  Luhmann  (1996) points out that the 
term “risk” is a neologism that came into use with the transition 
from traditional to modern society.  He adds that In the Middle 
Ages the term “riscium” was used in highly specific contexts, 
above all in sea trade and its ensuing legal problems of loss 
and damage.  Further, Luhmann observes that in the English 
language the term risk appeared only in the 17th century, and 













Figure 1. An overview of Risk Studies1,2
1  Other terms used in this context: Risk characterization, risk assessment, Risk 
analysis. 
2  I have used the term Risk Studies as a disciplinary term which encompasses all 
the other studies done within     the inter disciplinary frame work. 
27
M G Narasimhan
Risk Studies: The beginning
Two major consequences emerged from this conceptual 
evolution.  Firstly, the concept of risk became an analytical 
category with the help of which one could identify the major 
transitions of social evolution. This kind of analysis is particularly 
well presented by Beck in his work “Risk Society: Towards a 
New Society”.  In this work,  Beck traces the emergence of what 
he calls as “Reflexive modernization” from the earlier phase 
of tradition,  i.e., premodern societies to the  current phase 
of modernity via the phase of early modernity. (Beck, 1992). 
Secondly, the emergence of the concept of risk paved the way for 
the birth of important research fields such as  (a) risk analysis,  (b) 
risk perception and (c) risk management (Luhmann, 1996).  One 
major omission from this list of what Leiss calls “risk subfields” 
is “Risk communications research” (Leiss, 1996).
From the Study of Risk to Risk Communication  
Research
Describing the sociohistorical backdrop within which the 
theme of risk communication emerged, Plough and Krimsky 
(1987) observe, “That the emergence of risk communication as 
a research theme cannot be fully appreciated or accounted for 
without understanding its link to a set of issues that symbolize 
the discord between scientific experts and the public around 
the issue of risk.  These tensions are played out in disputes 
between different research traditions on fundamental questions 
regarding the perception of risk and the essential nature of 
human rationality”.
Two important issues deserve to be noted here.  First, there 
is the critical issue related to “the discord between scientific 
experts and the public” and second, there is the reference to “the 
perception of risk” and its relation to “essential nature of human 
rationality”.
Leiss in his important historical study of risk 
communication offers similar observations, and hence notes that 
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“Risk communication research…, is the newest of the four risk 
subfields, the phrase itself appears to have been coined during 
1984” (Leiss, 1996). He then explains that it  arose out of the 
problems being investigated in the risk perception area, which 
since its inception had concentrated on the disparities between 
risk as assessed by experts on the one hand and as understood 
by the general public on the other hand. Further more, Leiss 
points out that while risk perception studies have focused 
attention on explaining these disparities risk communication has 
from the beginning had a “practical” intent, i.e., given the fact 
that there are disparities between experts and general public in 
understanding each other, risk communication has to respond to 
two important challenges.  First, there is the question, how can 
we improve the quality of the dialogue about risk across the gap 
the separates experts and the general public?  And, secondly, 
how can we apply this improved dialogue to achieving a higher 
degree of social consensus on the inherently controversial aspects 
of managing environmental and other risks? 
Apart from Plough and Krimsky, and Leiss, Fischoff also 
has explored the developmental history of risk communication. 
In his entertaining essay “Risk Perception and Communication 
unplugged:  Twenty Years of Process” (Fischhoff, 1995) identifies 
seven stages in the evolution of Risk Management:
•	 All we have to do is get the number right.
•	 All we have to do is tell them the numbers
•	 All we have to do is explain what we mean by the numbers.
•	 All we have to do is show them that they have accepted 
similar risks in the past.
•	 All we have to do is show them that it is a good deal for 
them. 
•	 All we have to do is treat them nice
•	 All we have to do is make them partners 
•	 All of the above.
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Commenting on this list, Leiss (1996) argues that Fischhoff’s 
stages can be regrouped into three phases of evolution of risk 
communication practice. Accordingly, the first two stages of 
Fischhoff’s list corresponds, roughly with Phase I, (which in 
chronological terms spans the period from and to 1975-84), 
wherein quantitative estimates were predominant. In Phase 
II (about 1985-95) aspects of successful communications were 
emphasized and the final phase coming after 1995.  The idea 
behind this regrouping,  Leiss observes, is that it highlights the 
radical nature of the  transition that has characterized the growth 
of risk communication. While Leiss’ account traces development 
from 1975 to 1996, McComas (2006) in her recent study identifies 
what she terms as “Defining Moments” in Risk communication 
research where in she covers a period of about a decade, i.e., 
from  1996-2005.  After, listing most  important mishaps, both 
natural and man-made (this  including the terrorist attack on 
World Trade Centre on September 11, 2011), which raised 
the level of ‘risk awareness’, McComas  (2006) describes the 
various ways in which risk communication research had been 
transformed.  New avenues such as the media and new forms 
such as strategic risk communication had emerged making the 
risk communication process, more complex and also expanding 
it in terms of stakeholders’ role and coverage. 
Risk Communication
(a) Definitions
One important point which emerges out of the above historical 
account is that although the field of risk communications is fairly 
young, it has shown rapid growth within the overall framework 
of Risk studies testifying to its importance and centrality in the 
discipline.  As such risk communication occupies a middle ground 
linking risk perception with risk management (Fig. 1).
According to the document titled “Improving Risk 
Communication” published by the National Research Council 
(USA), Risk Communication is defined as follows:
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“Risk Communication is an interactive process of exchange 
of information and opinion among individuals, groups and 
institutions.  It involves multiple messages about the nature 
of risk and other messages, not strictly about risk, the express 
concerns, opinions or reactions to risk messages or to legal and 
institutional arrangements for risk management”, (Improving Risk 
Communication, 1989)”. Commenting on this definition, Ropeik 
(2007) observes, that risk communication should be considered 
a dynamic two-way street.  Both sides get to talk, and both sides 
have to listen and respond to input from the other.  As has been 
pointed out by many commentators this definition signifies an 
improvement over earlier ones which treated risk communication 
as a one way,  top down transmission of information. 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission of Food and 
Agricultural Organization also offers a somewhat similar 
definition of risk communication: According to it risk 
communication involves, … 
“The interactive exchange of information and opinions 
throughout the risk analysis process concerning risk, risk 
related factors and risk perceptions, among risk assessors,   risk 
managers,  consumers, industry and the academic community 
and other interested parties, including  the explanation of risk 
assessment findings and the basis of risk management decisions”, 
(cf. Lupin 2007).
Taking the two definitions together the following aspects of 
risk communication process can be identified:
a. Risk communication is primarily an interactive exchange, 
i.e., communication should be two way or multiway 
process.
b. In terms of content Risk communication should be 
more than presenting a list of bare facts.  It should be a 
composite message combining information and opinion 
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which accounts for the affective components in people’s 
perception of risk of bare facts. (Ropeik, 2007). 
c. Risk communication is a continuous and on going process 
especially in the context of risk analysis which is itself a 
continuous process.
d. The participants of risk communication process are all those 
who are affected by risk, risk assessors, risk managers, 
consumers, industry, the academic community and other 
interested parties.  In other words, all the stake holders are 
involved.
e. The CAC definition requires recognition of the fact that 
“values are a key element in risk communication”, (Lupin, 
2007).  While risk communication should concern itself 
with risk, risk-related factors and risk perceptions, it should 
not be confined to understanding only scientific (assessed/
measured) risk but (it should also include) the perceived 
risk and possible risk related factors”. 
f. Finally, the principal objective of risk communication 
should be to offer proper explanation, to explain how and 
why a certain set of decisions have been taken instead of 
any other.  Also, explanation is needed because not all 
the stakeholders would have the necessary scientific and 
technical knowledge to grasp the nature of the risk.
(b) Models
As can be seen from the above risk communication (which 
can be treated as a special form of communication) is a process 
where information flow or exchange is made possible amongst 
different participants or stakeholders. One major implication of 
this interpretation is that the structure of risk communication can 
be best represented in terms of models. This, for example, can be 
seen in a simple communication model developed by Shannon 
and Weaver in their important paper published in 1949. Risk 
communication models are generally based on this model with 
additional features specific to risk perception (Fig. 3).
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Figure 3. Model of Risk Communication: Risk message model based 
on generalized ‘Shannon and Weaver’ model (1949). Aim – efficient 
uninterrupted, clear communication of risk from sender to receiver. 
Model – Deficit model, linear, one way communication. (cf. Wardman, 
2008)
This ‘informational’ model (see Figs  2 and 3) was the first of 
its kind and has been described as “… one of the main seeds out 
of which Communication studies has grown”, (Chandler, 1994). 
Chandler in his discussion   of the model points out the following 




The last feature was particularly important as the model 
was developed mainly to assist in the formulation of the 
mathematical theory of communication. Wardman (2008) 
observes that the model is a deficit model (i.e., a model where 
information flow is top down), linear one and is characterized by 
one way communication. 
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Although the Shannon and Weaver model (also known 
as Sender–Receiver model) was very useful for some purposes, 
it was beset with serious shortcomings – the most important 
being – there was no role for ‘SEMANTICS’ IN it.  Weaver (1949) 
makes this amply clear.  According to him “the word information 
in this theory, is used in a special sense that must not be confused 
with its ordinary   usage.  In particular, information must not be 
confused with meaning.   In fact, two massages, one of which 
is heavily loaded with meaning and the other of which is pure 
nonsense, can be exactly equivalent, from the present viewpoint, 
as regards information. It is this, undoubtedly, that Shannon 
means when he says that ‘the semantic aspects of communication 
are irrelevant to the engineering aspects’” (Weaver, 1949).   
In other words, as Chandler (1994) observes “meaning making is 
not central in transmission models”.  
Now given the problematic nature of the classical 
communication model, several risk communication theorists 
such as Renn (1992), Rohrmann (2008), and Wardman (2008) 
have proposed models which are based on semantics, i.e., 
models in which meaning making plays an important role.  One 
such model is presented by Renn (1992) (See Fig. 4)
In this model, which Renn describes as an ‘Organizational 
structure of communication’ he includes all the important 
participants who are involved in the process of risk 
communication – senders, transmitters, and receivers.  Further, 
within each group he includes variety of contributors -  for 
example,  in this model the term ‘interest group’ refers to 
what is generally known as  the ‘civil society’  and within 
the larger group of sources Renn provides  important roles 
to scientific communities, public agencies and eye witnesses 
hereby broadening the scope of community participation  in the 
process of risk communication.  Similarly he has in his model 
made provision for those communities which are involved in 
transmission and reception of communication. (Renn, 1992). 
One important innovation made by Renn is availability of ‘feed 
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Figure 4. Models of Risk communication (Renn 1992).
While describing the actual manner in which his model 
operates Renn observes that the sources, as noted earlier, are 
basically made up of a variety of participants – scientists, 
institutions associated with science like the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), USA and other agencies.  These initially 
provide information in the form of formal communications to 
others i.e., transmitters or receivers (under certain circumstances) 
and this information leads to further interaction. Following this 
initial step, the involvement of public through transmitting 
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agency is made possible and finally the end receivers respond to 
the initial messages either in terms of support for or rejection of 
the source message.
In other words, Renn’s model shows that “communication 
must happen within all sources, all transmitters, and all receivers 
respectively, in  order for the correct information to be conveyed 
and then received appropriately by the various receivers”. 
(C) On the Significance and Complexity of Risk Communication
Ever since the emergence of the concept of risk, two areas 
(amongst others) have acquired deep significance in the overall 
discipline of risk studies.   They are ‘risk perception’ on the one 
hand and ‘risk communication’ on the other. As mentioned 
earlier (Leiss, 1996) risk communication emerged from risk 
perception and in turn developed as an important component 
of Risk Management.  Plough and Krimsky (1987) while tracing 
the history of the concept observe, “Risk Communication 
is more than a research frame work.  It has become a concept 
that is strongly marketed by specific interest groups and used 
instrumentally to achieve particular ends. At the federal policy 
level, the environmental protection agency (EPA) has been the 
strongest marketer of the concept of risk communication”.  Its 
(i.e., EPA) chief administrator has stated: “On the national 
level, we will build risk communication into regulatory policy 
whenever possible”. The EPA has elevated the concept of risk 
communication to a strategy level of importance in both its 
regulatory activities and its research agenda.  Industries that 
are regulated by the EPA also seek risk communication as a key 
policy and management issue” Plough and Krimsky, 1987 (P. 
4).  Thus risk communication has acquired the status of a state 
subject.
Given this significance of the concept, it is important that 
we understand its nature properly, specifically in terms of the 
fact that it is essentially a process which involves continuous 
exchange of critical information. An important aspect of emphasis 
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is the recognition that risk communication is a complex process 
with a variety of participants and stakeholders interacting with 
each other. This complexity is graphically presented in the 
following figure:  (Fig. 5) 
Figure 5. On the complexity of Risk communication – Multiple stakeholder 
idea.  Source Web communication: Pathak.
A key issue: Experts’ vs. Lay People Dichotomy 
in Risk Perception and its implications for Risk 
Communication
One of the most important aspects of all studies related 
to risk, being perception, communication or management is 
the problem of ‘Knowledge discrepancy’ that exists between 
experts’ perception  and understanding of risk and lay persons’ 
perception and understanding of the same phenomenon. 
Merkelson (2011) points out “the most studied and debated 
differences in risk perception are those found between experts 
and lay people.  This gap, which is often described in terms of 
a knowledge discrepancy emerged in various risk perception 
studies in the seventies that were conducted as a consequence 
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of a general public skepticism towards nuclear technology” 
(P-10).  He adds that in the course of last four decades studies 
have persistently pointed to the existence of such a knowledge 
discrepancy more or less regardless of risk or hazard type”. The 
gap indicates that there are major differences almost making 
them seem like polar opposites.   The following table gives us a 
broad based picture of the dichotomy: (See Table 1).
Table 1. Experts’ vs. Lay People Dichotomy: Important differences between 
the perception of experts and lay public of risk.
No. Experts Lay Public
1 Quantitative Qualitative 
2 Experts pay more attention to probability Public to consequences 
3 Objective Subjective
4
Physically given (risk seen from the view 
point of Realism) 
Socially constructed 
5 Technical Rationality Cultural Rationality
While some of the differences could be attributed to a 
certain set of biases, other differences have had their origin in 
the presence of presuppositions in experts’ perception.  This 
is particularly  true in the case of the Psychometric paradigm 
which had and still has considerable influence on the way  in 
which risk was perceived and interpreted.  The psychometric 
paradigm is characterized by emphasis on quantitative and 
probabilistic analysis (Bostrom, 1997). Bostrom in her detailed 
study of the problem argues that although experts operate 
with formal definitions of risk, there was no reason to think 
that the definitions agreed and thereby indicate the fact that 
experts operated with a shared and consensual viewpoint.  In 
other words, as she puts it: “Thus technical risk assessments 
by experts can disagree dramatically” (Bostrom 1997, P-105). 
From a philosophical viewpoint a critical issue in this context is 
rationality.  While experts operate with the notion of ‘Technical 
rationality’, lay public operate in terms of what Plough and 
Krimsky (1987) call as ‘Cultural rationality’.  Explicating the two 
concepts Plough and Krimsky observe “This form (technical 
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rationality) rests on explicitly defined sets of principles and 
scientific norms.  These include hypothetico – deductive methods, 
a common language for measurement and quantification and 
comparison across risk events”.  Contrasting this with Cultural 
rationality the two authors argue “Cultural rationality can only 
be understood when people’s cognitive behavior is observed as 
they are threatened by a real risk event.   It is only then that 
the full panoply of factors come into play that create a complete 
picture of a public response.  To understand cultural rationality, 
one must address anthropological and phenomenological issues 
as well as behavioral ones”.
A Conceptual Intervention: On the role of Trust and 
Expertise in Risk Communication
A major casuality emerging from this persisting knowledge 
discrepancy is the concept of ‘Trust’.  The lack or absence of 
trust between the experts (generally policy makers and industry 
officials) and the lay public has been responsible for the failures 
of risk communication (Loftstedt, 2003).  In response to the 
problems created by this divide some social scientists  have 
examined the possibility  of redefining the notion of trust in such 
away as to create a level playing ground which would enable 
experts and lay public to  negotiate  on equal tooting. In the 
same context, the notion of ‘expertise’ has also been examined 
by philosophers and sociologists (Rask, 2008; Collins, 2004). 
The primary motive behind these investigations seem to bring 
together more nuanced  notion of trust and a broad based idea 
of ‘expertise’ which would  provide a common ground for all the 
stakeholders in the risk communication process.
Loftstedt (2003) defines trust as follows, “The term Trust 
can be an expression of confidence between the parties in 
an exchange transaction and can be both process/ system or 
outcome based”, (P-419).  Elaborating his concept of trust Lofstedt 
identifies three important components – Fairness, Competence, 
and efficiency.  In Lofstedt’s terms “Impartiality and Fairness are 
an important element of any regulatory decision that will have 
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an impact on public trust … Fairness is usually defined a view of 
the process or outcome as being impartial”. As far as competence 
is concerned he observes, “Public perceptions of risk managers’ 
competence is viewed as the most important component of trust. 
Did the regulators handle the process as proficiently as possible? 
Did the risk managers have the necessary scientific and practical 
background to deal with the range of issues associated with the 
process?” – are some of the questions which the lay public are 
likely to ask in the context of the issue of competence. Finally, 
the third component of trust efficiency is related to the question 
“How taxpayers’ money is used in the regulatory process…”. 
The point here is efficiency refers to a sense of accountability in 
respect of proper utilization of taxpayers’ money. Apart from 
Lofstedt other risk communication experts also have offered 
similar lists of attributes concerning the trustworthiness  of 
expert opinion (Renn and Levine, 1991; Kasperson, 1992).  
In sum then, there seems to be a general accord amongst 
risk communication specialists to the effect that trust in risk 
communication holds a key position in risk management and 
plays a critical role in perception and acceptance of risk.
In addition to trust, the concept of expertise has also 
acquired a significant role in risk studies. The Business 
Disctionary.com defines “‘Expertise’ as the basis of credibility 
of a person who is perceived to be knowledgeable in an area of 
topic due to his or her study, training or experience in the subject 
matter”. According to Rask (2008) expertise is understood 
“generally as either experience based or academically certified 
knowledge, skills and competences”, (P-22).  Rask adds 
that the structural form of expertise is called a ‘Profession’. 
Concomitantly an expert “is a person with extensive knowledge 
or ability based on research, experience or occupation in a 
particular area of study” (Wikipedia).  An important dimension 
of expertise is the kind of epistemic authority or in a larger 
sense, cultural authority it is normally endowed  with.  Given 
this fact, the role of experts in risk situations is critical. It is 
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this critical positioning which comes into play in expert vs. lay 
public risk perception. In response to this some what mutually 
exclusive positioning of expert and lay public, Rask argues in 
favour of Expansion of Expertise in science and technology 
management.  By that he means, “The process of involvement 
of new actors and knowledge perspectives beyond technically 
and professionally certified elites” (Rask, 2008).  He adds that 
this will open up the process of negotiation as the new actors 
bring a long different professional cultures, world views and 
knowledge perspectives. 
On bridging the gap and a way forward
To conclude then what needs to be done in bridging or 
closing the gap between experts and lay public  is that we need to 
provide a role for democratically broad based notion of expertise 
and more nuanced interpretation of trust in the overall process of 
risk perception, communication and management.  In addition 
one could also deploy constructively the seven cardinal rules of 
communication as proposed by Covello and Allen (1988).   The 
rules are as follows :
1. Accept and Involve the Public as a Legitimate Partner.
2. Plan Carefully and Evaluate Performance.
3. Listen to your Audience.
4. Be Honest, Frank and Open.
5. Coordinate and Collaborate with Other Credible 
Sources.
6. Meet the Needs of the Media.
7. Speak Clearly and with Compassion. 
As can be clearly seen these rules are based on concepts 
such as fair play, commitment to openness, clarity of articulation 
and finally compassion.  It is a well known fact that risk 
communication is a complex process and achieving effective and 
successful communication is an arduous exercise.   But achieve 
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we must in order to overcome many a barrier on the way and 
eliminate risk as successfully as possible. 
Additionally we need to consider further the following issues: 
a) Risks have become pervasive and its experience, ubiquitous 
(Remember Bhopal tragedy). So much so that the modern 
society has to accept risk as one of its defining features. 
b) In the light of this all aspects of Risk Studies, i.e., 
Conceptualization, Perception, Communication, 
Management and Governance have to be examined with 
great responsibility  and accountability to the society  as a 
whole. 
c) Success / Failure in any of these domains can have far 
reaching implications  not only for the present but also for 
the future. 
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The word ‘risk’ has been used to mean different things and 
depends on who uses the word.  In everyday language it is the 
possibility of the occurrence of an undesirable event.  When used 
by a scientist in a technical sense, it is something quantifiable – 
such as probabilities or a numerical representation of severity 
(Hansson, 2009).  A psychologist on the other hand uses the term 
such as risk and at risk with reference to health or mental health. 
Studies on risk have adopted two different approaches. 
One views risk as a physically given attribute of hazardous 
technologies, leading to traditional and technical approach 
to risk assessment while the other is psychometric and 
social science approach (Bradbury, 2009).  Foundations of 
risk lie in decision theory – that focuses on uncertain choice. 
This has led to collaborations among multiple disciplines 
including natural scientists, social scientists, mathematicians, 
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Some risks have immediate effects (tainted food, physical 
and psychological injuries).  Some affect people, others affect 
the environment.  Some are voluntary while others are not. 
Risk may deal with premature babies, vehicle insurance, sex 
education and so on.  Some risks may have varied effects at 
various developmental stages of the person.  Some even may 
affect subsequent generations (Fischhoff and Kadvany, 2011).
A historical evolution of the concept of risk by Beck (2010) 
highlights the evolving of the concept over a period of time. He 
sees darker dimension to developments in science and knowledge 
consequences of scientific and industrial development are a set 
of risks unlike what we have ever seen before.  These dangers 
are not limited to the present time as future generations too 
are affected.  Their spatial consequences are not answerable as 
they cross geographical and national boundaries.  Further it is 
impossible to compensate those who are touched by the hazards. 
Beck saw it as a three stages modernisation and social change. 
First being pre-modernity, second simple modernity where the 
fruit of modernity is reaped by everyone in the industrialised 
society and the third new reflexive modernity representing a risk 
society reaping goods and dangers.  We are faced with choosing 
wealth production and risk production.  Progress remains under 
the jurisdiction of business, science and technology for whom 
democratic procedures are invalid.  In addition, the risks are 
not only more widespread, these are not visible and thus escape 
perception.  These dimensions studied often may be on chemical, 
biological, technological toxins on the environment, rarely does 
it focus on social, cultural and political impacts.  
The socio cultural approaches deny the possibility of a 
standard absolute risk.  Improved technical risk analysis is not 
the answer.  The three key aspects namely, risk perception, risk 
communication and risk management are inextricably linked 
to the larger socio-cultural debate on the nature and role of 
our own modern industrialized civilisation.  The socio-cultural 
approaches have contributed to the following insights.  
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•	 In risk perception there will be new areas such as 
nanotechnology, terrorism, climate change, public health 
and food scares (Lofstedt and Boholm, 2010).
•	 Concepts in risk communications have almost peaked.
•	 Mental models and social application research have 
matured.  Bradbury (2010) sees social trust as a key issue. 
The role of feelings has been highlighted.  
•	 The real growth area is of Risk Management and the whole 
topic of communicating uncertainty.  Greater transparency 
and openness are needed to solve the issue of trust.
Thus we return to the role of psychology, in risk perception, 
communication and management involving the subjective aspect 
of risk – both in the “risk taker” and the “risk producer”.  It all 
settles down in the crucible of man’s perception of risk for himself 
and others and his responses to these in terms of emotions and 
behaviour.
Risk Perception
(a) Psychology of perception in general and risk perception in 
particular.  Perception is commonly view as a conscious process 
involving attention learning and memory.  These follow normal 
psychosocial and psychological rules.  These are laws of recency, 
novelty, repetition, spacing etc. 
Carl Jasper’s (1963) seminal work on psychopathology, 
focussed on the very aspect that causes distortions in perception. 
He grouped these distortion mechanisms as ‘prejudice’ and 
likened them to blinkers limit our perception.  These are:
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o Philosophical (moralistic / theological)
o Use of false analogy
The above prejudice renders one to lose sight of multiple 
facets of the same observed phenomenon.  Risk perception is not 
uniform.  It is determined by the blinkers worn by the perceiver.
(b) Perception leading to responses in the realm of emotions and 
behaviour.
Emerging out of the evolutionary biology, illustrated 
by ‘flight or fight’ in the face of danger response of the man 
that he with the animal, we have, come a long way.  Man’s 
response to ‘real’ ‘impending’ (Risk) and even ‘imagined’ 
dangers have examined in realm of psychology, especially from 
the vantage points of cognitions and emotions.  In this context 
some psychological processes will be described.  These are 
ones described earlier conscious and unconscious processes of 
coping with fears and anxieties.  When a threat is perceived real 
or imagined, the body responds to these by the activation of 
autonomic nervous system.  The manifest symptoms are rapid 
breathing, palpitation, sweating, abdominal discomfort to site 
a few of them.  The immediate response is that of heightened 
emotional state of fear, anxiety or even confusion.  Cognitive 
evaluation also occurs along with.  But all these are intermixed 
strands that are hard to separate.  
Conscious and Unconscious Processes of Normal 
Human Mind
The ways of conscious coping could be problem solving, 
blaming an external agent, manipulation of another person’s 
mind through persuasion, advertisement, propaganda and even 
more recent phenomenon of ‘spin doctoring’ – are examples all 
in the familiar realm of marketing strategies.  
Freud’s pioneering insights in uncovering the unconscious, 
processes that he termed ‘defense mechanisms’ is of relevance 
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here.  Cognitive assessment of perceptions leads conscious 
strategies of coping with the perception, threats or risks.  
Freud’s concepts of defense mechanisms have been 
elaborated by Anna Freud C A Greud. Freud’s unique 
contributions of the defense mechanisms have received no 
attention except from the practising clinicians dealing with 
human mind.  Even then, there is scepticism that these concepts 
have not been empirically validated.  However it is essential 
for us to understand these concepts in the background of risk 
perception.  The linkages will become apparent as one goes 
through the gamut of risk studies.  It is proposed that the human 
mind in a vast reservoir of which only some parts available to 
conscious examination.  Much of our minds contain unconscious 
material consists of images, repressed thoughts or unpleasant 
dreams and many more aspects.  It is proposed that under the 
state of anxiety some of the unconscious material escapes and 
enters the conscious realm.  He suggested the following defense 
mechanism commonly used by us. Defense mechanisms work 
by changing unacceptable impulses into acceptable forms, or by 
unconsciously blocking such impulses, and this reducing anxiety. 
(i) Repression:  Longstanding unconscious suppression of 
unacceptable feelings / thoughts / actions, events and 
to storing these in the unconscious – thus denying its 
existence, a kind of non deliberate one / fools oneself that 
the unpleasant event never happened / or it is completely 
forgotten.
(ii) These do not resolve the conflict but alleviate anxiety to a 
great extent.
(iii) Rationalisation: Tendency to explain one’s behaviour as 
rational with conviction even though it is not.
(iv) Projection: To attribute one’s own thinking to other people 
– while in reality it may be totally untrue.
(v) Displacement: To displace one’s emotions on an object or 
person when it cannot be expressed at the legitimate source.
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(vi) To deny the existence of painful emotions to oneself and 
consequently to others.
(vii) Introjection: Completely absorbing and making one’s own 
thought, feelings and identification behaviours of people 
significant in our lives.  This has an enormous role in the 
building of what is termed ‘conscience’.
(viii) Reaction Formation: A person may disguise his motivation 
and conflict by believing that his motive is exactly opposite 
of what it is.
(ix) Sublimation and Compensation: This is a process – 
where unacceptable impulses are converted into socially 
productive altruism behaviour.  
The above mechanisms form a part and parcel of our 
day-to-day behaviour repertoire – without our being aware of 
it.  But we can access them if we open ourselves to this kind of 
introspection.  
There are also some other conscious and partly unconscious 
mechanisms such as empathy versus bystander apathy.  These 
are important to our responding to subjective and objective 
risks. The point where all the conscious and unconscious defense 
mechanism coincide is where the perception of risk is divided 
into subjective or objective.  
In the risk studies, importance of social networks, risk 
communication and risk management, role of feelings in 
perceiving risk and role of ‘Trust’ in risk management are 
highlighted.  Thus the ‘risk taker’ and ‘risk giver’ are both share 
the human foible of conscious and unconscious mechanisms 
coming in the way of effective dialogue leading effective 
management.
The term individual risk is a misnomer – as all risks are public 
risks in view of collateral damage such as family distress in fluid 
through accidents etc – of which individual is only a small part.
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Subjective risk perception can be mediated, yet the studies 
on tobacco / alcohol misuse, despite best risk communication 
and management have proven to be very resistant to change at 
the level of the individuals.  When one examines the public risks, 
which are continuously being objectively assessed, fortunately 
are more amenable to effective management.  The issue is that in 
a risk society, the onus of risk management cannot be with either 
the experts or the lay public alone.  The broader risk perceptive 
across multiple disciplines, taking into account feelings and trust 
being central to it.
Some examples of the distance between the ‘risk taker’ 
and ‘risk giver’ will illustrate the point.  For example, be it 
war, or any other manmade catastrophe, there is a tendency 
to the perpetrator to view the victims – as non human, 
demonised or considered expendable.  The poor, backward, 
disadvantaged are only there to enable us to grow rich or 
powerful.
Example: Iraq war displaying the Hussein Government 
functionaries as and the pack of playing cards – promoted by the 
US war machine is one such example.
Handling of crisis – through ‘empathy’ and ‘bystander 
apathy’ are two contracting behavious approaches to 
some one in distress  risk perception, communication and 
management and contradictions within three concepts can 
be resolved with clear and specific instances and areas. 
These need to be viewed from vantage points of multiple 
disciplines. Psychology of risk perception and management 
is one of the areas that has been paid only scant attention. 
Risk research should focus not only on the end but the means 
as well.  It is important to remember that anticipation of risk 
as that produces fear is psychologically as damaging, if not 
more, as the actual physical harm.  Thus risk management 
in the biological, psychological and social realms are equally 
important.
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Prof VS Ramamurthy aptly pointed out that the media has 
a major role in shaping public risk perception and acceptance. 
The crux of the issue of risk acceptance is the issue of who is to 
decide what risks are to be taken especially in the public arena 
– should it be the specialist who has all technical knowledge 
or the layperson who is the actual stakeholder. In the public 
arena, we have witnessed waves of anxiety and sometimes 
pandemics when it comes to issues of risk like nuclear decisions 
or epidemics like H1N1, SARS etc. As Prof pointed out, if there 
is public anxiety it means that nothing was done to remove 
anxiety. It means that the specialist has not communicated the 
right information the laypeople. What is significant is that risk 
response is something that have not yet learned and this is due 
to a cluster of factors including sociological and cultural. In the 
end however risk acceptance by individuals is highly personal.
Namitha Kumar
***
Dr. Sangeetha Menon began the session with her talk 
titled ‘Risk Perception and the Sense of Security: A Humanities 
Approach’. In the backdrop of her personal experience of a trip 
to Mt. Kailash, she presented the concerns of individual risk 
perception. The fundamental basis of her talk was the ‘sense 
of security’. Our actions and responses are founded on a sense 
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of security. She discussed keenly phenomenological aspects of 
who is at risk and what is at risk. Dr. Menon’s basic tenets were 
desire, fear and insecurity play a major role in our choice and 
decision-making regarding risk experience. 
Dr. Narasimhan presented a detailed analysis of ‘Risk 
Communication’. The various mediating sources in risk 
communication were discussed at length. He mentioned the 
concept of ‘knowledge-discrepancy’ which highlighted the gap 
between experts and lay people. Experts are credible sources of 
information with sufficient training and experience and they are 
invested with the responsibility of transmitting the information 
to the lay people. 
Dr. Malavika Kapur spoke on the ‘Psychological, Social 
and Cultural Perspectives on Risk’. She spoke of the “blinkers” 
that we adopt (using a term from Jasper’s theory). Blinkers 
are theoretical frameworks which orient our thinking process 
and decide how we view phenomena. For instance, one may 
adopt a ‘methodological blinker’ through which everything is 
‘quantifiable.’  The other theory that Dr. Kapur referred to was 
Freud’s psychodynamic approach. She discussed the various 
defense mechanisms which are not to be considered as risks 
themselves but rather as consolidating the person for perceiving 
risks in a controlled manner. She also discussed importantly 
Empathy and Bystander apathy which foster feelings of trust or 
hostility. These psychological factors affect the individual’s risk 
perceiving modes and thereby also influencing his responses 
and behaviours.
The discussions that followed these talks drew attention 
to the aspects of trust, fear, uncertainty, anxiety that underlie 
in perceiving risk. The ideas of sense of security, emotional 
valences, defense mechanisms, evolution of psychological 
mechanisms of coping for transformed risks, and the various 
communication aspects were brought to the fore and debated 
upon which resulted in a clearer analysis of salient features in 
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risk perception. The individual and his/her psychological forces 
are primary in understanding the situation and also making 
the choice of action, as well as negotiating the consequences. 
However, the individual is also acted upon by the social and 
cultural factors which make key impacts on perception of risk. 
Communication of risk in the public sphere is exigent to the 
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Alcohol and Risk
I begin with the idea of alcohol as a risky commodity. We 
are not talking about something that is “maybe”, “perhaps”, etc. 
Alcohol is a definitely risky commodity, but unfortunately in the 
public mind it is not how it is viewed. 
Risk is focused on a particular form of alcohol use which 
is called alcoholism, alcohol dependence, etc. Unfortunately there 
is another spectrum of alcohol use which is called hazardous 
and harmful use, about which there is no public discourse. 
Unfortunately, in the public discourse, we all think that anyone 
who uses alcohol or uses alcohol in greater measures is an 
alcoholic. I will come to why I am making this distinction. When 
you look at hazardous and harmful use, there is a potential harm 
from the use of alcohol. People who drink too much, drive and 
have an accident. When you drink too much, get disinhibited, 
or go beat your wife and children. The harm from this kind of 
use without you having satisfied criteria for alcoholism is much 
Chapter 5
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more harmful than the harm from alcoholism. Unfortunately 
for our policymakers, this does not exist. What exists is the 
alcoholic. 
So what has happened is that for our policy makers, for 
people who dream up treatment interventions in this country, 
we have spent our money in creating systems for alcoholics 
who have this particular spectrum of behavior. It is a brain 
disorder, like diabetes is a particular disorder of the body. 
Alcohol dependence affects less than 5% of adult Indian males. 
25% of adult Indian males have harmful and hazardous use. 
Unfortunately all our treatment systems are made for the 5% and 
not the 25%. 
Alcohol Use Disorders: Hazardous and Harmful use:-
•	 Hazardous use: pattern of consumption carrying a risk of 
harmful consequences – physical, mental, social consequences 
to self or others.
•	 Harmful use: already causing damage to health - consequences, 
interactions; Strongly affected by sociocultural and 
economic factors Involves approximately 15% of male adult 
population
•	 Greater social costs than dependent users 
•	 Common risk factor implicated in >60 diseases
•	 25% of adult males
Dependent use/Addiction:-
•	 Chronic relapsing brain disorder à interactions of host (genetic 
susceptibility) agent (ATOD), mediated by environmental 
factors (availability, social factors, stress etc). 
•	 Cluster of: strong desire to consume alcohol; impaired 
control over its use; persistent drinking despite harmful 
consequences; higher priority given to drinking than to 
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other activities and obligations; increased alcohol tolerance, 
and a physical withdrawal reaction when alcohol use is 
discontinued. (5% of adult males)
The figure below shows how public perception of risk also 
determines, the public spending on health and other things. So 
basically people are spending only on that small part and not the 
larger portion of the pyramid. 
Figure 1.
It has been invariably been discussed that experts and 
lay people differ over the risk perception about the various 
technologies, natural hazards etc as far as its amount of risk 
concerned. People do not typically respond to the real risks, they 
act out on their own beliefs and perceptions. 
What is not realized is that as far as the global burden of 
disease is concerned, alcohol use causes as much mortality much 
as mortality from contaminated water and poor sanitation. 
Proportion the risks are not perceived as the same. 
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But despite all the harm, alcohol is a low risk perception 
in public discourse. Unlike some of the topics that we will 
talk about, which without proper evidence have a huge risk 
perception. Risk perception is a subjective judgment that people 
make about the characteristics and the severity of the risk. 
Figure 2. Burden on Health: Alcohol misuse- a common risk factor in  
>60 diseases.
Figure 3. The global burden of disease 2004: Population attributable fractions 




Alcohol and Infections  
There is significant relationship between high risk sexual 
behaviour, HIV risk and alcohol use (Chandra et al 1999).  
Alcoholism has been found to be an important factor in 
delay of diagnosis of tuberculosis in South India (Rajeswari et 
al 2002). 
Figure 4. Occupational problems (Gururaj, Girish and Benegal, 2006: Burden 
and socioeconomic impact of alcohol, WHO-SEARO).
Now they use a number of heuristics to evaluate the 
information. Usually these are useful short cuts based on what 
people already know. Now the acceptance of a risk is related to 
how large it is, the benefits associated with the risk generating 
activity, for example, how beneficial is a nuclear power plant, 
versus how dangerous is it? And such qualitative factors 
determine  the voluntariness of the risky activity. 
Now these are some of the things which are also interesting 
to look at. Things which are imposed upon us cause greater fear. 
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Things which are likely to lead to more pain and sufferings like 
cancer cause greater fear. Human made events cause less benefit, 
greater fear. Uncertainty and risk to children – these are some of 
the things which generate more fear in the public discourse.
Figure 5. Alcohol related profits and losses in 2003-04 : Projected national 
estimate. (Gururaj, Girish and Benegal, 2006: Burden and socioeconomic 
impact of alcohol, WHO-SEARO).
Risk perception
•	 Subjective judgment that people make about the 
characteristics and severity of a risk.
•	 Experts and lay people often disagree about how risky 
various technologies and natural hazards.
•	 People  typically do not respond directly to the  real risks, 




Greater Fear Less Fear
Imposed (nuclear accident radia-
tion) Voluntary (medical radiation)
More Pain and Suffering (cancer) Less Pain and Suffering (heart disease)
Human-made (radiation from 
technology) Natural (radiation from the sun)
Less Benefit (vaccines for diseases 
that have been mostly eliminated)
More Benefit (vaccines for 
new strains of influenza – 
H1N1/”Swine flu”)
Uncertainty (nuclear radiation – 
because we can’t detect it, science 
doesn’t have all the answers, or 
we don’t understand all the sci-
ence.)
Certainty/Familiarity – (motor 
vehicle crashes)
Risks to Children (childhood 
vaccines) Risks to Adults (adult vaccines)
There is less fear – if it is voluntary, for example, the fact 
that I am going and having 20 X-rays and probably getting the 
same radiation of in voluntary nature does not cause so much 
fear in my mind. When it is no pain and suffering, natural 
radiation from the sun, that doesn’t cause as much fear. When it 
has more benefit and it has certain familiarity with that particular 
technology, etc. and that is has more risks to adults than children, 
then fear about it comes down. 
Alcohol is risk is perceived as old and well known. It has 
been with human beings since the beginning of time and has 
low and disastrous potential. This is what is there in public 
perception of the risk from alcohol. And so there is obviously 
a schism between what is really true and what is the public 
perception. 
Compared to things like ageing, lightning, traffic accidents, 
industry pollution, etc, the difference between personal risk and 
general risk … that is “I am at risk” to the “Population at risk” is 
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maximum for alcohol and it is probably minimal for other things 
like global warming, etc. Whereas here, there are other things 
like depletion of Ozone layer, global warming, there is quite a 
lot of concordance between “I am at risk” and “Everybody else 
is at risk”. 
People generally expect others to be more affected by 
alcohol than they would be themselves. With the exception of 
problem drinkers – people who drink a lot and who experience 
equally positive and much smaller negative effects than others. 
Generally personal risk is rated as greater – the higher the level 
of alcohol consumption that one has, there is a clear under-
estimation of personal risk from alcohol. 
Questions about smoking risk also show the same trend. 
The reason why we need to be worried about it is that is it is well 
known that health promotion by means of campaigns is usually 
quite ineffective. 
These difficulties may be related to the lack of insight into 
the personal risk the people frequently face. Perception of risk 
also differs with age and gender. With younger people, as far as 
drugs and alcohol are concerned, younger people less likely … 
to actually twelve to thirteen year-olds, perceive smoking, drugs, 
marijuana to be than older people. This perception also differs 
with gender. 
Women tend to look at some of these behaviours as of 
greater risk than men, in fact this is a study the 23 country study 
that we did, basically on nonrated use of alcohol in men and 
women in India, and what we found was that women tend to 
have more negative effects from alcohol than men did.  Now, 
the second point I wish to make is that the public discourse on 
alcohol consumption like it has started off is very different from 
the reality. The public discourse is focused on the alcoholic and 
therefore it marginalizes and minimizes the risk as belonging 
to a small group of others. Not us.  So the people who are at 
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risk are what I call the four “P”s. the Poor – they drink because 
they don’t know what to do, the Primitive – the tribals drink 
because they are not educated enough. The Perverted, that is 
the rich and that kind of thing … they drink … what can we do? 
They have too much of money for their own good and lastly the 
Privileged. 
So, if it is a problem related to a small proportion, then shut 
them up. This is the way we looked at asylums, this is the way 
we looked at sanatoria. We don’t know the reason why this is 
happening, if we don’t know why tuberculosis happens, so shunt 
the person off to a hill station where the cold climate will make 
the person better. And that is how we have looked at alcohol 
problems and how we have dealt with them. 
Neurobiology of Risk perception and  
Communication
I have put these in deliberately because we were talking 
about some of these things. 
How the Brain Works
Now it is important to understand how the brain perceives 
reward and risk. Now the most important things that the brain 
does is that it propels and motivates.
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So, in other words, this is how people perceive risk. The 
other thing that you need to know is this perception is about 
general risk. They are parts of the brain which Ramachandran 
(2000) has famously to alluded to as mirror neurons that mirror 
where the activity and thoughts reflects those of other people. 
This may happen in risk perception too. 
The human brain has this capacity of filling in the dots or 
gaps. And this is very important when it comes to risk perception. 
I have some amount of information … it is not full … but my 
brain fills in the gaps, and makes a rope into a snake. 
The take away from neurobiology is that we could use is 
that risk is related to high emotional value or failure. Something 
which has greater emotional value will always be perceived as 
the right message. 
We should have for scientific communicators, a learning 
that we need to be able to pick up the game form the people who 
do advertising. We need to be able to sell scientific facts in the 
same way they sell soaps! Obviously people in science are not 
paid to do it. Then you should have someone who does that! 
First, it is always how you dress up the message. Second, you 
need to reduce cognitive dissonance. For example, whether I feel 
it for something or not depends on what is there in my database. 
What is there in my database is my father saying “Do not steal 
… do not take anything from … “ … there is no way I am going 
to do it or no way I am going to consider it. If I have to consider 
it, then the alarm bells will ring … “Risky, risky, risky, risky … 
don’t do it!’. 
So when you give a message, you need to reduce the 
cognitive dissonance. Everybody’s database, is full of “My god! 
We are all going to die!” as opposed to  “we need lots of energy” 
That is a new fact. I mean, it does not … it cannot come “My 
god! You are going to die!”. The message should be openness 
and trust worthy. 
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One also needs to appear as open and trustworthy, because 
the brain also reacts and have a mechanism to look at and say 
this is pure stimulus and this is non –pure stimulus. This is an 
open phase, this is a closed phase. 
The last is “reasoned evidence”. The problem with evidence 
is that we believe that “Oh! You must get evidence … and 
evidence will trump all”. Unfortunately evidence creates more 
confusion. 
As far as drugs and alcohol is concerned, adolescents and 
young adults are at risk, people who have this whole external 
behavior where they are impulsive, have more process of 
attention allocation, planning some mistake, hyperactive, you 
know… these are the same parts of the brain that I talked about 
which are involved in motivation and risk perception… 
Kids have a poorer ability because the brain has not 
matured. The myelination or the insulation of the wiring of 
the brain does not occur till 23 or 25 and these areas of the 
brain are the last to mature. So, young people do not have the 
ability to really perceive risk. Of course, people who have had 
developmental stresses, people who grow with malnutrition, 
uncongenial environment, poverty in childhood, all these go 
to delay in maturation of the brain. So what we have been 
finding consistently in this spectrum of people. There is a 
need of impulsive experimentation, novelty seeking, peer 
influences is greater than parental warnings, and difficulty 
in learning from prior mistakes, and difficulty from assessing 
risk benefits. But what we do find is that adolescents have 
poorer risk perception because their brains are not mature or 
grown up enough and it is still a work of art in progress. But 
what we have been consistently finding. That when you look 
at children who are at high risk of developing problems, who 
have poorer risk perception, you will find in comparison, the 
children with better risk perception. 
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In children with poor risk perception that there are certain 
areas of the brain that are consistently smaller, grow at a slower 
pace, than children who are not at risk. And this is the pre-frontal 
area of the brain. 
Offering mode recent information is much better than peer 
campaign, as far as all the things are concerned. Peer campaign 
usually leads to immediate desire to experiment and try it out. So 
all the advertising that we do for drugs and alcohol are useless, a 
waste of money, because they only make young people go “Oh! 
That? Let’s go and try that!”. 
To conclude, this is what we have learned from neurobiology;
(i) It is that any information should have high emotional 
value, balance of emotional values, or failures. It must 
be something which is important, and it should strike an 
emotional chord in the person.
(ii) It is that it should aim to reduce the cognitive dissonance 
or the gap between what I already know and what I really 
believe in and what you are telling me. And if it is out of 
sync with what I know, I am going to reject it. 
(iii) It is that it should be presented in a matter that it should be 
in an open and confidence inducing.
(iv) It is that there should be presentation of reasoned evidence, 
not a huge mass of unsuitable evidence
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Introduction
There has been a sudden explosion in the use of cell phones 
over the last ten years. In India, millions of cell phones are being 
used, at all economic levels, with a significant impact on the 
economy and living style of individuals. As may be expected, 
the younger generation are the largest users of cell phones. Some 
of them use cell phones for hours. 
In India, cell phone base stations are spread all over a city. 
There do not seem to be much concern expressed at any level 
1 (This article has two sections. In the first, the essential features of Cell phones and the 
Electromagnetic radiations are discussed. In the second section, the possibilities of 
brain Cancer emanating from the use of cell phones are discussed)
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about health hazards, if any, caused by the proliferation of cell 
phones and base stations. Several International studies have 
been carried out. Some of the results do not warrant concern. 
Some of the studies are inconclusive.
It has been reported that reduction of population of some 
insects such as bees, has been observed in some places. It 
has been suspected that intense microwaves may be causing 
disorientation of some insects and birds. Birds are seldom seen 
to rest on the roof top towers that are cluttered all over Indian 
cities, possibly against rules which we seldom like to adhere 
to.
A brief account of Electromagnetic waves, used as carrier 
waves in Cell phones, is provided, with particular emphasis 
on thermal effects that it causes due to dielectric heating. This 
calls for a brief account of the structure of a cell phone and the 
transmitter and aerial where maximum intensity of the EM 
waves occurs.
Electromagnetic Waves and microwaves
We seldom realize that we are immersed in electromagnetic 
waves. Solar energy comes as electromagnetic waves, largely as 
visible light and infrared or heat. Besides, radio waves are all 
pervasive which enable us to tune in any station anywhere in 
the world. Light and heat waves are essential for  life rather than 
being harmful. What is most important is the intensity of these 
waves. Intense light may be blinding and intense infrared may 
scald.
Figure 1 gives  an Electromagnetic wave band and one may 
see that microwave occupies the range of about 800-2000 MHz 
( million cycles per second ) placed between infrared and radio 
waves. At the high frequency  and short wavelength end ,we 
have Gamma Rays, X’rays,  which are high energy waves and 
can ionize an atom. It is known that Extensive exposure to X’rays 
can cause cancer. 
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Figure 1:
Source: http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/cell-phone-radiation1.htm
These rays are ionizing and can break a DNA leading 
to cancer. Excessive exposure to ultra violet rays are also 
undesirable.
Microwaves are non-ionizing, much as visible light and infrared 
are, have lower frequency, longer wavelength (in mm-cm range) and 
less energy.
The energy from Infrared incident on a body is absorbed 
leading to the increase in molecular velocity and the temperature 
of the body increases (heating water by applying heat in a gas 
cooker). The thermal effect in a microwave oven is different. This 
is caused by what is known as di-electric heating.
Consider a molecule of water (or of some fatty tissues). 
In water two Hydrogen atoms are attached at an angle (almost 
105 deg). The Oxygen end is more electronegative than the 
Hydrogen end and the molecule with opposite polarities at two 
ends acts as an electric dipole.  When subjected to an alternating 
electric field, the dipoles try to align themselves with the 
direction of the field. In a microwave oven, this happens say 
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1000 million times in a second (the frequency of the microwave 
chosen) and the water. Molecules constantly hit each others 
and the “friction” generates heat. We shall presently see that 
although non-ionizing, a microwave operated cell phone has 




A cell phone is so called not for its cellular structure 
but because the operational area of a phone is divided into a 
number of hexagonal cells. The frequency selected for one 
cell is different that of an adjacent cell but may be the same 
as a cell with any other non-adjacent cell. When a cell phone 
owner moves from one cell to the adjacent cell she is locked 
into a different frequency and that is what makes the cell 
phone a “mobile phone”. A cell phone is some what like the 
chord-less phone in which the telephone behaves like the “base 
station’ with the user “locked” into the base wireless with one 
frequency and within a limited range. The base emits the audio 
signal it receives from a caller using an electromagnetic wave as 
the carrier wave modulated by the audio signal. The intensity 
of the signal diminishes as one moves farther away from the 
base, becoming inaudible beyond a point. In a mobile phone the 
signal is picked up at a different frequency without interrupting 
the conversation.
Unlike in a telephone, the caller’s audio signal is also 
delivered chord-less with the help of a carrier wave. In a radio, 
audio signals which are slow (1.6km in five seconds and get 
attenuated) are  “carried”  as it were by an Electromagnetic wave 
which travels at 300,000 km  in one second  and at the filtered by 
the receiver at the other end and amplified. 
A cell phone has both a “Transmitter” an “antenna” and 
a “receiver” all built into a small place with the rechargeable 
battery, providing the power for transmission, reception and 
amplification occupying a disproportionately large space. 
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As has been stated earlier it is the intensity of the signal 
which is important and in the case of cell phone Specific Absorption 
Rate (SAR) is of significance. It measures the electromagnetic 
energy absorbed in a human body in weight in unit time and the 
unit of SAR is Watts/kg. (Watt is the unit of power or energy in 
unit time) The U.S., Canadian and Australian legal limit for SAR 
is no more than 1.6 W/kg, taken over a volume of one gram of 
tissue. 
Cell phone generates di-electric heat in the tissues in the 
area against which the cell phone is kept pressed, the power 
density in the antenna being maximum. Since the user of cell 
phones is habituated to use the same side of the head and the 
same area the tissues tend to get heat heated and it is essential 
to study whether the thermal effect, which is likely to be 
cumulative, may cause any damage after several years of cell 
phone use.
Since microwaves, as stated earlier, are non- ionizing, the 
cumulative effects of ionization as may be in ultraviolet or X’rays 
may be ruled out where microwave or radio frequencies are 
concerned.
Health hazards of base stations
The base stations which monitor hundreds of cell phone 
all the time have antennas which are constantly receiving 
and transmitting signals may cause harm to the immediate 
neighbourhood since the signals are operative most of the time 
and may add up to cause more harm. The intensity of the signal 
decays inversely as the square of the distance and if the tower 
is tall the intensity of the signal reaching the ground is not 
sufficiently strong to be harmful. 
A 2005 recommendation from a group of experts in France 
considered it mandatory that antennas should be located 
at more than 100 meters from primary schools or childcare 
facilities.
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As stated earlier, rules and regulations in our country are 
violated with impunity and no studies seem to have been made 
about the hazardous effects, if any, of base stations on humans, 
like a shopkeeper who sits in a shop all day under an antenna, 
not very far above. 
It is desirable that such studies be carried out by governments 
and regulatory bodies so that legislations, if required, may be 
passed to protect people from what may be a long term hazard 
from the use of telephones and/or base stations scattered all 
over a city.   
Can cell phones cause cancer?
Cell phones emit radiofrequency energy (radio waves) is 
a form of electromagnetic radiation(non-ionizing radiation). 
Tissues nearest to where the phone is held can absorb this 
energy. Electromagnetic radiation can be categorized into two 
types: ionizing (e.g., x-rays, radon, and cosmic rays) and non-
ionizing (e.g., radiofrequency and extremely low-frequency 
or power frequency) Exposure to ionizing radiation, such as 
from radiation therapy, is known to increase the risk of cancer. 
However, although many studies have examined the potential 
health effects of non-ionizing radiation from radar, microwave 
ovens, and other sources, there is currently no consistent 
evidence that non-ionizing radiation increases cancer risk .The 
only known biological effect of radiofrequency energy is heating. 
Radiofrequency exposure from cell phone use can cause heating 
but it is not sufficient to measurably increase body temperature. 
A recent study showed that when people used a cell phone for 
50 minutes, brain tissues on the same side of the head as the 
phone’s antenna metabolized more glucose than did tissues on 
the opposite side of the brain . 
Although there have been some concerns that radiofrequency 
energy from cell phones held closely to the head may affect the 
brain and other tissues, to date there is no evidence from studies 
of cells, animals, or humans that radiofrequency energy can cause 
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cancer. It is generally accepted that damage to DNA is necessary 
for cancer to develop. However, radiofrequency energy, unlike 
ionizing radiation, does not cause DNA damage in cells, and it 
has not been found to cause cancer in animals.
Researchers have carried out several types of epidemiologic 
studies to investigate the possibility of a relationship between 
cell phone use and the risk of malignant (cancerous) brain 
tumors, such as gliomas, as well as benign (noncancerous) 
tumors, such as acoustic neuromas (tumors in the cells of the 
nerve responsible for hearing), most meningiomas (tumors in 
the meninges, membranes that cover and protect the brain and 
spinal cord), and parotid gland tumors (tumors in the salivary 
glands) In one type of study, called a case-control study, cell 
phone use was compared between people with these types of 
tumors and people without them. In another type of study, 
called a cohort study, a large group of people is followed over 
time and the rate of these tumors in people who did and didn’t 
use cell phones was compared. The results of these studies have 
generally not provided clear evidence of a relationship between 
cell phone use and cancer, but there have been some statistically 
significant findings in certain subgroups of people.
Examples of case control studies:
The Interphone Study, conducted by a consortium of 
researchers from 13 countries, is the largest health-related 
case-control study of use of cell phones and head and neck 
tumors. Most published analyses from this study have shown 
no statistically significant increases in brain or central nervous 
system cancers related to higher amounts of cell phone use. 
A cohort study in Denmark linked billing information 
from more than 420,000 cell phone subscribers with brain tumor 
incidence data from the Danish Cancer Registry. The analyses 
found no association between cell phone use and the incidence of 
glioma, meningioma, or acoustic neuroma, even among people 
who had been cell phone subscribers for 10 or more years.
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Early case-control studies in the United States, Europe, and 
Japan were unable to demonstrate a relationship between cell 
phone use and glioma or meningioma. Some case-control studies 
in Sweden found statistically significant trends of increasing 
brain cancer risk for the total amount of cell phone use and the 
years of use among people who began using cell phones before 
age 20. 
However, another large, case-control study in Sweden did 
not find an increased risk of brain cancer among people between 
the ages of 20 and 69. In addition, the international CEFALO 
study, which compared children who were diagnosed with brain 
cancer between ages 7 and 19 with similar children who were 
not, found no relationship between their cell phone use and risk 
for brain cancer.
Reasons for these discrepancies include the 
following:
•	 Recall bias, which may happen when a study collects data 
about prior habits and exposures using questionnaires 
administered after disease has been diagnosed in some of 
the study participants. Many epidemiologic studies of cell 
phone use and brain cancer risk lack verifiable data about 
the total amount of cell phone use over time. 
•	 Inaccurate reporting, which may happen when people 
say that something has happened more or less often than 
it actually did. People may not remember how much they 
used cell phones in a given time period.
•	 Morbidity and mortality among study participants who 
have brain cancer. Gliomas are particularly difficult to 
study, for example, because of their high death rate and 
the short survival of people who develop these tumors. 
Patients who survive initial treatment are often impaired, 
which may affect their responses to questions
•	 Participation bias, which can happen when people who are 
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diagnosed with brain tumors are more likely than healthy 
people (known as controls) to enroll in a research study. 
Also, controls who did not or rarely used cell phones were 
less likely to participate 
•	 Changing technology and methods of use. Older studies 
evaluated radiofrequency energy exposure from analog 
cell phones. However, most cell phones today use digital 
technology, which operates at a different frequency and a 
lower power level than analog phones. Digital cell phones 
have been in use for more than a decade in the United States, 
and cellular technology continues to change. Texting, for 
example, has become a popular way of using a cell phone to 
communicate that does not require bringing the phone close 
to the head. Furthermore, the use of hands-free technology, 
such as wired and wireless headsets, is increasing and may 
decrease radiofrequency energy exposure to the head and 
brain.
Studies from major organizations
The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), 
a component of the World Health Organization, has recently 
classified radiofrequency fields as “possibly carcinogenic to 
humans,” based on limited evidence from human studies, 
limited evidence from studies of radiofrequency energy and 
cancer in rodents, and weak mechanistic evidence (from studies 
of genotoxicity, effects on immune system function, gene and 
protein expression, cell signaling, oxidative stress, and apoptosis, 
along with studies of the possible effects of radiofrequency 
energy on the blood-brain barrier).
The National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences 
(NIEHS) states that the weight of the current scientific evidence 
has not conclusively linked cell phone use with any adverse 
health problems, but more research is needed.
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is 
responsible for regulating the safety of machines and devices 
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that emit radiation (including cell phones), notes that studies 
reporting biological changes associated with radiofrequency 
energy have failed to be replicated and that the majority of 
human epidemiologic studies have failed to show a relationship 
between exposure to radiofrequency energy from cell phones 
and health problems.
The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
states that, although some studies have raised concerns about 
the possible risks of cell phone use, scientific research as a whole 
does not support a statistically significant association between 
cell phone use and health effects.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) concludes 
that there is no scientific evidence that proves that wireless phone 
use can lead to cancer or to other health problems, including 
headaches, dizziness, or memory loss.
Studies that will help further our understanding of 
the health effects of cell phone use
A large prospective cohort study of cell phone use and 
its possible long-term health effects was launched in Europe 
in March 2010. This study, known as COSMOS, will enroll 
approximately 250,000 cell phone users ages 18 or older and 
will follow them for 20 to 30 years. Participants in COSMOS will 
complete a questionnaire about their health, lifestyle, and current 
and past cell phone use. This information will be supplemented 
with information from health records and cell phone records.
Do children have a higher risk of developing cancer 
due to cell phone use than adults?
In theory, children have the potential to be at greater 
risk than adults for developing brain cancer from cell phones. 
Their nervous systems are still developing and therefore 
more vulnerable to factors that may cause cancer. Their heads 
are smaller than those of adults and therefore have a greater 
proportional exposure to the field of radiofrequency radiation 
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that is emitted by cell phones. And children have the potential of 
accumulating more years of cell phone exposure than adults do.
So far, the data from clinical studies in children do not 
support this theory. The first published analysis came from a 
large case-control study called CEFALO, which was conducted 
in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland. The study 
included children who were diagnosed with brain tumors 
between 2004 and 2008, when their ages ranged from 7 to 19. 
Researchers did not find an association between cell phone use 
and brain tumor risk in this group of children. However, they 
noted that their results did not rule out the possibility of a slight 
increase in brain cancer risk among children who use cell phones, 
and that data gathered through prospective studies and objective 
measurements, rather than participant surveys and recollections, 
will be key in clarifying whether there is an increased risk.
Conclusion
It is difficult to give a definitive answer to the question of 
whether the use of cell-phone may cause brain cancer or other 
health problems. Since the extent and duration of the use of cell 
phones have been increasing, particularly among the younger 
population, certain precautions should be taken to avoid 
potential hazards that may not be totally ruled out. 
The FDA and FCC have suggested some steps that 
concerned cell phone users can take to reduce their exposure to 
radio frequency energy.
•	 Reserve the use of cell phones for shorter conversations or 
for times when a landline phone is not available.
•	 Use a hands-free device, which places more distance 
between the phone and the head of the user.
Hands-free kits reduce the amount of radiofrequency 
energy exposure to the head because the antenna, which is the 
source of energy, is not placed against the head.
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Discussion
Prof  Vivek Benegal:  The issue of alcohol use/abuse is 
perceived usually as the problem of alcoholism which affects 
5% of adult males. Public perception of alcohol use/abuse is 
usually restricted to the issue of alcoholism. Alcoholism tends 
to be viewed mostly as a general risk rather than a personal 
risk. There is less fear regarding this issue (because it is kind 
of voluntary, one gets into it and there are ways of getting out 
unlike diseases like cancer over which one has no control). The 
psychometric model views this issue as linked to developmental 
stresses. There are neurobiological reasons behind risk-related 
behaviors but this is not a simple deterministic model. What 
Prof Benegal rightly points out is that in deterring risk-related 
behavior when it comes to alcoholism, drugs or smoking is the 
need to personalize the message so that it hits home to the right 
spot. 
Prof D P Sen Gupta, NIAS & Dr.Vani Santosh, NIMHANS: 
Cell phone usage and risks regarding brain cancers is a pressing 
issue given the widespread use even among children. As Prof 
Sengupta pointed out, microwaves used as carrier waves to 
transmit and receive audio signals are thought to cause brain 
cancers. However, as Dr Vani Santosh pointed out through 
reference to studies made, the induction time is over several 
decades. There does not seem to be conclusive studies regarding 
the magnitude of the risk involved. Some studies have shown 
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that the risk of developing brain tumor on the same side of 
the head preferred for cell phone use. Radiation used to kill 
primary tumors of the brain often leaves the patient with a risk 
of developing a secondary tumor post-treatment. This can in a 
way be linked to the risk of cell phone and brain cancers. (Gap 
– What about the other technologies associated with cell phones 
apart from the magnetic waves? Bluetooth, infrared, wireless etc. 
We looked at the thermodynamic image of a brain that was 
under cell phone conversation for about 15 min. What does this 
imply? Does it mean that some sort of damage is done to the 
brain but it may not be cancer? (Just like TV, computers cause 
problems like Attention Deficit Disorders, are there any studies 




Demystifying GMOs  
in India
(Public Risk Perception of – Genetically 
Modified (GM) Crops)
 M Mahadevappa
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Mysore 570 004
While I hear and read a great deal in the media about 
concerns and apprehensions about GM foods these days, I 
am convinced that more efforts are needed on the part of the 
scientific community towards disseminating factual information 
related to GM technology and creating public awareness on the 
safety and benefits of  this modern and potential  technology. 
This note is a small step in this endeavor.  
Application of modern biotechnology for crop improvement 
is one of the most significant technological advances to impact 
modern agriculture in the past twenty five years. Since their 
first approval for commercial cultivation in the USA in 1996, 
genetically modified (GM) crops, as of 2010, are grown on about 
148 million hectares (650 m acres) in 29 countries, including India, 
by 15.4 million farmers (James, 2010).  In India, Bt cotton which 
is the only GM crop approved since 2002, is cultivated on over 
Chapter 7
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10.0 m ha by 6.0 m farmers, reflecting their vote of confidence in 
this technology (Manjunath, 2011). Researchers in this field are 
transferring genes into plants to impart resistance to herbicides, 
biotic and abiotic stresses (insects, disease, drought, low 
temperature and soil mineral stresses, storability of products etc), 
besides enhancing nutritional quality of foods and production 
of pharmaceutical and industrial products.   Biotechnology can 
aid in producing new varieties more quickly and efficiently, 
and it can introduce desirable traits into plants that could not 
be established through conventional plant breeding techniques. 
Here are some scientific reasons as to why many apprehensions 
regarding biotechnology are unwarranted.
Mode of pollination
Adding some new genotypes through genetic 
engineering or conventional breeding techniques to the existing 
germplasm (varieties), for the benefit of the farmers, does not 
pollute or contaminate or destroy native germplasm. Life began 
with a single cell (unicellular) and multicellular organisms came 
into existence as the evolution progressed and diversity has been 
expanding all the time on account of genetic and environmental 
conditions and their interactions (Lemaux, 2009).   Destruction of 
biodiversity is occurring by unscientific and irrational diversion 
of the pristine forest and agricultural lands for commercial 
purposes through land grabbing (habitat destruction), an all too 
common occurrence in the developing countries. 
Though new genotypes are being added by nature and 
by human selection, the mode of pollination specific to crop 
does not change.  There is no scientific evidence to suggest that 
GM varieties changed the mode of pollination, contaminated 
native species or destroyed the native germplasm after their 
introduction into the counties growing GM crops (Lemaux, 2009). 
Farming, which is constantly expanding for increasing food and 
fodder production, by itself, might have reduced habitats of wild 
germplasm to some extent.  It is to conserve the germplasm many 
gene banks are in place in most countries. In India, National Plant 
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Genetic Bureaus (NBPGR, NBAGR, NBFGR, NBAIM and NBAII 
for plant, animal, fish, agriculturally important microorganism 
and insects, respectively), which are the third largest facility in 
the world, are conserving both wild and cultivated germplasm 
ex-situ and in-situ. Farmers are also participating in this activity 
as partners with National Active Germplasm Sites (NAGS) for in 
situ conservation.
Bt Cotton 
Bt cotton is the first and the only GM crop under cultivation 
in India. The fact that Bt cotton revolutionized cotton production 
in India bringing it to second position from the fifth position in 
the world stands as testimony for success of the first GM crops 
technology.  In addition, there is drastic reduction in use of 
pesticides obviating environmental pollution and enhancing the 
profit margin of farmers, a win–win situation in environmental 
economic terms (Naranjo and Ellsworth, 2009; Kalyan, 
2010).  This is an apparent illustration of the ways and means 
of conserving the genetic wealth of cotton adopting both in 
situ and ex situ methods. There is significant contribution from 
the farming community in situ conservation which needs to be 
recognized. In fact, for the first time in the history, the Prime 
Minister of India recognized farmers of Karnataka and Orissa 
states for their conservation efforts on July 16, 2011 on the 
foundation day of Indian Council of Agricultural Research, New 
Delhi.
Development of varieties in the National Agricultural 
Research System (NARS) in India
NARS in partnership with farmer/scientists, traditional 
way of selecting improved ones, hundreds of new varieties and 
hybrids are released both from public and private sectors. Most 
of these are improvements of the local traditional cultivations to 
meet the productivity and quality requirements.  These efforts 
cannot be treated as biopiracy as some NGOs allege. NARS has 
the right to use varieties for improvement and has been doing 
since ages. The Seed Act and seed rules, under sui generous system 
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in vogue in India, clearly exempt the use of native germplasm by 
farmers and the researchers. 
Challenges posed by climate change and diminishing forest 
area and shrinking agricultural land
With climate change destabilizing the agro climatic 
conditions in which water and arable land are reduced, modern 
biotechnology comes in handy to mitigate and improve 
productivity through varietal improvement, including hybrids 
which can tolerate harsh environments. Biotechnological 
tools are powerful and need to be exploited to meet the future 
challenges arising out of climate change and declining land 
productivity including large scale conversion of agricultural 
lands for non agricultural purposes.
Biosafety
It is a matter of serious concern in the minds of the public 
that needs to be addressed.  Therefore, all biosafety issues 
become important that is the reason that, in all countries, 
biosafety committees are in operation.  Government of India has 
established a statutory regulatory committee of experts to assess 
biosafety of biotechnology products.  The biosafety committee 
should take care of this aspect and it is why it should be broad 
based representing all stakeholders with experienced and 
knowledgeable members to guide the research activities keeping 
biosafety as the prime concern. What is often not realized by the 
critics as well as by public is that in every country, every biotech 
product is subjected to stringent biosafety and agronomic tests 
before they are approved as safe for commercial cultivation. In 
India, Bt cotton has undergone such tests for 7-8 years and the 
safety data are posted by the Dept of Biotechnology (DBT), Govt 
of India, in the public domain (website of IGMORIS). 
Intellectual Property Rights
There is   general ignorance about the provision that plant 
varieties can be registered according to Protection of Plant 
91
 M Mahadevappa
Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act (PPV & FRA). It is necessary 
to understand and appreciate that the crops and varieties can 
be registered with PPV & FRA as the property of individuals or 
organizations and that there is a system to conserve germplasm 
(Kowalski et al., 2002). 
All the stakeholders involved in the research on transgenics, 
GMOs and genetic engineering need to be fully aware of the 
provisions in the genotypes for conversion through the related 
Acts (PPV & FRA; NBA; Seed Act & Rules etc.).  While BD 
Act 2002 makes provision to use germplasm by the public 
institutions for the public good development, it also provides 
the necessary frame work for equitable sharing of profit among 
the people who conserved the germplasm.  It is also the NBA’s 
responsibility to educate the public and demystify all rules 
and regulations I on their website.   Activists and NGOs also 
need to make use of the provision made in PPV &FRA, NBA 
and State and GoI Departments to create awareness on the new 
Acts. 
Misconceptions
Many in the public have misgivings, apprehensions and 
misconceptions about the GM crops.  It is important to realize 
that safety is accorded the highest priority in biotechnology and 
allay such fears by providing explanations based on scientific 
facts (Manjunath, 2011). Some of these are highlighted below:
GM crops have terminator gene: There is a fear that GM seeds 
have terminator gene blocking the germinating capacity of the 
seeds of next generation of a variety forcing the farmer to buy 
seed every time.   There is no terminator gene being used in 
any breeding programme either with the public or with private 
sector. 
The soil gets contaminated and fertility goes down: A vast area 
is planted to GM crops in many countries. There is no data or any 
scientific basis to fear this.
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GM crops promote monocropping: It is often quoted that in 
India GM crops have promoted monocropping since Green 
Revolution time. The first GM crop to enter Indian soil was Bt 
cotton which was allowed for commercialization only during 
2002. Green revolution in India was due to adoption package 
of high yielding and hybrid varieties with suitable package 
of practices and quick adoption by farmers, even before GM 
technology research commenced in India! 
Safety of Bt Cry proteins: Be it cotton or brinjal, the cry 1 class 
of proteins have selective toxicity to certain category of insects 
called Lepidoptera.  Cotton boll worms and fruit and shoot borers 
of brinjal,   require certain specific conditions for their effective 
action. The protein has to be ingested by the target insects which 
happen when the caterpillars feed on the transgenic plant tissues. 
It requires an alkaline pH of 9.5 or above for effective processing 
and also specific receptors for binding before it can kill the target 
insect. All these conditions are available in cotton bollworms and 
brinjal fruit and shoot borers and, therefore, those caterpillars 
get killed when they feed on them. The protein cannot act in the 
human or animal intestine because their intestine is acidic, pH 
is about 3.5 and there are no receptors. Hence, Bt protein is safe 
to such non-target organisms. The cry proteins produced in Bt-
cotton or brinjal have been shown to rapidly degrade when crop 
residues are incorporated into the soil.   Thus, the impact of these 
crops on environment and human safety is negligible. This is 
further supported by the long history of safe use of Bt microbial 
spray formulations for control of insect pests on a variety crops 
all over the world for more than 40 years. 
GM crop seeds can be produced and sold only by multinational 
companies: This is not true. Public organizations are researching 
now and will soon come out with GM varieties/ hybrids and 
private companies will have no role on seeds of such seeds 
unless there is agreement to that effect. Farmers can be trained 
to produce their own seeds. Only in respect of specific hybrids 
developed by private companies farmers will have to go to 
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MNCs. This could help to clear the doubts prevailing in minds 
of activists and some NGOs that this technology is the monopoly 
of MNCs.  Bt brinjal varieties being developed at University of 
Agricultural Sciences, Dharwad are one such example where 
farmers can produce their own seeds and share with fellow 
farmers.
The traditional varieties will be contaminated and biodiversity 
disturbed: This is not true and has no scientific basis as explained 
above in this article. Several varieties have been co-existing 
and the new genotypes will be added as accessions to the 
existing germplasm.  The nature of pollination does not change 
if a few new genotypes are added. There is no evidence that, 
with addition of new genotypes the traditional biodiversity is 
contaminated.
Inadequate testing: This seems to be a serious concern of 
many.  There is a committee that evaluates the biosafety of every 
GM crop.   This committee called GEAC has been doing its job 
competently for over 15 years now. 
GM technology needs to be encouraged. Delaying their 
development and release for reasons which are not scientific 
is denying the Indian farmer the benefit of science! China is 
harvesting science and technology benefits through quick 
adoption of technologies that are developed from time to time 
and hence their productivity level is of the order of twice that of 
Indian farmer.  Indeed, never before in the history of mankind 
the food crop varieties were subjected to the rigorous tests the 
GM crops are being subjected. If need arises, it can be made even 
more rigorous. 
Benefits from Bt. cotton: Both pre- and post-
commercialization studies conducted by several public and 
other institutions have clearly indicated that Bt cotton has been 
beneficial to farmers. The increase in yield due to effective 
control of bollworms was 37%, reduction in chemical sprays 41%, 
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increased in net profit to a farmer was about 89% that accounted 
for about US$131 (Rs.7,750=00) per hectare (Qaim, Subramanian 
and Sadashivappa, 2009), acknowledging that benefits will vary 
from year to year depending upon the weather factors and pest 
intensity.
Conclusions
With a rising population, depleting land and water resources 
and rapidly increasing food prices, India needs cutting edge crop 
technologies to enhance farm output and achieve overall food 
security. The impacts of such changes have been significant in 
India’s cotton sector, but less so in case of the country’s main 
cereal crops, where both yield and output growth rates have been 
relatively stagnant. Genetically Modified (GM) technology is a 
globally recognized way to improve productivity, profitability 
and sustainability of farm production systems, including the 
small farm holdings. At present public perceptions about GM 
technology are often not based on scientific facts. It is an irony 
that on one side we are testing and releasing pesticides on a 
regular basis that are harmful to ecosystem and on the other 
we pose hurdles in releasing biotech products that reduce the 
use of pesticides quoting the same environmental concerns! 
Information communication system, including public extension 
and awareness services, need to be considerably improved in 
order to effectively deliver correct and unbiased information to 
farmers and the general public.  The benefits of the technology 
far outweigh any risks and we must embrace the opportunities 
created by it.  It should be realized that biotechnology research 
is meant for human welfare and should be harnessed for lifting 
people out of poverty. 
References
BD Act, (2002). India’s Biodiversity Act 2002 and its role in conservation. 
Tropical Ecology 50(1): 23-30, 2009
Andow, D.A. (2010). Bt Brinjal: The scope and adequacy of the GEAC 
environmental risk assessment. (Not cited in the text)
Betz, F.S., Bruce G. Hammond and Roy L. Fuchs (2000). Safety and 
95
 M Mahadevappa
Advantages of Bacillus thuringiensis-Protected Plants to Control Insect 
Pests. Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology, 32: 156-173. (Not 
cited in the text)
IGMORIS (Indian GMO Research Information System): http://igmoris.
nic.in/major_developments1.asp James, Clive. (2010). Global Status 
of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2010. ISAAA Brief No. 42. 
ISAAA: Ithaca, NY. (Not cited in the text)
Kalyan, C.  (2010). Report: Cotton industry (Production management), 
Cotton industry (Technology application), Agricultural biotechnology 
(Economic aspects), Indian Journal of Economics and Business, 
Volume: 9 Source Issue: 4
Kowalski, S.P., Ebora, R.V., Kryder, R.D. and Potter, R.H. (2002). 
“Transgenic crops, biotechnology and ownership rights: What scientists 
need to know?” The Plant Journal 31(4): 407-421. 
Lemaux, P.G. (2009). Genetically Engineered Plants and Foods: A 
Scientist’s Analysis of the Issues (Part 11). Annual Review of Plant 
Biology. Vol. 60: 511-559. http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/
doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.arplant.043008.092013
Manjunath, T.M. (2011). Q&A on Bt-cotton in India: Answers to more 
than 85 questions. 2nd Edition.  Association of Biotechnology Led 
Enterprises – Agriculture Group, Bangalore, 112 pp. (http://
ableindia.in/index_reports.php).
Naranjo, S.E. and Ellsworth, P.C. (2009). Fifty years of the integrated control 
concept: moving the model and implementation forward in Arizona. Pest 
Manag. Sci. 65: 1267–1286.
Qaim, M., Subramanian, A. and Sadashivappa, P. (2009). Commercialized 




Threat Perceptions of Gene 
Manipulation
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Modern agricultural technology was introduced to a 
largely uneducated Indian farmers through inputs distributed 
by untrained vendors. Our granaries are full and the 
agribusiness companies are rich but the public perception 
of the Green Revolution remains negative. Our farmers are 
in deep debt, sick with cancers and fluorosis, the fields have 
become contaminated with poison, groundwater is depleted 
and the pests have developed resistance. Consequently 
the public is wary of any new technology especially if it is 
pushed by a not-so-credible multinational company. Besides, 
arguments against GM technology are much stronger in Indian 
context than in Europe or any other developed society because 
of the vulnerability of the Indian farmers to manipulations by 
powerful lobby of some multinational corporations. While in 
Europe opposition to GM foods is consumer driven, in India 
it is driven by the farming community, backed by NGOs and 
proactive media. The threat perception is enhanced thanks to 
questionable integrity of the scientists and those sitting in the 
approval committees. 
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Karnataka has seen many battles against the GM technology. 
In fact, the first battle in India against Transgenic Species, i.e, 
Bt cotton took place here in Haveri district some 15 years ago. 
An army of farmers under the banner of Karnataka Rajya Raita 
Sangha (KRRS), went to the trial field of Bt cotton and uprooted 
the crop and put fire to it. ‘We will not allow any multinational 
company to set foot in our land’ said Prof. Nanjundaswamy, the 
then President of KRRS. It true that some individual farmers have 
since embraced Bt cotton, the farmers organization continues to 
oppose GM crops. There is no respite. Just last year there was 
another surprise attack on the testing fields of GM crops near 
Bangalore.
Controversy regarding the Genetic Engineering being 
largely an off-shoot of the prevailing Green activism in Karnataka 
it may be worthwhile to trace the evolution of environmental 
awareness in this state. 
Karnataka was pioneer in many environmental movements. 
The first ever people’s movement against  major dams was 
witnessed here in Bedthi valley. The first ever National Seminar 
on Major Dams was organized 30 years ago in a place called Sirsi 
presided over by Dr. Shivaram Karanth, the Jnanapeeth awardee 
whose name I recall here with special reverence because he 
is considered as the father of Environmental movement in 
Karnataka. He took leadership not just against major dams like 
Bedthi and Sharavati but also against the Kaiga Nuclear Power 
Plant, Harihar polyfiber factory and Ecalyptus monoculture. He 
was the first to translate a huge volume of the first ever Citizens 
Report on India’s environment. And was probably the only 
person in India to translate into a vernacular language  ‘Our 
Common Future’ written by Gro Harlem Brundtland, the then 
Chairperson of the World Commission on Environment.  Both 
these tomes were published by a very respectable Akshara 
Prakashana. Shivarama Karanth was very vocal in defending the 
common assets of the country  in his speeches,   articles and even 
letters to the editors.  He even contested for a Parliament Seat 
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from South Canara constituency, thus becoming the first (and 
probably the only) Green Candidate.
Besides Shivarama Karanth, the Gandhian activist Sundarlal 
Bahuguna inspired young people here to initiate the first Appiko 
movement, the  tree hugging satyagraha akin to Chipko in the 
Himalayan region. 
Karnataka was fortunate to have many scientists from 
respectable academic institutions like IISc and IIM. Dr. AKN 
Reddy of IISc strived to take technology to rural areas by 
establishing an exclusive unit called ASTRA and Dr Madhav 
Gadgil worked on the ecosystem of certain sections of the 
Western Ghats. While Dr. DK Subrahmaniam worked on the 
energy scenario , Dr. K.S Jagdish worked on low cost construction 
materials. While  Dr. Vandana Shiva of IIM worked on the 
farmers issues, Dr. Cecil Saldanha began publishing a series of 
volumes on the State Environment in Karnataka. Each of the of 
work of theses learned people had contributed towards raising 
public awareness about the impact of modern technology on our 
ecosystem and rural life. 
No wonder Karnataka had so many firsts in the arena of 
green activism. No wonder it was the first to oppose nuclear 
hegemony in India. The people of this state opposed the setting up 
of a nuclear power plant at Kaiga.  At this juncture I should also 
mention the name of Dr. DP Sengupta one of the participants of 
today’s deliberations. While the majority of scientists were silent 
on the nuclear issue and while other scientists were giving silent 
blessing to the antinuclear groups, it was Dr. Sengupta’s lone voice 
against nuclear technology  that added the necessary impetus . For 
nearly five years he was the darling of the media which wanted 
some scientists who could be critical about our nuclear empire. 
Awareness about destructive developmental projects touched 
not only the students community, Civil Society groups and the 
literary circle it also reached the farming community early in the 
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80s. Farmers groups were seen uprooting monoculture plantations 
raised by the forest department. There were demonstrations 
against the new patent regime. The farmers attacked the office 
premises of Cargill Seed Company and also Kentucky Chicken. 
There is a strong reason for farmers being suspicious of 
modern technology. In the name Green Revolution what we 
have done to farming community is well known. More than 
180,000 farmers have committed suicide. Modern agricultural 
technology was introduced to a largely uneducated Indian 
farmers through inputs distributed by untrained vendors. Our 
granaries are full and the agribusiness companies are rich but 
the public perception of the Green Revolution remains negative. 
Our farmers are in deep debt, sick with cancers and fluorosis, the 
fields have become contaminated with poison, groundwater is 
depleted and the pests have developed resistance. Consequently 
the public is wary of any new technology especially if it is pushed 
by a not-so-credible multinational company. It is quite natural 
that the farmers feel vulnerable to manipulations by powerful 
lobby of some multinational corporations. The threat perception 
is enhanced thanks to questionable integrity of the scientists and 
those sitting in the approval committees. 
The threat of Transgenic Crops should be viewed with this 
backdrop. 
Let us now look at the sources of these threats:
Issue of Concern No.1:
It is a well known fact that the multinational company 
Monsanto has pioneered this technology. If we just type a search 
word ‘Monsanto’ in any internet browsers and look for images 
what we get is mostly a set of negative images. It is shown as a 
monster. A large number of entries in the internet in any browser 
paint a very disturbing pictures of this global giant. Most of its 100 
years’ history comprises of production of hazardous chemicals 
like DDT, PCBs, herbicides and bovine growth hormones. It 
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has faced several law suits by citizens and the US government 
agencies and has paid heavy fines for unleashing many unsafe 
products and careless disposal of hazardous wastes. 
Issue of Concern No. 2:
There is no recall facility if the GMOs turn out to be 
rogue elements. Once you release a new organism in the open 
environment nothing can be done to retrieve it. 
Issue of Concern No. 3: 
Consumption of GM food may reduce immunity system 
in human body. Further, it also would affect the digestive, 
metabolic functions and may cause carcinoma. 
There is no substantial research to look into the long term 
impact of GMOs. 
Issue of Concern No. 4:
Threat to Crop diversity.   Already crop diversity has been 
threatened due to overemphasis on certain crop varieties that are 
successful in the market. Moreover if this particular gene escapes 
into the environment it may contaminate the natural varieties. 
Especially India being a region of very rich biodiversity, 
precautionary measures should have been a top priority.
Issue of Concern No. 5:  
Threat to Farmers freedom:  Monsanto sued farmers who 
attempted to save the seeds. It hires detectives to spy on the 
farmers. Whistle blowers are harassed, marginalised, defamed 
or otherwise intimidated into silence. There were cases of organic 
farmers suing Monsanto for contaminating their field.
Issue of Concern No. 6:
Threat to India’s soverenighty 
Bypassing the Law of the Land: Mahyco, a partner of 
biotech giant Monsanto, and their collaborators  have accessed 
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local brinjal   varieties to develop  Bt Brinjal without the prior 
approval of the  National Biodiversity Authority of India. 
These companies bypass the grassroot democratic institutions 
like Gram Panchayat and take up trial farming without informing 
the farming community. 
Issue of Concern No. 7:
False Promises to farmers
Genetic Engineering has failed to increase the crop yield 
substantially. In a report, “Failure to Yield: Evaluating the 
Performance of Genetically Engineered Crops,” Doug Gurian-
Sherman, a biologist in the UCS Food and Environment Program 
says, “In comparison, traditional breeding continues to deliver 
better results.” Indian Farmers, already under heavy financial 
burden, may lose both their profit and native gene pool. recent 
studies have shown that organic and similar farming methods 
that minimize the use of pesticides and synthetic fertilizers can 
more than double crop yields at little cost to poor farmers in such 
developing regions as Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Issue of Concern  No. 8.
Threat of Super Weeds and Super Insects: insects will 
become resistant to  crops that have been genetically-modified to 
produce their own pesticides.
Issue of Concern No. 9.
Threat to scientific freedom: Unethical restrictions on 
scientists: The Bt gene ‘Cry1’ was given to academic scientists 
in Dharwar under the condition that they should not develop 
hybrid varieties of their seeds.
Issue of Concern No. 10
Unethical Approvals: GEAC has become Appraisal 
Committee, rather than Approval committee. And our scientists 
have become mere rubber stamps.
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There are other issues like Labeling a genetically modified 
food item. Such proposals are highly untenable in India. GM 
Food labeling will not be practical  where a large number of 
villagers are illiterate and where unpacked food items are sold 
in village markets or even in City Malls. Consumer protection 
will be compromised.
It is quite obvious that the multinational corporate bodies 
are planning to take over food production from Indian farmers. 
These are the very corporate bodies that have enslaved the 
farmers in the name of Green Revolution. They unleashed a series 
of deadly chemicals to our soil and water bodies and reaped 
enormous benefits in the name of the farming community. Now 
they are introducing a range of untested new organisms. We 
are compromising not only our food soverenighty but also the 
health of our future generation.
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Prof. Mahadevappa discussed that there is a need of public 
awareness education on GM Technology on part of scientific 
community. Though Professor was neither in favour nor 
against of the use of GM Technology but he talked of various 
apprehensions about genetically modified crops that exist in 
people’s mind like idea of terminator gene, contamination of 
soil & decreased fertility, Bt cry protein safety, selectivity and 
spread, GM seeds production by multinational companies, loss 
of biodiversity etc.
Rising population, depleting land & water resources, 
rapidly increasing food prices puts India to adopt cutting 
edge technologies to enhance farm output & achieve overall 
food security. Genetically Modified (GM) technology can be a 
promising technology only if public perceptions about it are 
based on scientific facts and not just media speculations and in 
order to do that information communication system, including 
public extension and awareness services, need to be considerably 
improved to effectively deliver correct and unbiased information 
to farmers and the general public. 
Dr. Nagesh Hegde discussed the ten issues of major 
concern of GM Technology like tainted flagship in Monsanto’s 
hands to horizontal transfer of gene and superweeds, patenting 
the farmer’s rights, gutter science etc. He said, while in Europe, 
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opposition to GM foods is consumer driven, in India it is driven 
by the farming community backed by NGO’s and proactive 
media. 
The question raised by him, whether GM crops are threat 
or boon will continue to remain if the scientist and approval 




Public Perception of the 
Seriousness of Climate 
Change as a Problem
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After the almost saturation coverage by the print and 
television media of climate change as an issue leading up to 
the Copenhagen summit meeting in December 2009, the public 
perception of the seriousness of climate change as a problem has 
begun to decline.  This is true in most of the countries where 
opinions are being tracked by the Pew Research Centre’s Global 
Attitudes Project.  Thus, whereas 67% of the respondents from 
India viewed climate change as a very serious problem in 2009, 
only 62% were of that view in 2010.  The declines in many other 
countries have been more dramatic.  In the US, only 37% of the 
respondents in 2010 viewed climate as a very serious issue, 
whereas 47% had done so in 2007.  In Britain the decline was 16%, 
in Japan, Poland and Spain 20%.  In France it was 26%, and in 
Pakistan 28%.  This means at a time when scientific evidence was 
still accumulating, as much as a fourth or a fifth of populations 
in many countries stopped believing in the seriousness of the 
problem in a span of one to three years. There are dimensions 
Chapter 9
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of risk, benefits and consequences that go to decide when a 
risk acceptance is a matter for individual determination and 
when it calls for public intervention.  With these dimensions 
we can create typologies that can help us understand societal 
responses to risks.  In the climate case, several factors make it a 
difficult problem to address and a different problem from that 
of stratospheric ozone depletion. The so-called climate sceptics 
and the media are important in determining the perception of 
the public.
Introduction
Almost everywhere where public opinion is being tracked 
from year to year, the perception of the seriousness of climate 
change as a problem has begun to decline.  Before presenting the 
data on these declines and some of the reasons for them, I would 
like to discuss under what circumstances an environmental or a 
public health problem becomes a case fit for societal intervention 
and when society leaves it to individuals or individual companies 
to deal with.  There are at least 5 broad dimensions which go enter 
into this consideration: risks, consequences, benefits, transaction 
costs and control costs.  We will consider each briefly in turn.
Research in Risk Analysis has shown that whenever risks 
are voluntarily assumed (as in the case of bungee jumping), 
when they are occupational or concentrated to a few people 
(doubles in movies), when they are known, or if the exposure is a 
luxury, when there are alternatives available, then society leaves 
the decisions to deal with the risk to individuals or individual 
firms.  On the other hand, when risks are involuntary, when 
they affect ambient concentrations, are diffused, uncertain, 
essential, without alternatives, then a case can be made for social 
intervention.
Similar sub-dimensions for consequences are when the 
effects are acute or immediate, they affect the average person, 
they are local, they result from use as opposed to misuse, they 
are not feared and have are high probability of low outcomes, 
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these cases are left for individual determination.  A stronger case 
for societal intervention will be made when consequences are 
chronic or delayed, affect the sensitive part of the population, are 
global, when consequences are dreaded and have low probability 
of high consequence.
Similarly if the benefits from the activity are small and 
concentrated, society chooses not to intervene as opposed when 
these are large and widespread.  When both transaction costs 
and costs of control are high, society is more likely to intervene.
Using some of these dimensions of risks and benefits, 
typologies are created to study societal responses to various 
problems.  These typologies can be useful in predicting responses 
to new hazards when they arise.  One example is given in Table 
1 (Ahuja, 1981).








Since both the risks and benefits (of not taking action) are 
widespread and diffuse, climate change is an appropriate arena 
for societal action and less so for individuals.
Public Perception of Climate Change
With the exception of Indonesia and Lebanon, wherever 
public attitudes towards climate change are being tracked by the 
PeW Research Centre’s Global Attitude Project, they indicate a 
decline in the belief about its seriousness.  Table 2 shows this 
data collected in 19 different countries in four successive years 
from 2007 to 2010.  This data is consistent over several different 
surveys and seems insensitive to how exactly the questions are 
phrased.  
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In some countries, such as South Korea, Japan, Spain and 
the United States, interest has been lower in every subsequent 
year since 2007.  Even though the interest in China was at a 
minimum in 2008, it has begun to pick up since then but had not 
reached the level in 2007.  In another group of countries, such as 
France, Britain, Poland, Turkey, Germany, Russia, Argentina and 
Mexico, the interest peaked in 2008.  In India, Pakistan, Jordan 
and Egypt, the belief peaked in 2009.  Indonesia and Lebanon 
were the only two countries not showing a decline.
The percentage changes from the maxima have been most 
pronounced in France and Pakistan (26% and 28%) respectively. 
Japan, Poland and Spain have had declines of 20%.  This means 
that in a period of one to three years, almost between a fifth and 
a fourth of the population in these countries stopped believing 
in the seriousness of climate change as a problem.  In some 
countries the declines are lower, but the average belief may also 
have been lower to begin with, as in the United States.
Table 2:  Percentage of Public believing that Climate Change is a 
serious or a very serious problem.  (Source: Pew Research Centre’s 
Global Attitudes Project)
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 Reduction
Turkey 70% 82% 65% 74% 8%
S. Korea 75% 68% 68% 68% 7%
Japan 78% 73% 65% 58% 20%
Argentina 69% 70% 69% 66% 4%
Mexico 57% 70% 65% 68% 2%
France 68% 72% 68% 46% 26%
India 57% 66% 67% 62% 5%
Spain 70% 67% 61% 50% 20%
Germany 60% 61% 60% 52% 9%
Lebanon 41% 43% 53% 71% --
Britain 45% 56% 50% 40% 16%
Indonesia 43% 46% 46% 47% --
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Russia 40% 49% 44% 43% 6%
Jordon 32% 41% 54% 47% 7%
USA 47% 42% 44% 37% 10%
Egypt 32% 38% 54% 44% 10%
Pakistan 41% 48% 50% 22% 28%
Poland 40% 51% 36% 31% 20%
China 42% 24% 30% 41% 1%
Table 3: Percentage viewing Climate Change as very serious is 
correlated with Ideological Beliefs.(Source: Pew Research Centre’s 
Global Attitudes Project)
Country Total Left Centre Right (L-R) 
US 37 53 41 23 30 
France 46 59 47 37 22 
Germany 52 60 53 45 15 
Britain 40 51 38 37 14 
Spain 50 55 48 48 7 
Ideology is a big determinant in beliefs about climate 
change.  Table 3 shows a distribution of those who believe in the 
seriousness of climate change as an issue disaggregated by what 
the respondents acknowledged to be their political orientation—
liberal or left of centre, moderate or centrist, or conservative or 
right of centre.  As shown in Table 3, the polarization is most 
marked in the US, where registered Democrats are more than 
thrice as likely to believe in the seriousness of climate change 
than are registered Republicans.  Although not to the same 
extent, this tendency is true in all western countries where this 
question was asked: France, Germany, Britain, and Spain.
Surveys conducted and reported in Table 4 indicate the 
responses to question asked as to which country could be most 
trusted to do the right thing when it came to dealing with climate 
change.  As could be expected, the largest values of responses are 
along the diagonal.  That is, respondents had the most favourable 
opinion s of their own countries.  What is somewhat more 
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interesting is the fact that the matrix is asymmetric because people 
of a country A think differently of a country B than vice versa.
Table 4. Who can be most trusted to do the Right Thing in dealing 
with Climate Change?
USA Germany Japan China Brazil India Russia 
USA 57 12 8 3 3 1 2 
Germany 8 77 2 2 1 1 1 
Japan 8 32 38 2 3 1 0 
China 15 4 4 57 1 2 1 
Brazil 17 5 6 6 45 3 1 
India 16 3 4 5 1 55 1 
Russia 6 9 11 5 2 1 29 
Why has Climate Change proved to be such a 
difficult problem to address?
I have my list of ten reasons why climate change is such a 
difficult problem to address.  Different analyst might add a few 
reasons of their own or order this differently, but most of these 
reasons would be acceptable to most. Briefly,
1. Humankind has evolved to perceive and respond to 
immediate threats; we are not so pro-active at responding 
to slowly unfolding threats.
2. It is a “stock” problem rather than a “flow” problem, 
concentrations cumulative result of past emissions;
3. It is a  global problem requiring a global solution (involves 
both free riders and victims);
4. The perception of developing countries changed from being 
aid recipients to competitors in the west (or in the north);
5. It involves trade-offs within and across generations, and 
across species;
6. There is asymmetry in distribution of costs incurred in the 
present and benefits being in future which poses difficulties 
for politicians tuned to election cycles;
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7. Democratically elected governments are held accountable 
for economic performance but not for adverse climatic 
impacts;
8. Our public structures require a proof of need before they feel 
empowered to act.  They do not respond to unsubstantiated 
probabilities;
9. A rich and influential lobby benefits from status quo and 
opposes action.
10. The tendency of the media to present both sides of the 
debate.
I will end by making a few comments on the role of the media. 
In 2009, before the Copenhagen summit, media gave extensive 
coverage to the climate issue.    Rajamani (2009) has reported 
that the Indian Express, for example, carried on an average 
three stories every day on climate change, far in excess, I think, 
of the public interest in the subject.  Al Gore has characterized 
the role of the media as a referee in a tag-team wrestling match. 
As a referee or an umpire in the interest of objectivity, the media 
chooses to give equal time or space to the 2-3% of climate skeptics 
as it gives to 97-98% of publishing climate scientists who believe 
anthropogenic climate change is real.  Thus the public is left with 
an impression that the subject is more unsettled than it actually is.
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Climate Change is a great challenge before human kind 
and among the solutions suggested in mitigating climate 
change, Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is an important 
one. While IPCC has suggested that as a potential solution, 
organizations like OECD, IEA and many national governments 
and private sector have been strongly in favour of it. But CCS 
has not made much head way despite much investment and 
demonstration plants. While there are regulatory issues that 
constrain its implementation on a massive scale, risk perception 
and uncertainties associated with CCS have been major factors 
in deciding the acceptance of CCS by public. It is obvious that 
without   acceptance from public, particularly from communities 
that are closer to CCS plants and storage sites CCS will never 
be able to take off as a solution. While the supporters of CCS 
point out its merits and urge that it should be expeditiously 
implemented as a part of the mitigation strategy at the global 
level to avoid dangerous consequences of climate change, critics 
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and skeptics point out the risks, uncertainties and the various 
other issues that go against CCS to be considered as an acceptable 
solution. Thus even those who concede that CCS as a technical 
solution has many positive aspects are ambiguous in accepting 
it on account of risks, uncertainties and the long term costs and 
benefits of CCS. Public perception on CCS has been impacted by 
many factors and often Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) attitude 
goes against accepting CCS as a solution. There are strong 
parallels between CCS and Radioactive Waste (RW) storage and 
the earlier experiences in RW are relevant because RW storage 
has also met with opposition from public and environmental 
NGOs. As a result of all these factors even those who are 
strongly in favour of CCS concede that in the absence of right 
strategies on risk communication and engagement with public, 
the negative perceptions, fears and perceived uncertainties 
would  adversely affect acceptance and deployment of CCS. But 
whether plans for risk communication and more engagement 
with public make CCS more acceptable is a question for which 
there are no easy answers. CCS is thus simultaneously a global 
and local/regional issue and the interaction between the 
global, national, regional/local in deciding the future of CCS is 
complex. In this chapter I map some of these issues and point 
out that perceptions about CCS, its risks, uncertainties will play 
an important role in deciding the future of CCS. But this is not 
unique to CCS as perceptions about risk are important factors 
in public acceptance and understanding of many technologies, 
including nanotechnology, synthetic biology and biotechnology.
CCS:   Its origins, Technology and Current Status 
CCS is part of the geoengineering technologies and in the 
recent years there has been much debate on the pros and cons 
of deploying geoengineering technologies. In this chapter as the 
focus is on CCS the debate on other technologies which are part 
of the geoengineering solutions will not be taken in to account. 
Basically CCS is implementation of the idea that  by trapping 
emissions at source and by storing them on a long-term basis, 
release of the emissions of  Greenhouse Gases into the atmosphere 
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can be significantly brought down. The immediate fall out of this 
will be reductions in emissions of Carbon dioxide (CO2). Since 
the sources of emission are spread all over the world deploying 
CCS would entail finding sources for storage in many places of 
the world and in ensuring that the long term storage does not 
pose significant risks. But translating this idea of capturing the 
emission at source and storing it involves large scale of integration 
of technologies for capture, transport and storage. While CCS can 
be integrated into existing sources of emissions like refineries, 
cement plants, steel plants etc. it is cost intensive and running 
and maintaining it involves considerable costs. Issues relating 
to regulation, liability, environmental safety and health have to 
be addressed and appropriate regulatory frameworks have to be 
developed before CCS is deployed widely. While governments 
have by and large, supported CCS their response has not been 
uniform. 
Though CCS is an interesting option for large developing 
countries like India and China, it is yet to attain the level of 
maturity that facilitates quicker adoption in many countries. 
CCS technologies can be classified as post-combustion, pre-
combustion and oxyfuel technologies. In post-combustion, after 
combustion of the primary fuel, CO2 is separated from flue gases, 
while in pre-combustion CO2 is removed before combustion. In 
the third category burning of the fuel in oxygen rich environment 
and CO2 rich waste gas stream is generated. In all the three,  CO2 
is dehydrated and compressed for transport/storage. (Mertz et. 
al. 2005, International Energy Agency, IEA 2012, Harvey 2010, 
Hester, Harrison 2010)
These processes are energy intensive and depending upon 
the industry the energy requirements vary. This obviously 
increases the cost of deploying CCS. IPCC acknowledges that 
in power generation a CCS plant would require 10-40% more 
energy than the equivalent plant without CCS (Mertz et. al., 
P22). While advocates of CCS acknowledge such factors they 
point out that as technology advances and matures, the costs on 
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account of additional energy use is likely to decrease and hence 
CCS is certainly viable in the long term. In fact the Road Map 
published by IEA acknowledges that while CCS is commercially 
available the associated costs have to be lowered, technology is 
yet to be demonstrated commercially (IEA 2012). It suggests that 
commercialization can be incentivized by tax breaks and funding 
for demonstration projects have to be hiked significantly, by 
OECD governments, and this is estimated to be $ 3.5 to 4 billion 
per annum from 2010 to 2020. Since the costs are substantial 
including CCS under Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
of UNFCCC  is an alternative option. Mandating CCS at large 
plants and sources of emissions will help its wider use but unless 
the costs are reduced further such mandates alone would not 
attract investments, as the energy requirements are substantial. 
Given the current status of CCS, it is difficult to be overly 
optimistic about rapid deployment of CCS within the next few 
decades and stabilization of CO2 emissions within the next few 
decades is critical to avoid dangerous consequences of global 
warming. Thus while deployment of CCS has to be expedited, 
there is no guarantee, given the current state of the technology, 
costs and other issues that affect its deployment, that it will be 
widely deployed by 2020 or 2030. Hence it is no wonder that 
documents from IEA, Global CCS institute and other agencies/
bodies that advocate CCS as a solution call for more investments 
in R&D, more incentives, map the potential storage sites, address 
regulatory issues, concerns of the communities and more 
international collaboration, particularly in technology transfer. 
At present the number of large scale integrated projects 
(LSIPs) is only 75 and while nine new projects were to be 
undertaken, for various reasons eight were cancelled.  But to 
maintain the trajectory to 2 degree C target, by 2020,  the number of 
operational projects must increase to about 130, from the current 
number of 16. To achieve the global targets in emission reduction, 
70% of the CCS deployment will have to be done in developing 
nations by 2050 (CCS Institute 2012). But this would be feasible 
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only if  CCS is supported through climate financing schemes, 
technology transfer, collaborative projects and incentives in 
developing countries. In other words unless developed and 
developing nations are willing to do all these together CCS will 
not be an attractive option for developing nations. So while 
deploying CCS in developed nations is necessary that it self is 
not sufficient to result in reductions in emissions  on account of 
CCS, as emissions from developing nations are likely to increase 
significantly and on a faster rate in future. Thus unless CCS is 
given a big push and all the issues that affect its deployment are 
addressed and resolved, expectations of reductions in emissions 
on account of CCS appear to be over optimistic. 
Although the idea behind CCS was articulated in the late 
1970s it gained much attention only in the 1980s as the challenge 
of global warming was becoming obvious. International Energy 
Agency gave a thrust to research on CCS and interest on CCS 
was not widely shared. In fact the Second Assessment Report 
(SAR) of IPCC published in 1995 did not consider CCS as an 
important solution, while the Third Assessment Report in 
2001n acknowledged that CCS was a potential option then than 
what was acknowledged in SAR. In 2001 the  Seventh COP of 
UNFCCC requested IPCC to examine CCS more fully. The IPCC 
Special Report of 2005 (Mertz et.al 2005) gave a fresh impetus 
to the idea that CCS is a potential solution. Since then CCS has 
been acknowledged as an important option and in 2008 EU 
adopted a draft directive on CCS.  Globally CCS has gained 
much attraction as a policy option, se for example Meadowcroft 
and Langhelle, 2010 on responses in some countries, while de 
Conick and Backstrand, 2011 give analysis of role of international 
organizations in promoting CCS   Gokce G. 2012 provides an 
account of CCS being negotiated at one of COPs of UNFCCC and 
the articles in an issue of Global  Environmental Change Vol 20 
(2011) examine the various issues relating to CCS.
 Since 2005, CCS has been debated widely and even those 
who acknowledge the technological hurdles, called for urgent 
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actions if CCS were to play an important role (Haszldine, 2009). 
The emergence of CCS as an important solution is not solely 
on account of technology. CCS is now promoted as a solution, 
partially because it lends itself as a solution that can be deployed 
(of course at considerable cost) in current and future sources 
of large scale emissions, which in reality means capturing the 
emissions from the source than reducing the emissions per se. 
Thus the emissions are not reduced but only their release into the 
environment is avoided. In other words, the limit to emissions 
and their storage is decided by the availability of storage 
space than by any other factor. While specific and time bound 
reductions in emissions reductions by countries is an issue 
that has eluded a solution, technical fixes like CCS can be used 
address the issue of reductions in emissions without making any 
firm commitment to reduce emissions per se over a period of 
time. Hence while international agencies like IEA, OECD call 
for reductions in emissions by countries, they are also strong 
advocates of strategies like CCS. From an international law 
perspective CCS is not a solution without problems and many 
conventions including London Convention have implications 
for deploying CCS (Proelss and  Gussow 2011) and CCS has been 
debated in Conferences of Parties to UNFCC and in Convention 
on Biological Diversity .
Framing and Understanding CCS: Of Faustian 
Bargains and Beyond 
Is CCS really a fantastic solution as suggested by its 
advocates or is it a Faustian Bargain which calls for commitments 
and compromises from the users of the technology. Views on CCS 
have been varied ranging from optimists to critics, pessimists 
to those who urge that CCS should not be promoted at the cost 
of options like renewables (Chatterjee 2011). Social Scientists 
have examined CCS critically and have examined the politics, 
policy and regulatory issues that are often not discussed in the 
scientific and technical literature. (Backstrand, Meadowcraft and 
Oppenheimer 2011, See also  articles in the special issue of Global 
Environmental Change on CCS). So although CCS is projected as 
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a technical solution, framing it is important to understand how 
such a technical solution is perceived, deployed and responded to. 
Faustian Bargain is a familiar metaphor to describe 
technologies that seem to be offer sound solutions but not without 
any dilemmas or being perceived as a solution that demands too 
much in return. A well known example is that of considering 
nuclear power as a Faustian Bargain, popularized by Weinberg 
in an article published in  Science in 1972. Interestingly in his last 
article published in 2007, Weinberg wrote
“CSS appears to be a classic Faustian Bargain. But, as in 
Faust’s initial bargain, it need not mean that our soul is left to the 
devil. It should mean that we accept the challenge of continual 
striving and vigilance, striving for more durable answers to 
global climate change and vigilance in assuring that stored 
carbon is not subsequently released to the climate system.”( 
Spreng, Marland, Weinberg,  2007, P 854). 
Analyzing the two facets of this Faustian Bargain, 
Dominique points out that CCS proposes a solution without 
imposing constraints on consumption and economic growth and 
the contested risk frames in CCS. (Dominque 2011). According 
to Dominique ” .. CCS can be seen as a solution to a risk, as a 
risk itself,  as an uncomfortable compromise between different 
risks, or a distraction from addressing a more imminent risk” 
(Dominque 2011, P21). So while international agencies and 
supporters of CCS describe CCS as a solution and point out that 
the risks from CCS are manageable, others who perceive the 
technological solution itself as a risk, understand CCS differently. 
Thus as Dominique points out there are  ‘Reluctant Advocates’ 
also who consider CCS as a bridge and consider that risks from 
CCS are preferable to the risks from climate change and risks 
of nuclear energy. (Hansson 2008). According to Toikka even 
when countries perceive CCS as a solution, the uncertainties 
in CCS development are responded differently on account of 
institutional factors. (Toikka 2012).
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CCS is framed differently by different actors and in the 
discourse on CCS, particularly on risks and uncertainties in 
deploying CCS, and,  framing of CCS plays an important role 
in accepting/questioning the role and need for CCS. While 
advocates frame CCS as an important solution that has to be 
supported on an urgent basis, critics question whether it is a 
solution at all or is it an option that masks larger and important 
issues in favour of continued reliance on fossil fuels and increasing 
energy consumption. Associated with these understandings is 
the perception of risk which affects the acceptability of CCS. 
Risk, Uncertainty and Risk Perception
Knight (1921) differentiated between risks and uncertainties 
and defined risks as uncertainties that are quantifiable while 
those that are not quantifiable are uncertainties. Risk is often 
constructed on the basis of technical parameters, probabilities and 
the outcomes. But is risk is purely a technical issue or it is a social 
construct also. (Slovic, Finucane, Peters and MacGregor,  2003). 
Or is it something that can be reduced to quantified numbers 
and probabilities only. While in scientific and technical literature 
risk is often defined and discussed in terms of probabilities and 
numbers and comparative costs and benefits which again are 
expressed in quantities, social scientists have pointed out that 
this is only one part of the story as risk cannot be understood 
solely in terms of such numbers and probabilities. 
In the last few decades or so, social scientists have pointed 
out the risk management based on such an understanding of 
risk, is not sufficient and instead called for a risk governance 
approach. (Renn, Klinke and van Asselt, 2011.) [For current 
perspectives in social sciences on risks and risk governance 
see  Renn (2008), Lotsedt and Boholm (2010), and Roeser et. al. 
(2012)]. There are a variety of understandings, definitions and 
classifications of risk and uncertainty and there can be more than 
one level of uncertainty. Despite differences in perspectives on 
risk and uncertainty, an integrated idea of the interfaces among 
the different perspectives is important. (Riesch, 2012). According 
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to Riesch, in case of CCS there are five levels of uncertainties 
including the ‘unknown unknowns’ (Riesch 2012, P106). 
Hence different actors have emphasized on different types of 
uncertainties on CCS .Even those who agree that CCS is a potential 
option may give different weightages to  different aspects, 
underplaying some risks and over emphasizing the benefits and 
vice versa. Thus, according to Hansson “The differences between 
the CCS proponents and opponents are generally not based on 
ideology or values, but instead on emphasizing different parts 
of the very same scientific reports (Hansson 2008 at P292). So 
it is no wonder that even reports which examine the long term 
feasibility of CCS also point out the uncertainties involved and 
how this will impact the future use and acceptance of CCS. 
Acknowledging uncertainties does not mean that CCS 
is not a feasible option and not all the uncertainties need to be 
resolved to make CCS financeable (UKERC 2012). Heptonstall, 
Markusson and Chalmers  (2012) have identified seven key 
uncertainties in their assessment  of realizing the potential of CCS 
and ‘policy, political and regulatory uncertainty’, and ‘public 
acceptance’ are among the key uncertainties. Understanding the 
inter-linkages between uncertainties is important to understand 
the possible synergies and trade-offs and efforts to reduce or 
manage one uncertainty will impact others. Absence of credible 
regulatory regime can have adverse implications for gaining 
public acceptance, which is important for political support to 
CCS (Markusson, Kern and Watson 2010). 
The issue ‘lock-in’ is important as CCS involves huge 
investments and long-term commitments in storage of captured 
CO2. Will CCS result in a lock-in situation that reinforces the 
current energy paradigm and thereby result in lesser attention 
to and investments in other sources like renewables or will it be 
used more a bridging solution enabling a low-carbon growth. 
While critics may argue that lock-ins are inevitable, Shackley and 
Thompson (2012) point out that the real issue is that of depth of 
lock-in than lock-in per se as deeper lock-in reduces the flexibility. 
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So the issue here is, not the support per se to CCS but to what 
extent and how it should be supported.  The potential pathways 
for deploying CCS could thus be many and uncertainties impact 
these path ways, which in turn affect the uncertainties. This co-
construction of pathways, risks/uncertainties means that CCS 
deployment is much more than demonstrating its technological 
and economical viability.  
Regarding risks from CCS there is substantial discussion in 
the literature, which indicates that, there are risks in different 
phases and there are also unanswerable questions of long-term 
storage and liability (For an over view see Ekmann 2011). The 
Table 1 below summarizes the commonly perceived benefits and 
concerns regarding CCS. (NCCS 2012).
Table 1. Commonly  perceived concerns and benefits of CCS
Benefits Concerns
A bridge to a low-carbon future Safety risks related to a CO2 leak
Could avoid release of large 
quantities of CO2 into the 
atmosphere
The risk of ground water 
contamination 
Allows for the continued use of 
fossil fuels
Harm to flora and fauna near 
storage sites
Should enhance energy security Possible explosion of CO2
Helps to clean up coal-fired power 
plants in developing countries 
that require energy
Wrong solution to climate change
Allows reduction of emissions 
without necessitating much 
change to life style.
Low availability of storage sites, 
CCS technology and infrastructure
Long term viability and economic 
cost of technology
Scale required for mitigation of 
CO2
Unknown technology
Could draw funding from 
renewables
Adapted from Ashworth et. al. (2010) in  NCCS 2012
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While the uncertainties influence the risk perception, the 
weighing in of costs and benefits also affects risk perception. 
As the literature in risk perception points out  catastrophic 
events can challenge the understanding of risks arising from a 
particular technology and trans-boundary risks pose challenge 
to geographical, political and regulatory boundaries [Kearnes, 
Klauser and Lane (2012)]. 
Thus there are risks and uncertainties, there is also the 
potential of unknown risks materializing in a way that was 
not anticipated. Once such incident is sufficient, to shake the 
public confidence in both technology and regulatory regimes. 
Both Chernobyl and Fukushima altered the public perception 
on nuclear energy. While these could be termed as exceptional 
events and rarest of the rare type of accidents, the changes in risk 
perception on account of such catastrophe play an important 
role in deciding the risk perception in future. On the other 
hand as Perrow pointed out in tightly coupled units the high 
potential for such  catastrophic events could not be ignored and 
such risks and accidents are ‘systematic’ or ‘normal’ (Perrow 
1984). CCS is technical system with many sub-components and 
the whole process of capturing and storage of CO2 involves 
deployment of different technologies across different time 
scales and spaces. Hence while risks from CCS can be estimated, 
it is impossible to assert that a totally unanticipated ‘accident’ 
will never happen. This has implications for risk perception 
because even those who consider CCS as a solution may also be 
concerned with potential risks if their livelihoods and properties 
could be affected by CCS in one way or other. As pointed out 
in a subsequent section, risk perception on CCS is not uniform 
and the responses to CCS can undergo changes over the time. In 
other words as perceptions of risks on account of CCS can vary 
over time, public perception today can be taken at best as the 
current perception on CCS.
Public perception about risks is not solely based on what 
scientific and literature states as risks and rather it is a socially 
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constructed perception of risk which is based on, inter alia, 
self-perceptions, intuitive approaches to risk assessment. 
Ignoring them as proof for ignorance among public is not the 
right approach (Schwartzman, Ross, Berube 2011). This is all 
the more true of CCS as the public awareness is low and the 
public is informed of both the danger, climate change and 
the solution (CCS). For a climate change skeptic, CCS may 
not appeal as a viable solution or the risk perception may be 
distorted on account of the skepticism on climate change. For 
those who consider climate change as a risk, risk perception of 
CCS entails understanding the different risks and the long term 
consequences of both and risks in choosing CCS as a solution vis 
a vis not taking action against climate change. 
Thus risk perception on CCS is impacted by many factors 
ranging from understanding the uncertainties to fear of the 
unknowns and the perceptions about the unknowable unknowns 
and perceptions about climate change as a risk to humanity and 
nature.
Public Perception of CCS
The perception of civil society actors, particularly 
NGOs on CCS plays an important role in shaping the public 
perception of CCS. But the environmental NGOs have not 
taken an uniform stand on CCS and their positions range 
from cautious support to outright rejection.  For example 
while Green Peace does not accept CCS as a solution, some 
NGOs including Natural Resource Defense Council and 
World Resource Institute support CCS and also insist that 
environmental regulations should be in place and argue 
that  no new, conventional coal-fired generation should be 
constructed without CCS (ENGO Network on CCS 2011). 
According to Corry and Reiner even environmentalists who 
are aware of the potential of CCS assign it a lesser priority 
and prefer renewables and reduction in demand as a solution 
and the nuclear debate has cast a long shadow over the CCS 
debate. (Corry and Reiner 2011). 
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By now there is a vast literature on public perception on 
CCS and factors that influence public perception. In this section 
I will highlight the findings from some studies so as to draw 
some general conclusions about public perception on CCS. By 
and large, the studies on public perception indicate that the level 
of awareness on CCS is low and the Eurobarometer study on 
perception on CCS in Europe confirms this. Since the awareness 
about CCS is low, increasing awareness about CCS is important 
to gain public confidence and this includes risk communication 
strategies (Global CCS Institute,  2011). 
Although there is a risk of simplification, from the studies 
some broad conclusions can be drawn as below (e.g.  Karuse, 
et. al., 2012,  Upham, Roberts 2010, Poumadere,  Bertoldo and 
Samadi 2011,  Wallquits, Visschers and  Siegrist 2010, Bradbury, 
et. al., 2009, Mander, et. al., 2011, Terwel, Daamen and  Mors 
2013, and Conick, et. al., 2006)
1. Not in My Back Yard (NIMBY) attitude affects the 
acceptance of CCS. Even those who support CCS are not 
greatly in favour of CCS in their community/neighborhood. 
Considerations on economic impact of CCS, world views 
also influence acceptance of CCS.
2. While concern about technological risks are expressed, 
factors like past experience with government, compensation, 
perceptions about economic benefits and costs play an 
important part in shaping the perception about CCS.
3. In general awareness on CCS is low; more knowledge need 
not necessarily translate into acceptance. It may result in 
changes in perception which may or may not result in more 
acceptances. 
4. Public needs to be reassured about the risks of CO2 
storage. Hence it is important to involve trusted parties in 
communicating about CCS. In other words credibility of 
the communicator also matters in determining the public 
trust of this technology. 
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5. Social contract approach rather than technocratic approach 
is desirable and deliberations with public and opportunities 
to interact, discuss and debate with public may help in 
reducing the opposition to CCS.
6. As unexpected opposition from public has constrained 
progress in other technologies (e.g. nuclear energy, 
genetically modified organisms in agriculture) 
understanding the public acceptance/rejection is 
important. Public understanding and acceptance is 
contextual and in this case it is linked with perceptions 
about climate change and the proposed solutions. Public 
perception is also impacted by the costs on account 
of CCS and the willingness to pay more for energy/
electricity.
In case of Europe the Eurobarometer survey of 2011 
provides an overview of the public perception on CCS and 
factors that influence the perception. (TNS Opinion & Social). 
One of the important findings of the survey is
“Correlations drawn from the results (knowledge of high 
CO2 impact on climate change linked to health concerns, for 
example) clearly demonstrate the need to communicate the 
facts about CO2 properties and the lack of risk regarding CO2 
storage. Furthermore, the better informed people are about 
climate change, the more supportive of CCS they are likely to be, 
highlighting the importance of explaining climate change if we 
seek widescale implementation of CCS.” (TNS Opinion & Social, 
2011, P118).
These conclusions indicate that public perception of CCS 
is a complex affair and it cannot be taken as granted easily 
as local factors also play an important role in accepting it. 
Moreover public perception on CCS is likely to be impacted 
by many factors but trust is an important factor in shaping the 
public perception. Hence credibility of the communicators, 
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opponents and advocates of CCS also matters in shaping the 
public perception. While making more knowledge available and 
dissemination of information is necessary how it is being done 
(process of communication and sharing of information) is also 
important.
The case studies and a survey of the literature point out 
that as in the case of other technologies public perception of 
risks and experts’ perception of risk need not be the same. The 
public acceptance of CCS is a must for CCS to succeed and as 
public perception on CCS is an important factor in molding 
the acceptance/rejection of CCS, developing plans to address 
the challenges posed by diversity in public perception is a 
challenging task for advocates and opponents of CCS. 
CCS and Nuclear Waste Disposal
CCS has been compared with other technologies on some 
aspects and such comparative studies point out that while some 
features are unique to CCS there are common elements with 
other technologies (Rai, Victor and Thurber, 2011, Watson 2012). 
In the literature CCS has been compared with radioactive waste 
(RW)/nuclear waste (NW) disposal because both solutions 
are controversial and there are some common features. While 
nuclear waste (NW)/radioactive waste (RW) disposal has been 
an on going controversy CCS is a new technology. Responses 
to NW and RW, particularly the public perception of risk, 
acceptance of/opposition to NW/RW depositories/disposal 
will be useful in understanding the responses, resistance to and 
acceptance of CCS.  In this section I highlight some inferences 
from the literature and for reasons of space a lengthy discussion 
is not provided. 
Reiner and Nuttall point out the key features in public 
acceptance of CO2 storage and disposal of RW.
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Table 2. Comparison of key attributes associated with public 





Public awareness Broad public awareness
Minimal public awareness 
of any aspect of CCS
Public 
understanding
Generally weak in 
spite of high awareness
Basic understanding of 
carbon cycle but minimal to 




Acceptability poor and 
greater acceptance not 
necessarily linked to 
greater understanding
Linked to climate change 
and perceived adequacy of 




opposition across time 
and region 
Little evidence of major dif-
ferences visible at this stage
Timing
Not necessary to 
address immediately; 
in most cases deferred 
for decades
Essential to resolve storage 
before operation begins 





but practice remains 
weak





government some of 
least trusted actors in 
society
Eroded by image of 
‘nuclear priesthood’
Involves energy industry 
and government, some 







although there has 
been successful 
engagement on narrow 
question of repository 
siting 
Main environmental 
groups are neutral to mod-
erately positive
Some resistance from grass-
roots groups less concerned 




Support for nuclear 
power remains divided 
and this division has 
continued for decades.
Unabated coal is becoming 
increasingly unpopular, 
although there remains 
support for coal miners in 
many countries.
CCS:  Carbon capture and storage; NGO Non-governmental 
organization.
Source Reiner and Nuttall (2011),  P311
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Reiner and Nuttall (2011) take the view that CO2 storage 
problem is likely to be less controversial than RW on account of 
the need for large number of sites, public familiarity and need 
to resolve the storage issue in the initial stage itself. de Groot 
and  Steg (2011) point out that acceptability of CO2 storage may 
be explained by factors that are influencing the acceptability of 
RW and these factors are similar. On the other hand although 
there are similarities between the two, the regulatory and legal 
regimes are very different (Rossati 2011).  Drawing on the 
lessons learnt from governance of long term RW management 
Flueler (2012) suggests, inter alia, that ‘Settle major issues and 
harmonize regulations before large actors (states, companies) 
deploy CCS on a scale of a fait accompli  (technically and in 
terms of generating CO2 certificates).’. Both the technologies rise 
ethical issues and according to Brown.
“If it can be shown that the risks from the geological 
disposal of RW and CO2 are less problematic than the threat of 
climate change and that there were no reasonable alternatives to 
the geological disposal of RW and CO2 as a way of mitigating 
the threat of climate change, an ethical justification for the use 
of these technologies, despite their risks, can be made; however, 
ethical duties remain to deploy these technologies in a consistent 
way with other ethical obligations to the maximum degree 
feasible” (Brown, 2011, P355-356). 
Thus while both technologies are controversial CCS may 
not be so strongly opposed and may gain acceptance as it is 
perceived as a major solution to climate change. In case of NW/
RW the question of serious adverse effects of radiation and its 
long term consequences, particularly for future generations 
impact public perception adversely and this is not the case with 
CO2. In that sense CO2 is a known and manageable  devil. More 
over the perception about nuclear energy and RW/NW disposal 
underwent a sea change after Three Mile  Island, Chernobyl and 
Fukuhsima, while in case of CCS there are no such examples. As 
the technology is yet to mature and deployed on a large scale it 
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provides opportunities to build safe guards, develop regulatory 
and liability regimes and risk governance, and, there by inspire 
confidence. Familiarity with sources from which CO2 will be 
produced is another factor that is in favour of CCS. While these are 
perceived as obnoxious and polluting, they are not considered as 
very dangerous when compared to nuclear power. It can also be 
argued that CCS is a safer alternative than resorting to  nuclear 
power as a solution, in tackling climate change. Hence it can be 
assumed that while there are similarities between the two CCS is 
not likely to fare worse in the eyes of public when compared with 
RW/NW disposal. Although public may not be overtly in favour 
of CCS, the very absence of a negative perception may work in 
favour of CCS. But this does not mean that public acceptance of 
CCS can be taken granted.
Public Engagement, Risk Assessment and Public 
Acceptance of technology
Over the last few decades the response of the public 
to technologies has not been uniformly positive and public 
opposition to technology has played an important role in 
deciding the fate of some technologies. The nuclear energy which 
was once perceived as a modern marvel was later perceived as 
totally undesirable and the changes in perception resulted in 
slowing down the growth of nuclear energy in some countries 
while in some progress was stalled. Similarly agricultural 
biotechnology was responded differently in different countries 
and the European response has been by and large negative 
although studies show that Europeans are optimistic about 
health/medical biotechnology. Understanding the societal 
responses to emerging technologies, particularly those which 
are perceived to be risky is important so that the responses 
can be anticipated. In the last few decades there has been a sea 
change in viewing public response to and understanding of 
science and technology. At the risk of over simplification one can 
state that from a deficit model of public understanding which 
perceived that the ignorant public needed more understanding 
of science and technology, today, an approach that favours 
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public engagement with science and technology is favoured, 
particularly in emerging technologies like nanotechnology 
(Sahoo, Anand and Srinivas, 2010).  
Acceptance of technology cannot be taken granted and its 
is a social process and building trust by institutions/agencies 
that promote the technology is important as it increases the 
possibility for greater public acceptance. (Stern, et. al., 2009). This 
means that public engagement is necessary for increasing the 
understanding by the public as well as enhancing the probability 
of acceptance by public. But public engagement is not a simple 
task and measuring its effectiveness is not easy (Pytlikzillig and 
Tomkins, 2011). Never the less there are no easy options as public 
engagement can be avoided at the risk of public perception being 
determined by other factors and actors, particularly NGOs. 
Hence the challenge lies in effective public engagement rather 
than trying again and again, top-down approaches to ‘educate’ 
the ‘ignorant’ public and perceive any mistrust or negative 
response as an indication of lack of knowledge. 
This is all the more true in case of CCS. The technology is so 
new that pubic awareness is limited while the public has better 
awareness on climate change, one way or another. This provides 
an opportunity to engage with the public and at the same time 
it is also a challenge to promoters and advocates of CCS. To say 
that their roles have been cut out will not be an exaggeration. 
Whether they will try this and succeed is an important question 
that is waiting to be taken up.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have pointed out how the responses to an 
emerging technology and perceptions about risk and uncertainties 
are important in shaping its future trajectory. Although this is 
not unique to CCS, public perception matters more in case of 
CCS given the estimated increase in its deployment across the 
globe and the challenge of global climate change. To conclude 
CCS is an example of an emerging technology whose future 
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is bound with meeting the challenges of global warming and 
public acceptance of CCS as a credible and viable solution.
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Public Perception of Nuclear 
Power
K S Parthasarathy
Department of Atomic Energy, Mumbai
Introduction
Right from the 90s there has been international recognition 
that public opinion is one of the factors that influences acceptance 
of nuclear power in the energy mix of a country. Many complex 
factors influence public perception. Many myths cloud realities. 
One of the methods to influence public perception is to describe 
these myths and realities with the hope that a discerning audience 
will identify the facts.
A paper titled “Why is the Public Acceptance so Peculiar 
only for Nuclear Energy”, by Ohinishi and Tsujimoto (2000) at 
the 10th International Congress of the International Radiation 
Protection Association (IRPA-10), highlighted some of the issues. 
A survey carried out by the researchers covered 2500 persons from 
two regions of Japan and 350 nuclear researchers from the whole 
of Japan. The analysis has revealed that the public’s degree of 
interest in science and technology and the extent of the knowledge 
Chapter 11
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of nuclear energy are quite low, whereas the extent of fear against 
nuclear technology is extraordinarily high as compared with 
those of researchers. Moreover the public’s nuclear knowledge 
was found to be considerably negative in its quality. 
In spite of the notable records, large segments of society are 
still concerned about this form of energy. “Lack of understanding 
and misconceptions contribute to this”, first Public Information 
Forum “Nuclear Power: Communicating for Confidence”, in 
Vienna, conceded (IAEA, 1990). 
The attitude of secrecy, a consequence of the association 
with military added to the concern. Mistrust developed over 
time in spite of the fact that nuclear power currently provides 
reliable electric power supply to many countries. Because of 
this stability in the generation of nuclear power in France, some 
countries in Europe may be able to walk away confidently from 
nuclear power.
Grimston (2002), who systematically carried out research 
on the future of nuclear energy, caricatured nuclear debate 
as a battle between two diametrically opposed groups, who 
nonetheless seem to share a large number of features in common. 
He listed them thus:
1. Both nuclear advocates and opponents believe that major 
elements of the future are predictable; they are certain about 
general projections of various energy sources.  While  the 
former  considers that renewables demonstrably  have the 
practical potential to remain only relatively minor players 
in world energy supply, the latter assert that renewables 
demonstrably have the practical potential to dominate 
world energy supply.
2. Nuclear proponents are absolutely certain about the future 
role of nuclear power (a major and important one), and 
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about issues such as nuclear waste (not a difficult technical 
problem).
 Nuclear opponents are absolutely certain about the future 
role of nuclear power (no role at all), and about issues such 
as nuclear waste (a technically insoluble problem).
3. Both groups have arrogance born out of belief in infallibility 
of own analysis.
4. Nuclear advocates believe that the public is irrationally 
frightened of nuclear power. If only people could be 
properly educated they would become more pro-nuclear 
and support the nuclear industry.
 According to nuclear opponents, public is irrationally 
complacent about nuclear power. If   only people could be 
properly educated they would become more anti-nuclear 
and support anti-nuclear campaigns.
5. Both characterise opponents as either fools or ill-intentioned!
6. Advocates of nuclear power believe that government is 
not to be trusted to take wise decisions as it is too much 
influenced by the anti-nuclear media and pressure groups.
Nuclear opponents fear that government can not to be 
trusted to take wise decisions as it is too much influenced by the 
nuclear industry and its supporters.
According to Grimston “public opinion” is a very complex 
issue. Opinion changes dramatically with circumstances. He 
feels that some of the factors behind the loss of confidence in 
some developed countries were caused by nuclear industry 
itself. Cost and time overruns in completing the construction of 
many nuclear power plants were far higher than projected. These 
factors remained the same in developing countries According to 
him, the performance of many plants was disappointing. 
This opinion is not true for all countries. For instance in USA, 
the nuclear fuel share of electricity remained 19 to 20 % from 
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1990. The average capacity factor remained above 85% from 
1999. From 2002, the average capacity factor was over 90%. 
Companied added 6018 MWe from 1977 simply by up-rating 
the capacity of operating nuclear power plants. Over 3200 MWe 
of nuclear power will be added by up-rating from 2011 to 2015. 
The production cost of nuclear power remained stable from 1996 
onwards (just over 2 cents per kWh) from 1996 onwards and 
lower than coal from 2001 onwards (Nuclear Energy Institute, 
2011).
Issues such as management of nuclear waste, nuclear accidents, 
nuclear proliferation, atomic bomb, nuclear terrorism, biological 
effects of radiation particularly genetic effects etc are typical 
subjects of concern. 
Management of Radioactive Wastes
Many myths and realities cloud these issues. Identifying 
these may influence public perception on nuclear power
Radioactive waste stored in glass?
In 1986, Shri O V Vijayan, a literary genius from Kerala 
wrote an article titled “The Superstitious” in a leading Malayalam 
weekly. He claimed that he had prolonged arguments with 
some nuclear scientists on radioactive waste management and 
believed that scientists are going to keep nuclear waste in glass 
vessels for thousands of years. According to him, the scientists 
told him that the glass vessels would not break for 100 or 1000 
years. I suspect that the “nuclear scientists” with whom he had 
discussed the topic did not know the vitrification process - the 
process in which radioactive waste is added as ingredients to 
glass thereby making the radioactive material virtually non-
leachable. Vitrification is one of the first procedures to handle 
high level waste
During the end of 1986, Shri V R Krishna Iyer who is known 
for his strong antinuclear views repeated the same wrong notion 
about storing radioactive waste in glass vessels at a meeting held 
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in Mumbai. I responded to several of his criticisms including the 
one on storing “nuclear waste in glass vessels”. It was difficult 
to convince him. Apparently, he was against all nuclear reactors. 
I told him that without operating a research reactor, we cannot 
have cobalt-60 an essential radioisotope used in the fight against 
cancer. It appeared that he has no objection to operate such 
reactors. 
Various views and concerns
A review of waste management technologies indicates 
that it is not an insurmountable problem. The World Nuclear 
Association, a nuclear advocacy group listed the following views 
and concerns of general public about radioactive wastes (World 
Nuclear Association Radioactive Wastes, 2009).
1. The nuclear industry still has no solution to the ‘waste 
problem’, so cannot expect support for construction of new 
plants until this is remedied.
2. The transportation of this waste poses an unacceptable risk 
to people and the environment.
3. Plutonium is the most dangerous material in the world.
4. There is a potential terrorist threat to the large volumes of 
radioactive wastes currently being stored and the risk that 
this waste could leak or be dispersed as a result of terrorist 
action.
5. Nuclear wastes are hazardous for tens of thousands of 
years. This clearly is unprecedented and poses a huge 
threat to our future generations.
6. Even if put into a geological repository, the waste might 
emerge and threaten future generations.
7. Man-made radiation differs from natural radiation.
8. Nobody knows the true costs of waste management. The 
costs are so high that nuclear power can never be economic.
9. The waste should be disposed of into space.
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10. Nuclear waste should be transmuted into harmless 
materials.
Solutions
WNA has answered these concerns satisfactorily. WNA 
argues that nuclear industry has actually developed the necessary 
technologies and implemented most of them. The real issue is to 
get them acceptable to public.
Safe management practices are implemented or planned 
for Low-level waste (LLW) and most intermediate-level waste 
(ILW), which make up 97% of the volume of the waste produced. 
These are being disposed of securely in near-surface repositories 
in many countries so as to cause no harm or risk in the long-
term. This practice has been carried out for many years in many 
countries as a matter of routine (IAEA, 1990).
Interim storage facilities currently hold High Level Waste 
safely. They are relatively small compared to other industrial 
sectors. Annually, HLW is currently increasing by about 
12,000 tonnes worldwide. The waste cools down as its activity 
lowers by decay. In 40 years, the radioactivity of spent fuel is 
one thousandth of what it was when it was removed from the 
reactor. It is still high and needs careful handling. According to 
WNA, interim storage is a viable option till the quantity of waste 
accumulated is enough to go for an economic repository.
For disposing high level waste construction of deep 
geological repositories is accepted universally as a workable 
solution. Countries such as Sweden, Finland (Grimston,2002) 
and USA have advanced programmes in progress. USA has 
a deep geological repository in New Mexico for the disposal 
of transuranic waste (long-lived Intermediate Level Waste 
contaminated with military materials such as plutonium).
Every country has realized the importance of public 
acceptance of the technology. In spite of heroic efforts public 
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acceptance of the technology is yet to be realized in most of the 
countries. In USA, the entire programme is mired in political 
controversy.
Transportation of radioactive waste
WNA has shown that packages that store waste during 
transportation are designed to ensure shielding from radiation 
and containment of waste, even under the most extreme accident 
conditions. Since 1971, there have been more than 20,000 safe 
shipments of highly radioactive used fuel and high-level wastes 
(over 50,000 tonnes) over more than 30 million kilometres (about 
19 million miles) with no property damage or personal injury, 
no breach of containment, and very low radiation dose to the 
personnel involved.
Toxicity of plutonium
Public has a firm belief that plutonium is the most toxic 
material in the world (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2011). WNA 
informs the public that gram for gram, toxins such as ricin and 
some snake venoms and cyanide are significantly more toxic. It 
may be difficult to change the perception of public on the toxicity 
of plutonium
Terrorist threat due to nuclear waste
Generally nuclear wastes are stored in secure places in all 
countries High Level Waste is stored as retained in glass or ceramic 
matrix.  It is very difficult to disperse it by terrorist action. They 
are very poor choice for “dirty bombs”. If terrorists strike, it will 
be messy; decontamination is possible; it is expensive but doable. 
A report released on June 25, 2002 by the National Academy of 
Sciences, concludes that if a dirty bomb attack were to occur, 
“the casualty rate would likely be low, and contamination could 
be detected and removed from the environment, although such 
cleanup would probably be expensive and time consuming.
Nuclear waste hazardous for thousands of years
Many believe that nuclear wastes are hazardous for tens 
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of thousands of years. They consider it as unprecedented; they 
feel that it poses a huge threat to our future generations in the 
long-term. Many industries produce hazardous waste. The 
nuclear industry has developed technology that will ensure its 
hazardous waste can be managed appropriately so as to cause no 
risk to future generations.
The radioactivity of nuclear wastes decays progressively 
and has a finite radiotoxic lifetime.  A major part of the radioactive 
species in high level radioactive wastes has a half life of about 
30 years. The radioactivity of high-level wastes decays to the 
level of an equivalent amount of original mined uranium ore in 
between 1,000 and 10,000 years. Its hazard then depends on its 
concentration, whereas other industrial wastes (e.g. heavy metals 
such as cadmium and mercury), remain hazardous indefinitely.
Most nuclear wastes are hazardous for only a few tens 
of years and are routinely disposed in near-surface disposal 
facilities. Nearly 3% volume of total waste produced is long-
lived and highly radioactive and requires isolation from the 
environment for many thousands of years.
International conventions define what is hazardous in terms 
of radiation dose, and national regulations limit allowable doses 
accordingly.  Regulatory agencies enforce these regulations. 
Any hazardous wastes are handled in a way that poses no risk 
to human health or the environment. Waste is converted into a 
stable form that is suitable for disposal. In the case of high-level 
waste, a multi-barrier approach, combining containment and 
geological disposal, ensures isolation of the waste from people 
and the environment for thousands of years.
Future impact of wastes from geological repository
Actually, with  today’s spent fuel or vitrified high-
level waste (HLW), extra layers of protection come from the 
multi-barriers of stable ceramic material, encapsulation, and 
depth from the biosphere that are designed to prevent any 
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movement of radioactivity for thousands of years. A stable 
geological formation, within which the waste will be disposed, 
also constitutes a highly reliable barrier. Such formations are 
available.
Scientists and engineers have produced detailed plans for 
safe underground storage of nuclear waste and some are now 
operating. Geological repositories for HLW are designed to 
ensure that harmful radiation would not reach the surface even 
with severe earthquakes or the passage of time.
Costs of waste management 
Producers of radioactive wastes should bear the costs of 
disposal. Most countries with nuclear power programmes make 
estimates of the costs of disposal and update these periodically. 
For low-level waste, the costs are well-known because many 
facilities have been built and have operated for many years 
around the world. For high level-waste (HLW), cost estimates 
are becoming increasingly reliable as projects get closer to 
implementation.
Based on the estimated total costs of managing nuclear 
wastes, many countries require that the operators of nuclear 
power plants set aside funding to cover all costs. Different 
mechanisms exist in different countries. Although the sum 
already deposited in dedicated funds are high, the costs of waste 
management do not drastically increase the price of electricity. 
Typically the spent fuel management and disposal costs represent 
about 10% of the total costs involved in producing electricity 
from a nuclear power plant. Thus, although the absolute costs of 
waste management are high, they do not render the nuclear fuel 
cycle uneconomic, because of the high ratio of revenue earned to 
waste volumes produced.
Waste disposal into space
The option of disposal of waste into space has been 
examined repeatedly since the 1970s. It is considered very costly. 
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The method may not be acceptable in view of the safety aspects 
associated with the risk of launch failure.
Transmutation of nuclear wastes
Transmutation is the process of transforming one 
radionuclide into another via neutron bombardment in a 
nuclear reactor or accelerator-driven device. By this method, 
we can change long-lived actinides and fission products into 
significantly shorter-lived nuclides. These are radio logically 
harmless in only a few hundred years.
It is not feasible for all of the wastes produced in the past 
or to be produced. Transmutation may be able to reduce waste 
quantities but it will do it only to a certain extent and therefore not 
eliminate the need for disposal. One of the technical challenges 
is to isolate each nuclide (partitioning) so that it can then be 
irradiated, otherwise the process is likely to create as much 
waste as it destroys! Even if the economics of partitioning and 
transmutation were favourable, it is likely that the benefits would 
not compensate for the burden of additional operations required 
for separating and transmuting only part of the nuclides.
Nuclear Accidents
There were nuclear accidents; one in 1979 at the Three Mile 
Island in USA and the other in 1986 at Chernobyl in the former 
Soviet Union and the latest in Fukushima in 2011.  International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reviewed the accidents. This led 
to improvements. No one abandoned nuclear power because of 
these accidents! 
Accidents at Chernobyl and TMI Island had less dramatic effects.
Electric companies connected 50 out of the currently 
operating 104 nuclear power reactors in USA to the grid since 
1979; nineteen of these after 1986. Canadian companies connected 
all the fourteen operating reactors in Canada to the grid after 
1979. Fifty-three out of 59 French reactors came on line after 1979.
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The rarest of the rare, simultaneous occurrence of two 
natural phenomena, a powerful earthquake and a devastating 
tsunami, led to a serious situation at the Fukushima Atomic 
Power Station (Fukushima Daiichi). The staff of the Tokyo Power 
Company (TEPCO) aided by other Japanese personnel is trying 
to mitigate the effects of the accident. In Fukushima everything 
which has a potential to go wrong did go wrong eventually. 
Nuclear technology appears to be on trial now.
On March 31, Xinhua news agency quoted the Japanese 
National Police Agency’s report that the quake and tsunami left 
11,417 dead and 16,273 as missing. Nobody died in Fukushima 
due to radiation exposure. Cost of Fukushima accident is 
reportedly $130 billion. The economic losses are pegged at $239 
billion, about 4 % of the Gross Domestic Product.
There was demand for halting the nuclear programme 
in Germany. Only a year, Germany decided to extend the life 
of its nuclear power stations it was clearly a political decision. 
Germans were prepared to pay higher electricity bills in return 
for ending nuclear energy.
“…. there is little doubt that Germany’s modern history 
has combined to produce a deep strain of risk aversion, of 
caution, and a dislike for surprises, all of which magnify the 
potential hazards of nuclear energy, producing a perception that 
is different from that of other major European economies like 
France or Britain” (Cowell, 2011) NYT quoted  commentators.
French nuclear industry will be happy; they have an assured 
market for nuclear electricity in Germany!!    
The Institute of Energy Economic of Japan (IEEJ) estimated 
that in spite of the expensive accident nuclear power remains 
competitive; for the past five years the cost of nuclear generation 
remained stable at around $0.09 per kilowatt-hour (kWh). 
During the same period fossil fuel power cost was $0.12 per 
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kWh; geothermal power $ 0.12. The Institute reported that fossil 
fuel power varied between $0.12 to$.016 due to fluctuations in 
the cost of imported fuel (World Nuclear News Nuclear still cost 
competitive in Japan, 2011). 
Even if compensation of up to $130 billion for loss or 
damage from a nuclear accident is taken into account, the cost 
of electricity generation with nuclear reactors increases to some 
$0.11 per kWh (World Nuclear News Nuclear, 2011). Japan 
which imports 84% of its primary energy has to be pragmatic 
in its approach to nuclear energy which prior to the accident 
provided 30 % of its electricity
Biological Effects of Radiation
Radiation is perhaps one of those subjects which have been 
largely misunderstood, not only by lay persons but sometimes 
even by highly educated persons. Often, the gap between the 
conviction and the reality is too wide to be believed. During 
the course of my professional career, I came across very many 
incidents and faced situations, which reveal the difference in the 
mythical perception of people and reality, and how difficult it is 
to convince people about the myths and the realities of radiation. 
The fear about radiation is also shaping the public’s perception 
on nuclear power. Based on the analysis of newspaper clippings 
from 1991, and on the treatment of the subject by the electronic 
media, I identified how significant groups of people developed 
biases against nuclear technology. Allegation of diseases in the 
villages near Jaduguda, birth defects in the villages near Rajasthan 
Atomic Power Station (RAPS), blindness and other ailments of 
cattle near Pokharan site, accidental overexposures of workers at 
various sites, cattle deaths near Tarapur Atomic Power Station 
due to leak from the Waste Immobilization Plant (WIP), intake of 
tritiated water by many workers at Kaiga Generating Station are 
some of the news stories. Since some of these were accompanied 
by telling pictures, many persons tend to believe the stories. Each 
of these have been investigated thoroughly; there were scientific 
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explanations. Mistaken notions about some of the practices 
followed in nuclear technology exacerbated the false notions. 
Undoubtedly these influence public perception on nuclear power.
Genetic effects of radiation
In 1991, Shri Karan Thapar interviewed me on a popular TV 
programme “Eye Witness”. It was an entertaining experience. He 
asked me 40 questions in ten minutes! In the ensuing controversy, 
I stated the known fact (known to radiobiologists and others 
who cared to read!) that no genetic effects were found among 
the thousands of children born to the atomic bomb survivors 
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Thapar, however, unhesitatingly 
contested my statement as “inexplicable”; he wondered how 
I did form the impression that no genetic effects were found 
among the thousands of children of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
He countered. “The opposite is not just a fact, it is the truth” he 
asserted. That was his perception.
I was not surprised at this scientifically unsupported 
conviction, as misgivings and myths about effects of radiations 
have been found to be rampant even amongst technologists, 
social scientists, physicists, and other highly qualified experts.
While responding to an opinion survey organized by 
AERB, for the National Academy of Engineering, over 80% of 
the participants from reputed academic and research institutions 
in India (IITs at Mumbai, Kanpur, Indian Institute of Science, 
Bangalore, Roorkee University, Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, 
Kolkata, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai) stated that 
genetic effect is a major health effect seen in the children of 
survivors of atomic bombings contrary to the fact.
An opinion survey, held by me, among 80 specialists 
attending a programme at the International Centre for Theoretical 
Physics at Trieste, Italy showed that nearly 30% of the scientists 
believed in the myth that double-headed monsters were born to 
the survivors of atomic bombings. 
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It is virtually impossible to correct such firmly held beliefs. 
Radiation deaths due to atomic bombing at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki
About 90,000 to166, 000 out of 340,000 to 350,000 estimated 
population at Hiroshima and 60,000 to 80,000 out of 250,000 to 
270,000 persons in Nagasaki died due to the overwhelming force 
and heat of the blasts as well as high radiation exposures. These 
occurred shortly or within two to four months after the bombing.
There is evidence that a smaller number of later deaths 
attributable to radiation exposure occurred over the next few 
decades.  Based on the 1950 census, about 280,000 persons are 
estimated to have been exposed and survived the bombing. 
Specialists attribute about 1900 of them suffered from cancer due 
to excess radiation till 2000. The general impression is that there 
was a tsunami of cancers among the survivors. In any population 
with a life expectancy of 70 to 75, about 25% is likely to die of 
cancer. In a population of size, 280,000 about 70,000 are expected 
to die of cancer.  There is a significant group of survivors living 
now. A small number of cancers among them will also be due 
to radiation. The excess incidence of cancer among the exposed 
A-bomb survivors were identified because scientists carried 
out a systematic epidemiological study extending over several 
decades
High radiation levels everywhere
A few years ago an “environmentalist” claimed that he 
measured high radiation levels at several points in Lucknow. 
“Radiation levels at some points are higher than those at 
Chernobyl. The levels at the hostel where the Members of the 
Legislative Assembly stay are high”, he claimed.
He “measured” higher levels under overhead electric cables 
and also in the exhaust of cars. The print and electronic media 




We found that the Geiger-Mueller counter based instrument 
he used was defective. It was light sensitive! Once the counter 
was made light proof by covering the counter by two layers of 
opaque paper, the radiation levels became normal background 
levels. Media picked up his version of the story earlier as the 
report had “the ingredients to stir raw emotions”. We published 
our version through a press release. The incident generated lot 
of media interest. The incident has nothing to do with nuclear 
power; the media frenzy was because the subject was radiation 
related.
Cattle deaths in Tarapur
Radioactive leak in any nuclear facility makes good copy. 
A small amount of effluent containing caesium-137 leaked out 
of a waste immobilization plant located near Tarapur Atomic 
Power Station. The story kept many reporters and scientists 
busy for a few days. Scientists identified the leak in a routine 
survey. Hordes of media persons who landed there went to 
town with exaggerated stories. The Times of India published the 
photograph of the skeletal remains of cattle side by side with the 
story of the “leak”. Cattle death was attributed to radioactivity. 
While on a visit to the site, I found that the villagers brought 
a dead calf and left it at the gate of Tarapur Atomic Power Station. 
I did not argue with them that radioactivity has nothing to do 
with the death of the calf. I arranged a post mortem by veterinary 
surgeons. They scooped up several kilograms of thin polythene 
sheets from its stomach. Swallowing of carelessly thrown 
polythene is the major cause for the maximum number of cattle 
deaths in many parts of India. The viscera of the dead animal at 
Tarapur did not contain any measurable amount of radioactivity. 
No newspapers published this part of the radioactive leak story. 
I spoke to Prof Robert Crease a well known science writer about 
the incident. He covered it in a feature titled “Horror story that 
grew legs” in the Physics World (Robert Crease, February 2002). I 
also published the item titled “Bags of trouble” in New Scientist 
(Parthasarathy, 30 October 2004). 
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Manmade radiation versus from natural radiation
Radiation emitted from manmade radio-nuclides is exactly 
the same form as radiation emitted from naturally-occurring 
radioactive materials (namely alpha, beta or gamma radiation). 
As such, the radiation emitted by naturally-occurring materials 
cannot be distinguished from radiation produced by materials in 
the nuclear fuel cycle.
Most elements have a radioactive form (radioisotope) and 
many of these occur naturally. We are surrounded by naturally-
radioactive materials, and are constantly bathed in radiation 
originating in the rocks and soil, building materials, the sky 
(space), food and one another. A typical background level of 
exposure is 2-3 millisieverts per year (mSv/y). Regulations limit 
extra exposure from man-made radiation due to human activities 
(other than medicine) to 1 mSv/y for members of the public and 
average 20 mSv/y for occupational exposure. These levels are 
very rarely exceeded, though no harm has been shown for levels 
up to 50 mSv/y. Some people are exposed to lifelong natural 
background levels which are higher than this (World Nuclear 
Association  Radioactive Wastes, 2009).
A few hundred thousand people live in high natural 
background radiation areas in many parts of the world. These 
include Guarapari in Brazil, Yangiang in China, parts of Kerala 
and Madras in India, and the Nile delta in Egypt, Southwest 
France among others (UNSCEAR, 2000, Vol. 1 Sources Table 
11, p.121). Background radiation levels in some locations in 
these places are a few hundred to a few thousand times greater 
than those in normal areas.  Similarly a few million people in 
temperate areas whose dwellings are laced with excessive radon 
levels are exposed. 
In some areas of United Kingdom, persons in 5 per cent of 
the homes are exposed to doses above 23.7 mSv/year. One per 
cent of the houses show dose values above 55.8 mSv/year. The 
highest estimated dose was 320 mSv/year in Cornwall. 
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Researchers have measured values up to 22,000 Bq per cubic 
metre.  The radon concentration in 500,000 homes in the United 
Kingdom exceed the 100 Bq per cubic metre (Health Protection 
Agency, 2010). If we assume that four persons live in a home, 
two million persons in UK are exposed to a radon concentration 
of five times the average levels. Researchers have measured 
radon levels as high as 50,000 Bq per cubic metre in Norway; the 
maximum concentration measured in Sweden is 85,000Bq per 
cubic metre 9 UNSCEAR, 2000, Vol. 1 Sources Table 24, p. 13).
The annual dose limit to radiation workers recommended 
by the International Commission on Radiological Protection is 
50 mSv. Many people in New Jersey and Pennsylvania get more 
radiation from radon in a week than anybody ever got at Three 
Mile Island. (Nicholls, 1986). 
The radiation doses to several hundreds of thousands of 
persons living in high background radiation areas or in areas of 
high radon levels will be higher than the average radiation dose 
to workers in a nuclear power plant. I am not suggesting that 
just because millions of people are getting exposed to natural 
radiation, we need not control radioactive releases from nuclear 
power stations. We must adhere to the stringent dose limits 
prescribed by the regulatory body in all practices involving 
radiation sources... The fact that virtually hundreds of thousands 
of people are exposed to natural radiation without any control is 
brought out just to   place the issue in perspective
The regulatory authorities allow nuclear power plants to 
release some radioactivity. These are measured to ensure that 
the releases are within limits prescribed by the regulatory body. 
The radiation doses to the members of the public due to releases 
are too small to be measured. Their magnitude is a small fraction 
of the background radiation present everywhere. 
The radiation levels from a nuclear power plant are very 
small. But if an accident occurs, the doses will be very high. 
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Emergency plans are in place in case a nuclear accident occurs 
anywhere.
Safe radiation dose
What is a safe radiation dose? The best answer is “It 
depends”. Though some puritans may argue that there is no safe 
dose!
There is no universally acceptable safe dose. For radiation 
workers, Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) wants the 
annual dose to be “as low as reasonably achievable” (ALARA); 
also it should not exceed 30 millisievert (mSv) excluding the dose 
due to natural background radiation and medical exposure, if 
any. AERB dose limit at 30mSv is lower than 50 mSv prescribed 
by USA (Sv is a unit of biologically effective dose. One Sv 
corresponds to a radiation energy absorption of one joule per 
kg; millisievert is one thousandth of a Sv). I have received about 
0.9mSv while recovering a lost radiation source used in industry.
During the Fukushima accident one worker received 
106mSv. 
For members of the public, the dose limit is one mSv. 
Pregnant workers may continue to work but the dose to the 
foetus should not exceed one mSv. In medically justified 
procedures the following doses in mSv may be considered as 
safe. Cardiac CT scan 12; angioplasty (a life-saving procedure 
involving removal of blocks in blood vessels)on an average 
400; at times even 1000mSv; treatment of hyperthyroidism, 
100,000; radiation treatment of cancer 60,000 mSv to part of 
the body. In all cases doses must be ALARA without losing 
medical benefits.
In USA, the dose limit for an astronaut is 250mSv per 
mission. In an off-site radiation emergency, sheltering and 
administration of stable iodine may start at a minimum dose of 
20 mSv; evacuation is mandated at 100mSv.
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The average natural background radiation dose is 2.4mSv 
annually. In England & Wales, residents of over 100,000 to 
200,000 homes are exposed to more than 10mSv annually from 
radon, a radioactive gas found in nature. The maximum value 
is more than 100mSv. Millions of persons in countries with 
temperate weather receive doses ranging from 5 to10 mSv from 
radon decay products
Thus, we accept different values of doses as safe and 
acceptable, depending on circumstances. One need not lose sleep 
over receiving a few tens of mSv, if the occasion demands it.
ROLE OF MEDIA
Media play a very important role in influencing public 
perception on any activity.  Nuclear power generation is no 
exception. Smyser (2002), Founder Editor of “The Oak Ridger” 
explained that his collection of  cartoons and photos dealing 
with nuclear technology  included ominous-looking faces of a 
row of cooling towers, a skeleton lording over a series of articles 
about nuclear wastes, a big-toothed Russian bear made of smoke 
coming out of a reactor stack, weird-looking vegetables with the 
headline “Zapped”, a caveperson-like figure seemingly prostrate 
in front of a mean-faced cooling tower and  a drawing of a cooling 
tower with the caption “What If?” (Smyser,2002). According to 
him, such graphics were relatively new journalistic phenomena. 
It is an “artistry to embellish and enhance the news”. Smyser felt 
that “cooling towers are like Richard Nixon’s jowls and Jimmy 
Carter’s teeth a graphic artist’s dream”
He revealed that generally good nuclear news will appear 
in page 4 or 5 with relatively smaller font size! Occasionally 
the font size may be large but the space allotted will be often 
less prominent. He goes to the extent of saying that there is an 
antinuclear mindset in the media. “The visual depictions are 
virtually always threatening and frightening. By and large if any 
bad news comes it will be spread in detail across top of page 1 
in huge headlines. “This is not a matter of partisan bias or anti 
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nuclear crusading. It reflects a series of routine news judgments, 
of daily decisions, repeated over the course of several years. It is 
not conscious intentions but common assumptions that quietly 
direct news coverage toward dominant perceptions of the news 
room”. Smyser quoted from “The Media Elite’ by Lichter, Lichter 
and Rothman.   Smyser argues that the role of the media is not to 
maximize anxiety or to minimize it. In case a radiation accident 
occurred the media should convey the information as promptly 
as fully, as accurately, as understandably and as totally in context 
as possible. In such a role it will minimize anxiety. He gave a 
few suggestions how scientists and engineers might help the 
media to play its role better. This will certainly help public to get 
better perception of nuclear power. My experience of interacting 
with a few of the most respected representatives of the media 
highlighted the value of Smyser’s suggestions.
Scientists as communicators
Most of the time scientists speak in a language of caution-that 
too extreme caution. Because of this media or the public is likely 
to think they are evasive. In addition, use of jargon also comes in 
the way of effective communication. We cannot blame the media 
for the handicaps of scientists and engineers. Even if the reporter is 
keen to listen, many technical people are not equipped to convey 
information effectively. Public and media are mostly on the same 
page. Perception on nuclear power conveyed by media is often 
taken as gospel truth because the counter view is seldom presented. 
Smyser suggests that maximum information on the topic 
should be made available as soon as possible. He is against 
withholding any information just because of uncertainty, 
incompleteness or ignorance. He proposes that the speaker may 
explain that the data are tentative, subject to error, preliminary 
or even as yet unknown.
Once there was a significant heavy water leak in Madras 
Atomic Power Station. It took time to rectify the leak. Workers 
under strict dose control procedures handled it well. The station 
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management did not explain promptly what was happening. It 
led to some media hype.
“The public is capable of understanding uncertainty”, 
Smyser cautioned. If, in a nuclear incident, you may not know 
how much radioactive material has been released you may say 
so that is Smyser’s advice. The spokespersons can assure the 
media that he will convey the information when he knows it 
with certainty. Honesty and openness pay. Smyser wants the 
spokesperson to speak in plain language, without jargon. Careful 
approach will help. One of the difficulties faced by scientists is 
that their assertions may sound arrogant.
In an eminently readable essay titled “Radiation’s unknown 
weigh on Japan” the New York Times Columnist Mathew Wald 
outlined the conceptual difficulties in quantifying biological 
effects of radiation. In fact the challenges in this field are the 
most important factor which influences public perception on any 
practice which involves ionizing radiation. After the Fukushima 
accident Japanese Government is very much exercised over 
the dose limits to be prescribed for populations in the vicinity 
of the stricken nuclear power plant. Fukushima accident led to 
significant changes in the perception on nuclear power of lay 
people. What was equally surprising is that a few news papers 
who were outspoken critics started looking at nuclear power 
benignly.
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What is Really Real?
Atul H Chokshi
Department of Materials Engineering
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The world is undergoing severe churning currently, 
especially in terms of people demanding meaningful 
participation in public policy. There has been a significant 
polarization, with many differing and often diametrically 
opposite views on a range of issues. Thus, for example, there 
appeared to be a scientific as well as public consensus developing 
on climate change and consequently a need to at least slow 
down, if not reverse, climate change. However, there has been 
a significant push over the past couple of years so that public 
opinion is changing, and with it the need for public policy to 
address climate change.
In such a situation, it has become difficult even for interested, 
but not directly involved, scientists as well as the general public 
to look at the evidence and make a judgment on what is really 
real. This presentation deals largely with issues relating to 
perceptions on nuclear energy, and it examines critically the 
basis for public fears and reservations against nuclear power. 
Note: This publication was subsequently published in Current Science, Vol. 102, 
No. 3, 2012 with the permission of Director, NIAS
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There have been several issues recently that have generated 
substantial public debate, including Bt brinjal, nuclear energy, 
climate change and medical testing and policies. A common 
theme running though these issues is the connection between 
society, science (and technology) and public policy involving 
governments at local, national and international levels.
Although there has generally been some interaction 
between science and public policy, society has generally been 
only provided public policy and science, without much direct 
involvement. However, with growing information available 
from many sources, there is an increasing questioning from the 
public towards both science and public policy. This has arisen 
in part from changes in science activities that have occurred 
especially over the past century relating to commercial interests, 
specialization and a checkered track record.
The general public idea of a scientist may be that of a person 
dedicated to uncovering truth and developing fundamental 
understanding, with some potential use of the knowledge 
eventually. However, scientists are also human, with normal 
human desires for fame and power. There has been an additional 
factor of wealth coming into this picture, especially over the last 
sixty years. The potent cocktail of fame, power and fortune has 
possibly altered scientific activities to such an extent that it may 
now be driven not just by curiosity but also by financial allure 
and inducement.
Thus, for example, data show that there has been an 
increase in industrial support of biomedical research from 
~32% in 1980 to 62% in 2000, and a study in 2003 revealed that 
lead authors of one in three articles held relevant financial 
interest (Nanjundiah,  2011). This raises an important issue 
relating to potential conflicts of interest and unbiased scientific 
investigations. As is well known, studies supported by the 




Scientists are still broadly trusted by society. A poll on 
public attitudes to energy found scientists, environmental 
protection organizations or consumer associations, and national 
governments being trusted by 71, 64 and 29% of the people, 
respectively (oecd-nea.org, 2010).
 About 50 years ago, medical doctors were treated as demi-
gods. However, with the advent of specialization and super-
specialization, increasing awareness of medical malpractices 
driven by money, a trust deficit developed, so that it is not 
uncommon now for people to ask for a second opinion in many 
instances. Science may also be heading in this direction.
Over the past 60 years, there has been a substantial increase 
in specialization, so that one tends to know more and more of 
less and less. This has frequently led to attitudes of “Leave it 
to the experts”, or “Daddy knows best,” which are no longer 
acceptable. 
The increase in specialization has necessitated 
collaborations not only within a discipline, but across disciplines; 
such interactions have been fruitful frequently. In addition, the 
complex issues being tackled, with the associated infrastructure, 
has led to scientific publications with numerous co-authors, 
compared to typically less than five co-authors until relatively 
recently. Analysis shows that a 1993 paper in the New England 
Journal of Medicine had 972 authors, so that each author 
effectively contributed two words to the paper (Nanjundiah, 
2011). There is an increasing potential danger with specialization 
and numerous coauthors, that responsibility for publication 
becomes diffuse, with a chance that collaborators may not fully 
know the details of the work of their co-authors.
There are at least three important contributors to nuclear 
fears in the public. First, our common human sensory organs 
relating to sight, sound, touch, taste and smell cannot be used 
generally to track nuclear dangers. Second, there are vivid and 
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horrific images from the nuclear bombing in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, and these memories have been revived by accidents 
at three mile island, Chernobyl and Fukushima. Third, there is a 
string of broken promises such as nuclear power becoming “too 
cheap to meter”, or that all precautions have been taken so that 
nuclear power is “safe”.
Many governments as well as the nuclear industry label 
the above nuclear fears as irrational or unfounded. Apart from 
financial commercial interests and specialization in science, 
it is appropriate to consider the track record of nuclear power 
to examine whether public fears about nuclear power are ill-
founded.
Nuclear Risks: Defense in depth, passive cooling systems and 
probabilistic risk assessment are some of the terms encountered 
when hearing experts discuss nuclear risks. Essentially, the 
idea is to develop several independent means of mitigating 
small problems or accidents, so that the overall possibility of a 
catastrophic accident becomes extremely small. It is unlikely that 
we will ever be able to account for all “beyond design” events 
such as the massive earthquake in Fukushima, or human error 
and bad design in Chernobyl. The third generation nuclear 
reactors are apparently designed with a risk of failure of one 
in a million reactor-years (Ramana, thebulletin.org). However, 
public experience has shown that there have been 5 core 
meltdowns within a total operation of 15,000 reactor-years since 
the 1950’s (Chokshi, 2011). Arguments that newer power plants 
are safe sound hollow when seen in the context of nuclear power 
plant operators trying to extend the lifetimes of old “less safe” 
reactors. Furthermore, despite their exhortations on the safety 
of nuclear power, it is important to note that both governments 
as well as the nuclear power industry tacitly acknowledge the 
possibility of a catastrophic nuclear accident: governments try to 
locate plants away from significant population centers, and the 
industry tries to limit liability and needs significant government 
financial support and underwriting.
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Figure 1. Variation in risk with radiation exposure dose, illustrating the linear 
no-threshold model as well as a model with a threshold; adapted from (gao.
gov).
Scientific uncertainties and implications: It is important to 
acknowledge and understand uncertainties in science. This is 
examined in Figure 1 by considering the changes in risk with 
radiation dosage (gao.gov). High dosage rates of more than10 
rem are very risky, with the risk increasing linearly with dosage, 
based on significant evidence from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At 
intermediate dosage of 5 to 10 rems, there is limited verification 
to show that risk continues to be linearly proportional to 
dosage. At low dosage rates of less than 5 rems, the data are 
extremely limited and uncertain. A general approach has been 
to extrapolate the behavior at high dosage all the way down to 
zero, and this is referred to as the linear no-threshold model. 
More recently, there has been a significant push to endorse an 
approach involving a threshold level of radiation, for which 
there is no risk below the threshold level. This is a topic on 
which it is difficult to get complete verification of the effects 
for at-least two reasons: (a) when the risk is small, the increase 
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in cancers or deaths associated with radiation will be small 
and this may be well within nominal statistical variations in 
data, and (b) the presence of natural radiation may obfuscate 
small effects due to low additional radiation levels. A detailed 
study by the US National Academy of Sciences committee on 
Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation stated (Health Risks 
from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation:  BEIR VII 
Phase 2, nap.edu): “The Committee judges that the balance of 
evidence from epidemiologic, animal and mechanistic studies 
tend to favor a simple proportionate relationship at low doses 
between radiation dose and cancer risk,” essentially supporting 
the linear no-threshold model.
Such uncertainties may have a profound effect on 
interpretations or estimations.
Thus, for example, estimates of cancer deaths related to 
the Chernobyl accident vary widely from 62 (unscear.org, 2008) 
to 4000 (who.int, 2005) to 93,000 (greenpeace.org) to 985,000 
(nyas.org)! The first estimate was given recently by the United 
Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation 
(UNSCEAR) whereas the second estimate was given by the UN 
Chrenobyl forum and the World Health Organization. The third 
report came from a study involving 52 scientists commissioned 
by Greenpeace, and the fourth estimate was from a group of three 
scientists in Russia and Belarus who collected information from 
many local sources that were not considered by Western scientists. 
While differences in methodologies certainly contributed to 
the vastly different estimates, one of the important factors is 
consideration for low level radiation. Thus, the estimated low 
value of 62 deaths from UNSCEAR arose because the committee 
explicitly noted that they did not consider projections from low 
level radiation because of unacceptable uncertainties in the 
predictions (unscear.org, 2008). Clearly, even if the risk is small 
at low doses, consideration of the very large areas over which 




There is an additional important point to bear in mind, 
relating to uncertainties of low level radiation. Eventually, one 
has to deal with decommissioning and cleaning up sites involved 
with nuclear activities. Calculations in 1995 revealed that the 
cost for cleaning up a site in Nevada increases drastically with a 
reduction in the remnant radiation (gao.gov).
Dealing with Nuclear Accidents: Nuclear accidents have a 
significant effect on public opinion and perception of nuclear 
power. Thus, polls conducted before and after a criticality 
accident in the Tokai Mora uranium mining facility in 1999, 
with the death of two people, resulted in a change to 53% 
polled considering nuclear power dangerous after the accident 
compared to 12% before the accident (oecd-nea.org, 2010). While 
news about “minor” accidents were not reported widely earlier, 
so that the impact of such accidents was largely local, the sense 
of heightened anxiety and wide exposure in media imply that 
such incidents will be widely disseminated, leading to stiffening 
of attitudes against nuclear power. Thus, following Fukushima, 
Germany has decided to close all nuclear power plants by 
2020, and Switzerland by 2032. Several other countries are re-
evaluating their plans for nuclear power.
There appears now to be a set pattern for officials to deal 
with nuclear accidents: (a) state that lessons will be learnt, (b) 
study the nuclear accident, (c) re-examine safety, (d) make 
changes considered necessary, and (e) declare all plants safe. 
While such a pattern may be intended to reduce apprehensions 
about nuclear power, it is necessary to go beyond the above list.
Looking historically at the development of nuclear power 
plants (see, for example, an excellent 1992 BBC documentary 
(bbc.co.uk, 2011) entitled “A is for atom”), it is clear that 
Governments and the nuclear industry have always claimed 
that nuclear power is safe, even when they had some contrary 
indications. While such approaches may be ascribed to the cold 
war era until the 1990s, when nuclear power was closely linked 
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with nuclear bombs, it is surprising to note that this legacy 
continues even now. Thus, the UK government decided to 
play down the Fukushima accident, with a coordinated public 
relations strategy together with nuclear companies (guardian.
co.uk, 2011). After Fukushima, a leaked recent study for the 
Russian president revealed that the Russian reactors were 
grievously under-prepared for natural and man-made disasters 
ranging from floods to fires to earthquakes to plain negligence; 
meanwhile, Russians declared their plants safe (bellona.org, 
2011). 
Coming to the situation in India, which followed the pattern 
described above, there have been two recent reports which 
cause confusion. First, around Sept 20 it was reported that India 
was awaiting a final report on French nuclear reactors, dealing 
with issues raised by Fukushima; orders would be finalized 
only after Indian authorities examined the report critically 
(thehindu.com). Within a week, there was another report from 
the nuclear establishment claiming that the Jaitapur plant would 
be completed, although with some delay (economictimes.
indiatimes.com). This reveals the difficult predicament of the 
nuclear establishment in riding two generally incompatible 
horses: on the one hand, they need to reassure the public that 
safety will not be compromised, but on the other hand they want 
to keep foreign vendors happy that the deals will go through, 
with a delay. The two statements also appear to suggest that 
anevaluation of the report will not be open-ended, as the decision 
to go ahead has already been made.
Making public policy “scientifically”: Frequently, in dealing 
with complex issues, claims are made that the decisions 
should be made scientifically. However, when there are many 
parameters involved with complex issues, it becomes clear that 
values guide the relative significance of the different parameters. 
Take a simple example of buying a car: usually this involves a 
trade-off between cost and performance, with different people 
choosing different trade-offs depending on their inclinations. 
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With complex issues, such as nuclear power or Bt brinjal, there is 
a need to make multiple trade-offs, so that the overall analysis is 
based on the judgment of the relative importance of the various 
factors. Therefore, one needs to always keep in mind: who pays 
the costs and who reaps the benefits, as these are usually two 
different sets of people. Thus, for example, is it reasonable to 
have asked local villagers near Tarapur nuclear power plants 
to give up their land and possibly their livelihoods so that air-
conditioned malls in Mumbai can operate comfortably; while, at 
the same time, the deprived villages in the vicinity of the power 
plants continue to suffer about 8 hours of power shutdown 
everyday (lokraj.org.in)? 
Human Development and Consumption: Over the last several 
decades, there has been a substantial push for economic growth 
worldwide, and the term GDP (gross domestic product) has 
become common usage. The term GDP has become conflated with 
development, and also consumption, with many suggestions of 
a correlation between GDP and energy consumption. About two 
decades ago, a human development index (HDI) was developed 
in recognition that life expectancy together with literacy and 
education also contributed to human development, apart from 
economic growth (hdr.undp.org, 2010); HDI varies between 
~0.3 and 0.95, with higher values being desirable (thewatt.com). 
Figure 2 shows the variation in HDI with per capita energy 
consumption for 60 countries. There are several other figures 
with different energy factors and units, but the general trend of a 
saturation is still maintained.
Such approaches have an important bearing on nuclear 
power, as energy planning is based on presumed growth 
of GDP over the next two to four decades; clearly, assumed 
linkages between GDP growth and energy consumption drive 
current policies for power production. The data in Figure 
2 indicate broadly that there is a saturation in HDI of ~0.9 to 
0.95 around a per-capita energy consumption of 2,400 kg oil 
equivalent (kgo e), so that an energy consumption of 2,400 kgo 
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e may be a desirable number. There are at least two important 
problems with this approach. (a) First, HDI is based on a mixture 
of contribution of some factors; limitations to the approach 
include the consideration of only a few factors relating to human 
development, and also the mathematical procedure adopted to 
come up with a single number. Indeed, the factors included in 
calculating HDI were modified last year, and the new approach 
gives HDI values that are lower than the older procedure. (b) 
Second, Figure 2 suggests that India would need to increase 
energy consumption by a factor of ~5 to increase its HDI from 
~0.62 to ~0.9. However, the data also shows that there are 
countries with ~600 kgo e energy consumption having an HDI of 
~0.8 to 0.82. This analysis suggests that an energy consumption 
increase of less than a factor of ~2 could suffice in obtaining a 
high HDI of 0.8 to 0.85.1 Essentially, the vertical spread of the 
data at any energy consumption could be termed the elasticity 
of HDI, representing conditions where an increase in HDI is not 
related to an increase in energy consumption; for example, at 
the vertical line of 2,400 kgo e, HDI varies from ~0.68 to 0.92. 
Extending the figure to consider all countries, instead of only 60, 
will probably lead to an increase in elasticity. It is interesting to 
note also that further increase in energy consumption beyond 
2,400 kgo e does not lead to any significant increase in HDI; 
while Hong Kong and USA have a similar HDI of ~0.93, USA 
consumes almost three times as much of energy per capita as 
does Hong Kong.
An increase in energy consumption by a factor of ~2 for 
India to get to an HDI of ~0.8 to 0.85 would lead to drastically 
different plan for power generation compared to one involving 
an increase in consumption by a factor of ~5; this may also reduce 
the justification for nuclear power plants. It is also important to 
bear in mind that projections beyond a couple of decades may be 
1 The equitable distribution of the available energy is an important but differ-
ent matter. Energy policies are frequently justified as necessary to provide 
electricity to the rural areas, although this is likely to be a minor factor in the 
overall energy consumption. 
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meaningless in the current technological climate with frequent 
new developments and possibilities for significant paradigm 
changes.
Figure 2. Variation in Human Development Index (HDI) with energy consumption 
showing a plateau in HDI (thewatt.com). The horizontal orange arrow suggests 
incorrectly that India will need to increase its energy consumption by a factor 
of ~5; the vertical black arrow at an energy consumption of 2400 kgo e/person 
reflects the elasticity in HDI, suggesting the possibility of an increase in HDI 
without any increase in energy consumption.
Alternatives to Nuclear Power: If nuclear power is not 
considered seriously due to the perceived risks and the lack of 
public acceptability, it is necessary to examine alternatives. It is 
appropriate to first utilize existing energy resources optimally. 
Currently, nuclear energy contributes ~3% of the total energy 
needs, and even with a substantial expansion over the next two 
decades, it is projected to contribute only 6% to India’s energy 
needs (planningcommission.nic.in). India’s current transmission 
and distribution losses for electricity are more than ~25% 
compared to values of ~5 to 10% globally. Clearly, a decrease in 
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such losses towards global levels will lead to substantial energy 
becoming available. Conservation of energy and enhanced 
energy efficiency can also increase available energy effectively. 
Note that dire consequences of large-scale power outages in 
Japan following Fukushima did not materialize, with a focussed 
effort towards energy conservation and efficiency.
Nuclear power has generally been considered to be cheaper 
than renewable energy from sources such as solar. However, this 
may largely have been a result of some creative accounting. As noted 
elsewhere, even in the ‘50s and ‘60s, British nuclear proponents 
had cooked up data to show that nuclear power was at that time 
cheaper than coal power (bbc.co.uk, 2011). With unusual candor, 
the British energy Secretary Huhne noted recently that nuclear 
power has been amongst the most costly failure of British policy-
making, with payments of £2 billion per year being made currently 
for power that was used decades ago; surprisingly, he supports new 
nuclear power stations without any public subsidies (independent.
co.uk) A very recent study has shown that solar energy will be 
cheaper than nuclear energy in two locations where nuclear plants 
are being considered in USA (ucsusa.org). Furthermore, there have 
been frequent time and cost over-runs in upcoming power plants, 
which would also favor alternative renewable energy sources. It is 
relevant to note that renewable power projects may also need to 
deal with issues relating to availability of land and other factors, 
for large solar farms as an example.
Closing Comments
It is clear that the linkages between society, science and 
public policy need to be reworked, so that society becomes 
intimately involved with both science and public policy, as 
shown in Figure 3. Questioning of science by the public does 
not warrant an anti-science label, just as societal desire for 
partnership and involvement in public policy should not be seen 
as being anti-constitutional. Gone are the days when leading 
authorities in Science or Public Policy can declare truths and 
directions for society to follow. 
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While scientific expertise is essential in providing some 
answers and directions for the future, it is clear that society 
wants to be, and needs to be, involved in shaping public policies 
that may entail scientific issues. 
Figure 3.  Illustration of desirable inter linkages between society, science and 
public policy.
There is sufficient information available to understand 
public apprehensions regarding nuclear power; open 
communication from nuclear bodies is essential, but it may not 
be sufficient to bridge the trust deficit. Plans for massive nuclear 
power installations based on projections for over four decades 
are not merited, as the projections may not be valid. Furthermore, 
there are sufficient alternatives available to generate the needed 
energy.
Governments and the nuclear power industry must desist 
from “proclaiming safe” (in opposition to “crying wolf”), as they 
only increase public anxiety and mistrust when the next nuclear 
accident happens. Comparisons of the safety of nuclear power 
plants with crossing a road in urban India or flying on a plane 
are insensitive at best, as the public appears to recognize that 
what is important is the potential for acute and chronic damage 
in case of a catastrophic nuclear accident. It is ironical that the 
conditional support for the nuclear renaissance arising from 
a more serious perceived threat of climate change is likely to 
be reduced, as corporations unwilling to have a longer term 
perspective of global warming have pushed an agenda to sow 
confusion about climate change.
174 
What is Really Real?
Finally, we all have our individual perceptions of risks, and 
on an individual basis we pay the price when reality differs from 
our perception. However, public policy must take into account 
the larger societally perceived risks, especially in a large densely 
populated country like India, without much hope of moving 
large populations in case of a serious accident. Allaying public 
fears and concerns is likely to be difficult, in view of the trust 
deficit arising from historical and contemporaneous approaches 
by the nuclear industry.
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Prof. Parthasarathy: There are many fears associated 
with the nuclear industry: radiation, proliferation, accidents 
etc. Though many industries produce hazardous waste, 
nuclear industry faces the brunt of protests. This is despite the 
development of technology in the nuclear field. This fear has all 
the more increased with the accident at Fukushima. Radiation is 
a subject that has been misunderstood not only by lay persons 
but even by the highly educated. Thus the nuclear regulatory 
body has a responsibility to communicate credibly and be more 
open. 
Due to constant communication journalists who were 
exposed to a lot of information after the Fukushima incident have 
helped few outspoken critics to look at nuclear power benignly. 
Thus with constant communication, pro-nuclear enthusiasts 
may find it a bit easier to change the perception of lay public on 
nuclear power.
Prof. Atul Choksi: Scientists are human and fallible. They 
have vested interests. Hence nuclear risk and uncertainty is not 
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NIAS has organized this very innovative and timely 
Brainstorming Workshop on Public Risk Perception. This is a 
serious problem which has appeared time and again worldwide 
as a conflict between developments based on modern technology 
on the one hand , and the possible hazards introduced by those 
technologies on the other. In India such concerns have arisen in 
different contexts ---our nuclear reactor programs, genetically 
modified crops and even hazards of using cell-phones. All these 
examples carry the common feature that individual members of 
the public (including most of its intelligentsia as well) cannot, on 
their own, assess the risks attendant to these complex technologies 
and have to make a less than fully informed assessment of the 
level of risk and compare it with the benefits.
The problem of Public Risk Perception has many dimensions 
to it, starting from the philosophical social, psychological, political 
and of course technical.  This Workshop has been fortunate in 
having presentations by experts on each of these aspects.  Issues 
discussed, among others, included the distortions caused by 
Chapter 13
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“Blinkers” in theoretical frameworks used in analyzing the 
problem, the knowledge discrepancy between experts and the 
lay man and the increasingly dominant role of the media. The 
sessions were also devoted to a clear pedagogical explanation of 
possible hazards associated with specific examples like nuclear 
energy, GM crops and cell-phone hazards.
The Concluding Panel Discussion was devoted to using the 
insights generated by all these talks to evolving a methodology 
of public debate on risk perception, assessment and intervention. 
To provide a framework for the discussion, the session began 
with enumerating what would be, at the conceptual level, the 
logical steps needed to achieve this goal. These were:
1. First the experts from different interest groups must get 
together to ascertain and agree on the facts. These experts 
would NOT decide policy or choose between alternatives -- 
only bring out the technical facts accompanying any given 
choice. Unless there is some level of agreement on FACTS 
between experts, the public will be prey to exaggerations 
and rumour.
2. Having come to an agreement the experts must educate apex 
policy makers and opinion makers, including bipartisan, 
parliamentary committees, media and NGOs representing 
different affected parties.
3. These opinion makers  then have to hammer out a 
compromise policy taking into account technical, economic 
and  “political acceptability ” factors
4. They then will have to decide whether to continue with 
project, or abandon it,  or delay it.
5. Having come to some consensus, the opinion and policy 
makers must convey a uniform and distilled massage to the 
public. This last part will be very difficult. Ways have to be 
found to communicate down to the affected public  through 




6. All this has to be done well before any agitation starts. 
Investment and   action in that project must be postponed 
till this is done.
It is self evident that this sequence of steps is not totally 
realistic. For this system to work everyone down the chain 
has to be honest.  They should not accept a viewpoint behind 
closed doors and then turn their backs on it outside for political 
expediency. Irrational and pre-conceived notions by the public 
have to be removed without at the same time minimizing any of 
their genuine concerns.
In the real world we live, these ideal pre-requisites don’t 
exist. So these different steps and stages will get intermixed 
and not follow the above logical sequence at all.  Indeed several 
participants in the room pointed out a variety of ways in which 
these different steps will get intermingled, with each step not 
waiting for the earlier ones to finish. The purpose of starting 
out by listing the idealized steps is only to benchmark what is 
needed, so that one can as close to them as possible. 
Some important recommendations made were:
1. Experts must keep in touch with the public regularly and 
gain their confidence.
2. There must be flow of ideas not just from the experts “down” 
to the public but just as importantly from the public to the 
experts bringing out the problems at the ground level.
3. The experts’ discussion should not merely be on the 
technological aspects but equally on social and cultural 
implications.



